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ABSTRACT
Into the nineteenth century most older workers were well inte-
grated into productive activity. Family, property, farming, crafts,
community, and almshouses provided a basis for support throughout life.
It was not expected that people would live out their lives in industrial
employment. Means were developed to deal with the relatively few cases
which were problems. Reduced work, reduced pay, informal gratuities,
and firing were all viable in early industrial employment.
By the late nineteenth century the employment of older workers
had become a problem. "Superannuation in industry" emerged from changes
in the organization and conditions of employment, changes in the charac-
ter of work, increasing dependence on industrial work as lifetime support,
and changing ideas about older people and aging.
Old practices became inadequate. Reduced work and wages were
precluded by integrated production and efficiency criteria, large scale
(less personalized) work organizations, and the notion of a hidden pen-
sion. Informal gratuities were precluded by large scale (less persona-
lized) work organizations. Firing was precluded (as a general means)
because the corporations were not simply free to do as they pleased: there
were reform pressures and the general problem of old age dependence, the
necessity to deal with labor, and a sense of corporate responsibility.
Outside industry new practices were tried but were either inade-
quate or unacceptable. Thrift schemes were acceptable to business but
they did not work. Some unions set up plans. The success of these plans
depended onbig:unions, whose development was opposed by business in some
cases. Union plans were also a source of union strength and worker inde-
pendence (from employers), both of which made the union plans unacceptable.
State plans were proposed and a few set up but much of big business opposed
these plans for fear of state intervention in labor relations and of
socialism.
Within industry there were reasons for business to undertake a
solution. Pensions were consistent with other aspects of corporate con-
cern and practice. Company plans could weaken or prevent unionism. They
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could help stabilize the labor force. They were consistent with other
formal, bureaucratic practices and forms being adopted. They were
consistent with corporate welfare measures the companies were already
applying to these problems.
Company pensions came first to railroading because railroading
led the way in modern corporate industrial forms and problems. Other
industries followed. The context in which these pension plans were set
up and the needs of the corporations are reflected in the plans' provi-
sions.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Fogelson, Professor of History and Urban
Studies
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"Who controls the past," ran the Party slogan, "controls the
future: who controls the present controls the past."
Orthodoxy means not thinking--not needing to think. Orthodoxy
is unconsciousness.
George Orwell, 1984
"You know I hate, detest, and can't bear a lie, not because
I am straighter than the rest of us, but simply because it
appalls me. There is a taint of death, a flavour of mortality
in lies--which is exactly what I hate and detest in the world
--what I want to forget."
Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness
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. . . this fragmentation of the object of production necessarily
entails the fragmentation of its subject. In consequence of the rationali-
sation of the work-process the human qualities and idiosyncrasies of the
worker appear increasingly as mere sources of error when contrasted with
these abstract special laws functioning according to rational predictions.
Neither objectively nor in his relation to his work does man appear as the
authentic master of the process; on the contrary, he is a mechanical part
incorporated into a mechanical system. He finds it already pre-existing
and self-sufficient, it functions independently of him and he has to con-
form to its laws whether he likes it or not.
Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciosness,
trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge, MA:
MIT Press, 1968), pp. 88-91.
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IINTRODUCTION
Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century in the United
States old age pensions in private employment were essentially impossible
to discuss: the conditions of the need for them had not been created and
any employer who routinely paid employees of any age for any reason not
to work would he thought a fool. By the turn of the century private em-
ployers had set up old age pension plans and by 1930 the dominant firms
in major industries (outside agriculture) had adopted plans. Underlying
this change in practice were changing ideas about old age, dependency,
employment, and business, changing practices in employment, property hold-
ing, family structure, relief, and the techniques and organization of pro-
duction, and changing needs and interests of business, workers, the un-
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employed, the dependent, the aged. How did these changes in ideas, prac-
tice, and needs and interests constitute a context for and shape the
introduction of old age pensions in private employment?
While this question is--to some of us--quite fascinating in itself,
it is of particular interest in this decade, when, as in the 1920s, the
welfare of older people and the problems of old age pensions are among the
primary social welfare issues discussed and addressed. Major Congressional
legislation in 1974 ended more than a decade of study of the problems of
old age pensions. That legislation, the Employees' Retirement Income Se-
curity Act, was again a beginning as publicity surrounding the legislation
and mandates issuing from it raised further questions and made more public
the scope and magnitude of the problems. In the context of such.pressing
concerns reflection on the origins of private old age pension practices
might prove insightful.
A century has passed since the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad set
up this country's first formal old age pension plan. In that time old
age income. security provisions for private workers in the United States
have changed considerably. Federal Social Security is perhaps the most
striking development. But within the limited arena of private pensions
much has changed. By 1973 about 46 percent of all full-time private sec-
tor employees were covered by private pension plans. Between 1880 and
World War II the only regulation of pension management came from adminis-
trative regulations of corporate income tax laws. Since the war industry-
wide, union negotiated pension agreements covering workers in basic indus-
tries and major national unions have occasioned further intervention di-
rectly in pension affairs. These reforms have been of two basic kinds:
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reforms to protect the rights of workers and reforms to regulate the
investment of capital.
In 1948 in Inland Steel Company vs. the United Steel Workers,
the National Labor Relations Board declared pensions a mandatory bargain-
ing issue under the Taft Hartley Act. The Supreme Court has ruled that
a pension agreement is an enforceable contract. In 1974 ERISA set stan-
dards for vesting and portability and provided reinsurance for pension
plans through the newly established Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation.
Section 302 of the Taft Hartley Act limited union control over bargained
pension plans and set a standard for fund investment. The Welfare and
Pension Reform Act of 1958 and ERISA in 1974 further restricted investment
of capital. The institutions we have today vary from those set up at the
turn of the century.
Yet it is striking that the problems plaguing workers have been
the same throughout the history of the plans. Almost daily one hears and
reads of injustices which occur in the administration of pension plans,
of the inadequacies in oursystem of old age income provision. An employee's
job is eliminated or he is fired short months before he reaches retirement
eligibility. Upon retiring an employee finds that a two month lapse in
employment ten years before disqualified him for any pension benefit. Two
companies merge; some employees lose jobs and with them pension entitlement;
other employees find their pension fund was lost in the shuffle. A company
goes bankrupt without having set aside funding adequate to meet its pension
obligations. Many jobs--precisely those least secure and lowest paying--
do not have any pension benefits.
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Vesting, portability, income adequacy, and employee rights have
been problems in the structure of private sector pensions from the begin-
ning. Beyond proposing further overlay--technical alterations and legal
protections--to improve these pensions for workers, an historical examina-
tion of the institutions' origins in theUnited States may suggest new
handles on old problems. First, considering origins may uncover struc-
tural considerations not obvious in current policy deliberations. The
circumstances under which an institution begins often involve new rela-
tions which are later taken for granted though they may be of the essence
of the institution. Second, in any historical consideration we put our-
selves in a position to see alternatives: a past that was different and
paths not taken. While the past is not open to us, we are reminded that
different ways of life are possible.
My interest here goes beyond pensions. This story of the begin-
nings of old age pensions in private industry is a story of the creation
of needs where none had existed, the interpretation of felt needs as
social problems, and the response to those needs--interpreted by and met
as interests in the social order. In the following chapters I examine
primarily one interested response, that of business. While this work is
primarily about pensions, it is as well the beginning exploration of ques-
tions about the genesis and bases of needs, their articulation, and their
satisfaction.
The organization of the dissertation follows these concerns. In
chapter 2, I sketch in broad outline material and ideological conditions
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prior to the establishment of old age pensions in private industry, con-
ditions in which consideration of old age pensions was essentially
impossible. Exceptions proved the rule that dependency and employment
were not handled according to one's age. In chapter 3, I analyze super-
annuation in industry, the development of old age as a problem to employ-
ers. Technical developments within industry made older workers undesir-
able. Social developments within industry made it increasingly difficult
for firms to fire undesirable, older workers. In chapter 4, I discuss
the failure of traditional solutions to meet this problem. In chapter 5,
I lay out the major old age income provisions proposed outside industry.
These might have relieved firms of responsibility for older workers but
for various reasons were unacceptable to business in general. Focussing
particularly on railroading and iron and steel in chapter 6, I discuss
business motivations for adopting company pension plans. In chapter 7,
I describe the plans which were set up and which reflect the context and
interests which gave them rise.
In beginning this work the question of how to proceed was not an
easy one to answer. The sources were, I was warned, probably hard to find
-- if, indeed, they existed and were accessible. The usual historical
guides to archives, documents, periodicals, and secondary sources were my
starting place. Current secondary sources--primarily histories of the
period--provided further leads. I also consulted the period's secondary
literature, which was for me primary material.
Given excellent local libraries I pursued secondary sources
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freely. Primary sources I chose on the basis of accessibility and rich-
ness, evaluated through collection descriptions and conversations. I
consulted the papers of the National Civic Federation and the American
Association for Labor Legislation, two major organizations whose interests
included old age pensions in the early decades of this century. Their
papers were easily accessible and promised to be rich; they were. The
U. S. Department of Labor historian's office subject files turned up
very little though the Department's library holds many useful secondary
sources as well as copies of many early pension plans. The bulk of
federally maintained documents on old age pensions is in the papers of
the Commission on Economic Security, which drafted national social security
legislation. The papers of the U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations
(1913-1915) also provided some useful material, as did other government
industrial and labor investigations of the time. My focus was on business
but my purpose was to get a broad view. For this reason and since their
usefulness was dubious I did not consult the few individual business
archives which I learned might contain papers on pensions. Likewise, I
did not consult the papers of individuals active in the movement for old age
pensions nor did I consult union collections, except for newspapers.
The examples I use were chosen from many. In many cases the choice
was quite arbitrary, there being numerous similar examples. In some cases
examples were chosen for being incisive--clear and succinct though not
exceptional. I chose railroading and iron and steel as the industry cases
on which to focus because they were early examples to other industries,
they exemplify somewhat different circumstances, and they are accessible
14
-- the subjects of considerable documentation at the turn of the century.
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II
EXCEPTIONS PROVE THE RULES:
OLD AGE SUPPORT THROUGH THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
Until the twentieth century age was not a primary determinant
of employment or dependency in the United States. For the most part,
physical capacity, property holdings, family status, and community
setting determined one's productive role and economic welfare.
In the colonial United States the elderly participated in a
system of interdependence based on property and familiarity. Without
regard to age those in need were supported in households by family and
community. In the Jacksonian period, the almshouse replaced outdoor
relief. The major institution for relief of dependents through the
nineteenth century, almshouse relief was administered without regard
to age.
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Industrial work was not lifetime work through most of the
nineteenth century. Usually, those workers who did not leave of their
own accord were fired when their productive powers waned for any reason.
By the closing decades of the century some firms assumed responsibility
toward long term employees. Reduced work and retirement gratuities
were arranged informally. Some unions made formal provisions for
reduced work or reduced pay rates. In these company and union provisions,
age itself was not primary. The person's waning productive capacity
and his long service were the bases of exception and provision.
In the colonial United States family, property, and community
provided economic security for the older members of families and commu-
nities. Land ownership was widespread. In an agrarian economy based
largely on independent farms, most people worked until they died.
Craftsmen as well as farmers worked the land and were bound to it. With
land and the skills to keep a farm, older people could subsist by their
own labor. Land was not the only property. A craftsman's tools could
provide subsistence employment in his later years.1
The family was the primary unit of production and social life.
As the prime welfare institution, the family cared for the aged as well
1Throughout this section I draw on community studies of the colo-
nial United States. John Demos, A Little Commonwealth: Family Life in
the Plymouth Colony (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970); Philip
J. Greven, Jr., Four Generations: Population, Land and Family in Colonial
Andover, Massachusetts (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1970);
Kenneth A. Lockridge, A New England Town: The First Hundred Years (New
York: W. W.- Norton and Company, Inc., 1970).
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as the poor and disabled. The family must produce a subsistence but
how production was distributed and carried out among family members
varied according to circumstance. 2
Small scale agricultural production dominated the economy well
into the nineteenth century. People generally worked and supported them-
selves until death in the varying family context. On family farms work
was in some sense perpetual. At the same time, productive activity
encompassed interruption and alteration by diverse factors. Work varied
by season. Over the course of the day the predominant activity might
be interrupted by the repair of a tool, a conversation with a neighbor,
or the instruction of a youth. The farm family worked primarily for
itself. The day's activities--productive and non-productive, domestic
and commercial--were intermixed. A variety of activity and pace filled
every day, season, year, and lifetime. The work of craftsmen, most of
whom were farmers as well, included similar variation, particularly if
they carried on business at home. The length of the day varied greatly,
from virtually no work in a slack season to constant labor when demand
was great. With a large degree of control over his work a person chose
his pace and tasks according to his capacity. Old age was a continuation
of what had gone before. Except for illness or other incapacity there
was virtually no idea of retirement.3
2Demos, A Little Commonwealth, pp. 50, 80-81, 183-84; Greven, Four
Generations, pp. 136-38, 142-58; Lockridge, A New England Town, pp. 57-78.
3Demos, ibid., p. 174-78. There are two notable exceptions of
retirement. Those in whom judgment was considered crucial, for example,
judges and clergymen, were sometimes retired on pensions in extreme cir-
cumstances. The other exception are the wealthy, who were said to [cont.]
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Land, the basis of the economy, was also a basis of family inter-
dependence. The family was the primary institution for owning, using,
and distributing property. Children were expected to care for the elderly
no longer able to care for themselves. The basis of this responsibility
was manifest in provisions for intergenerational care. For example,
it was common that a man will his house to a son whose inheritance was
contingent upon care of his widowed mother. Sometimes property was left
to the widow to ensure the children's continued devotion to her needs.
Occasionally a man retired on the social security of a child whose land
holding was conditioned on the support of his parents. This property
relation engendered a child's continuing loyalty to and dependence on his
parents. For some this meant that independence did not come until well
into middle age. It should be stressed, however, that dependence was
mutual. For example, in 1679 at the death of his father, Joseph Ryder
of the Plymouth Colony threatened to leave his mother unattended if he
was not granted a particular piece of property. Intergenerational
dependence was the basis for the maintenance and inheritance of indepen-
dence.4
Family configurations provided a basis for ongoing mutual support.
Nuclear families quite distinct from those of today formed most house-
holds. Children normally remained at home until marriage. Given patterns
[cont.] retire, for example, when they ceased work at thirty to pursue
avocations or to travel.
4Demos, ibid., pp. 61, 75-81, 103-6, 164-70; Greven, Four Genera-
tions, pp. 62-64, 70-99, 136-37, 142-58;.Lockridge, A New England Town,
pp. 71, 74-75.
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of marriage, birth, and death, an unmarried child might be in the home
until the parents' late sixties, within a few years of death. 5
This family pattern also provided a basis for different ideas
about old age. A family of nine children spaced approximately two years
apart might range from a young child to one about to marry--thereby
assuming a status similar to his or her parents' in another household,
where within a couple of years there might be a child. Along this range
age distinctions were hard to make, as were functional productive dis-
tinctions. There was no generally accepted idea that ages or generations
had separate spheres of activity.6
It is not surprising then that community aid was given without
respect to age. Poor, incapacitated, or without family a person in
need turned to the community, his neighbors. Most towns were relatively
insulated. Church and towns people, among these the local board of
overseers of the poor, responded familiar with one's circumstances.
As an aspect of the divine order--"the poor will always be with us,"
poverty was assumed manageable within the community. Since local re-
sidents dominated the relief lists, virtually all aid was granted without
reference to the distinction between deserving and undeserving poor
sometimes applied to strangers. Outdoor relief--in one's own or a
5Demos, ibid., pp. 57-58, 63, 65-66, 68-69, 133, 139-40, 151;
Greven, ibid., pp. 22-40, 97-98, 103-24; Lockridge, ibid., pp. 66-67,
74-75. Where the extended family did exist it was sometimes precisely
for the care of the elderly. See Greven, p. 138.
6Demos, ibid., pp. 57-58, 68-69, 133, 139-40; Greven, ibid., pp.
22-29, 31-37, 105-7, 117-20, 180-212; Lockridge, ibid., pp. 66-69.
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neighboring household--was the rule. As David Rothman points out, accep-
tance within family and community of dependent citizens kept poverty and
illness from seeming strange. The practices did not distinguish the
elderly, who received aid, like others, when they were ill, without money
or property, or without family. Among one's neighbors" the fact of need
dominated.
Two other alternatives--labor contracting and the almshouse--were
far less frequent resorts. By auction or direct contract with an employer
some towns placed poor persons in jobs for support. Almshouses were few
and mostly in cities. Indoor relief was reserved for extreme cases and
8
strangers, who were not as a rule taken into households.
If New York and Boston are a fair indication, almshouse prac-
tices did not differentiate older people. In New York, the elderly
almshouse residents were infirm or seriously ill. In Boston they were
not simply "ancient"--in their seventies or eighties--but also sick.
Aged widows in the almshouses were sick, without savings, and without
children nearby. The local people among the elderly couples were too
disabled to be kept in a home. For example, both had smallpox or were
over eighty and completely incapacitated. The "strange elderly couples
who stayed for any length of time were still short term residents--both
wife and husband sick and over seventy or both terminally ill.9
7David J. Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum: Social Order and
Disorder in the New Republic (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1971),
pp. 3-29.
8Ibid., pp. 19-35.
9 Ibid., pp. 35-45.
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These patterns of life are no doubt the basis for later appeals
to independence and hard work. But these ways did not last long. As
early as the middle of the seventeenth century some communities began
to disperse. New towns were established. People left for land to the
west. By the 1650s some towns limited population to ensure residents
reasonably sized land rights. In the eighteenth century children increas-
ingly acquired apprenticeship training rather than a land inheritance
since by the third generation family holdings could not support all the
offspring. Social and geographic mobility and the increasing separation
of work from home changed daily life and community structure. While
agriculture continued to dominate, by the War of Independence a bourgeoi-
sie was eager to establish a secure and independent national economy
based in manufacturing. 1 0
New industrial firms provided employment and a demand for factory
labor in the east. After 1820 the farmers of New England found it in-
creasingly difficult to compete with large western producers. Several
alternatives were open to them. Some continued on-farms and engaged in
domestic manufacture. Daughters went to the factories for temporary
employment until marriage. In some cases whole families relocated to
the town or engaged in factory work. The other major option was the move
west 11
1 0Demos, A Little Commonwealth, pp. 9-11, 120, 187-88; Greven, Four
Generations, pp. 155-71; Lockridge, A New England Town, pp. 9, 94-116.
1 1George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860,
The Economic History of the United States, vol. 4 (New York: Rinehart,
1951), pp. 266-67.
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Still, throughout most of the nineteenth century few workers
grew old in industrial employment nor did they depend on it to provide
for old age. Industrial work was not lifetime work. After a few years
in a factory one returned to farming or a trade. Many immigrants who
worked in industry returned to Europe after a few years.12
Community support remained the recourse for those poor or dis-
abled without family to provide for them, but after the War with England
assistance shifted from household to almshouse. By the 1820s the social
hierarchy, family structure, property relations, and religious and ethnic
homogeneity which bound colonial society were gone. Eighteenth century
outdoor relief was no longer viable given increasing geographic mobility
and the dispersion of families. As the portion of strangers in need of
relief increased, almshouses became more popular. Particularly between
1820 and 1840 smaller towns and rural counties constructed institutions. 1 3
By the Civil War the last resort of the eighteenth century domi-
nated public and private relief. Segregated into almshouses, poverty
became unfamiliar. Ideas about it changed. Two contradictory theories
explained poverty.
The poor, no longer neighbors, were subject to judgment. The
worthy, hardworking citizen struck by misfortune, the orphan, and the
disabled were distinguished from the unworthy poor--lazy, shiftless,
12W. Andrew Achenbaum, Old Age in the New Land: The American
Experience since 1790 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978),
pp. 68-74.
1 3Rothman, The Discovery of the Asylum, pp. 180-89.
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imprudent, transient. While in the eighteenth century the dominance
of relief to neighbors made this distinction ineffectual, in the nine-
teenth century the image of the stranger rendered it insidious. On guard
against abuses, critics of the relief system judged the disabled careless
and the elderly poor improvident. That individual failure caused
poverty was clear to those who argued that in the new republic abundant
land and scarce labor meant opportunity for all. Outdoor relief indulged
failure. The almshouse was an institution of reform. 1 4
While the notion of worth was used to blame the poor for poverty,
by the 1820s and 1830s it was also regarded as a social problem. The
poor did not cause depressions nor was all employment voluntary. The
society itself seen as the source of pauperism, the almshouse--unlike
outdoor relief--protected individuals from the temptations of life in
the community.1 5
Following earlier almshouse practice, older residents were not
distinguished by age so much as by disability or poverty.16
Despite formal reports and casual observations beginning as
early as the 1830s that the almshouses were decrepit, inadequate, and
poorly administered, this indoor relief dominated throughout the nine-
teenth century.17
1 4Ibid., pp. 155-65.
1 5Ibid., pp. 165-72. The social theory of poverty which says
that the poor need to be protected from vice also implicitly blames the
poor, saying that they are poor because they are weak.
1 6Ibid., pp. 202-5.
17Ibid., pp. 189-202.
24
In the small shops of the nineteenth century informality and
paternalism were the rule. Small scale production carried out by a few
employees under the owners' supervision made for familiarity and obliga-
tion. The employer was not always free to turn out or even to alter
the work arrangements of an unwanted, incapacitated, or otherwise
"depreciated" employee.
An example of this relation is found in Melville's Bartleby, the
Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street, first published in 1853. The narrator,
a lawyer, describes Turkey, a copyist in his employ. "Turkey was a short,
pursy Englishman of about my own age--that is, somewhere not far from
sixty." In the morning an exemplary workman, in the afternoon Turkey was
"reckless, and sadly given to making blots."
. . . some days, he went further, . . . He made an
unpleasant racket with his chair; spilled his sand-
box; in mending his pens, impatiently split them
all to pieces, and threw them on the floor in a
sudden passion; stood up, and leaned over his table,
boxing his papers about in a most indecorous manner,
very sad to behold in an elderly man like him.
On a Saturday, the lawyer suggested to Turkey, "now that he was growing
old it might be well to abridge his labors." Turkey responded asserting
his importance to the office. When the lawyer referred to the afternoon
blots, Turkey replied,
"True; but with submission, sir, behold these hairs!
I am getting old. Surely, sir, a blot or two of a
warm afternoon is not to be severely urged against
gray hairs. Old age--even if it blot the page--is
honorable. With submission, sir, we both are getting
old."
This appeal to my fellow-feeling was hardly to be
resisted. At all events, I saw that go he would not.
So, I made up my mind to let him stay, resolving,
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nevertheless, to see to it that, during the afternoon,
he had to do with my less important papers.18
The industrialization of the nineteenth century entailed the
growth of workplaces, supervision by managers rather than owners, and
the increasing anonymity of urban living. Under these conditions the
familiarity and obligation Melville depicts became less common. In
early industrial concerns the breakdown of paternalism was not met.
In most industrial employment through the nineteenth century
workers left of their own accord, not considering it lifetime activity.
For the rest, most firms were normally free to fire a worker when he
became undesirable for any reason. Firing, like colonial outdoor relief
and the Jacksonian almshouse, took no notice of age. At the same time,
firing was harshest on older workers, who were least apt to find new
employment competing with younger people for jobs.
In cotton manufacture, for example, until the 1850s no pensions
or compensation were provided for workers disabled or slowed down by
age.19 Companies assumed no responsibility for these workers' difficul-
ties, which were not seen as industrial problems and which were handled
by the almshouse and other traditional means. At mid-century employers
varied in their views and practices regarding welfare and employment.
1 8Herman Melville, Bartleby, the Scrivener: A Story of Wall Street,
in Great Short Works of Herman Melville, ed. Warner Berthoff (New York:
Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 41-43.
1 9 Caroline F. Ware, The Early New England Cotton Manufacture: A
Study in Industrial Beginnings (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1931;
reprint ed., New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1966), p. 289.
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Paternalism was the practice at Lowell where various informal arrangements
were made on an individual basis. In Fall River laissez-faire was the
rule. An agent is quoted as having said in 1855,
. . I regard my work-people just as I regard my
machinery. So long as they can do my work for what
I choose to pay them, I keep them, getting out of
them all I can. What they do or how they fare out-
side my walls I don't know, nor do I consider it my
business to know. When my machines get old and use-
less, I reject them and get new, and these people
are part of my machinery.20
Workers were fired when no longer of adequate use to employers.
With a supply of available labor, employers looked for the most coopera-
tive and efficient employees. The responsibilities derived from familia-
rity and traditional practice no longer had force. In 1868 John Douglas,
President of the Illinois Central Railroad, wrote to R. H. McClellan, an
Illinois attorney,
we can only employ men who hold their places so
long as our interests are subserved and cannot permit
the tenure by which places are held to be dependent
to any extent upon antecedent obligations.2 1
Railroad employers often responded harshly to disruptive workers
without respect to age or future prospects. Anticipating a strike by
20
Quoted from Mass. S. Doc. No. 21, 1868, p. 23, in Norman Ware,
The Industrial Worker 1840-1860: The Reaction of American Industrial
Society to the Advance of the Industrial Revolution (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1964), pp. 76-77.
2 1Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business
Mind in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), appen-
dix, p. 316, John Douglas, president, Illinois Central, to R. H. McClellan,
attorney, 4 June 1868. The great resource in Cochran's book is the appen-
dix, which excerpts correspondence among the railraod executives during
1845-1890. The correspondence is taken from railroad presidents' official
correspondence. I cite this appendix frequently.
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the Locomotive Engineers in 1872, John Henry Devereaux, General Manager
of the Lake Shore and Southern Michigan Railroad, said in a letter to
Horace F. Clark, President of the road,
And I also notified the Committee yesterday that (such
as I should personally regret it) I would proceed to
discharge every man on the Buffalo Division who con-
tinued to foment, and cause a disturbance as had been
carried on the last six weeks. Justice had been done,
and discipline would be maintained. It would be a sad
thing for some of the old white-haired Engineers of
the Buffalo Division to be thrown out of work, but I
told the Committee I should strike with an unsparing
hand, if I was forced to strike, if it took every
Engineer who was in the Division.22
In 1912 an article in The Miners Magazine, publication of the
Western Federation of Miners, complained that firing older workers, in
particular, was inhumane since they were without support and unlikely
to be rehired. Critical of military and jurists' pensions, the article
said judges and military officers should have saved for old age--having
had the luxuries of life while workers had not. The worker outside these
and the civil service pension systems, it said,
. . . is relegated to the junk pile with less
consideration than is accorded to the worn-out tools
with which he once produced the means of life. 23
While firing was the common practice, by the close of the nine-
teenth century many workers spent their lives in industrial employment
and firms accommodated some long term employees no longer able to work
at full pace or volume. In Europe formal government and private retire-
2 2Ibid., appendix, p. 314, John Henry Devereaux, general manager,
Lake Shore and Southern Michigan Railroad, to Horace F. Clark, president,
23 August 1872.
2 3
"Equal Before the Law," The Miners Magazine 12 (18 January 1912):
5.
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ment pension plans were being adopted but in the United States employers
did not consider formal pensions appropriate or necessary. Informal
practices were maintained well into the twentieth century.
Some workers who became unable to continue at their jobs due to
some disability attendant upon old age--the disability perhaps just re-
duced productivity--were transferred to jobs "in which they [were] capable
of serving."24 Such jobs paid less and were presumably less strenuous.
Reduced work made possible continued employment for the older worker and
his replacement by a younger, more efficient worker. Such altered work
arrangements depended to some degree on familiarity in a relatively small
business and on the employer's sense of responsibility.
Even some firms which enforced severe maximum hiring age limits
made provisions for workers grown old in the company's employ. For exam-
ple, a company producing plows, barrows, cultivators, and corn planters
just after the turn of the century made special arrangements for long-
term employees.
No, we do not employ even middle-aged men for
permanent positions, but if a man grows old in our
employ we give him something to do; not at his
trade, of course, but something. 2 5
Reduced employment was the employer's acknowledgement of responsibility
and of the worker's need. But age or incapacity alone was not the
basis of the obligation. Lighter employment was an alternative to firing
2 4Emory R. Johnson, "Railway Departments for the Relief and Insu-
rance of Employes," Annals of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 6 (November 1895):428.
25U. S. Commissioner of Labor, Regulation and Restriction of
Output, Eleventh Special Report (1904), p. 205.
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an employee who had given long service.
In 1907 the Lobdell Car Wheel Company of Wilmington, Delaware,
was among those companies which transferred older employees to easier
jobs.
Our company has no PensimnPlan, or Superannuation
Fund, other than our policy to continue in our
service at some light employment, all our employees
when they become incapacitated for regular work.26
Two years later in December 1909 William Lobdell wrote to Gertrude Beeks
of the National Civic Federation elaborating his company's policy with
older workers.
* . . strictly speaking we have no pension plan in
operation at our works. We have quite a number of
old employees who are not capable of performing a
full day's work, to whom we assign light work such
as they are able to perform. Our experience is that
it is better for them in every way to be employed
than to be unemployed, and drawing a weekly stipend.
A self-respecting:man would rather return some equi-
valent for monies received than be a pensioner, un-
less he had been engaged in some hazardous occupa-
tion for which he had not been equitably compensated.
A general pension payment irrespective of character
of service rendered and length of time employed is
a premium for idleness and inefficiency.28
2 6William W. Lobdell, Letter to Gertrude Beeks, 16 March 1907,
NCF Papers, Box 113, file: Lobdell Car Wheel Company, Wilmington, Dela-
ware, NYPL.
2 7The National Civic Federation was a business organization which
included members from labor and "the public." Founded in 1900 the NCF
stood in opposition to socialists and radicals among workers and reformers
and the "anarchists," i.e., laissez-faire advocates, among businessmen.
For the NCF's role in pensions, see p. 106-13.
2 8William Lobdell, Letter to Gertrude Beeks, 22 December 1909,
NCF Papers, Box 85, file: Old Age Dependence and Pensions, General Cor-
respondence B, NYPL.
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Lobdell held common opinions in thinking of pensions as degrading
to the pensioner and inefficient for the firm. Many workers and employers
alike regarded pensions as charity. Like outdoor relief, they were a
sign of the person's failure at independence and self-sufficiency. At
the same time, reduced employment acknowledged the worker's dependence
on the firm.
Employers regarded pensions as inefficient in two ways. First,
pensions were payments for idleness, payments on which the firm received
no return. Second, pensions were thought to encourage wastefulness
and inefficiency. Employees anticipating a pension would not save for
old age or produce for the employer's favor.
In 1907 French of Smith, Kline and French Company wrote,
. . . we do not have a Pension Plan or Superannuation
Fund. The writer does not recollect, however, any
employee ever having been discharged for age except
by death. 2 9
That a principal of the company would have personal knowledge of such
matters is an indication of the company's size and organization at the
time--small enough to practice individual paternalism and to absorb
age variation. While Smith, Kline and French might have transferred
older employees, the drug company's production process--not a heavy
mechanical process--may not have required such adjustments.
Formal pensions were generally unacceptable throughout the nine-
2 9French, Letter to Gertrude Beeks, 15 March 1907, NCF Papers,
Box 114, file: Smith., Kline and French Company, NYPL.
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teenth century but by 1900 some companies informally pensioned a few
employees. Considered the usual response of industrial concerns,30 these
informal pensions were called "gratuities," in reference to their grant
and tenure: they were in all ways gratuitous. Very few workers received
gratuities. Entirely at employer discretion, lump sum benefits or
periodic payments were arbitrarily granted at any time--even after a
worker had left the company's employ for some years and perhaps suffered
hardship--and were sometimes revoked. These informal pensions varied
according to the employee's standing with the firm--his job, wage, service
record--and his need, often known or easily learned. All pension and
compensation allowances were given under the direction of company
officers at the recommendation of superintendents and managers.31
The Remington Arms and Ammunition Company and the Remington Type-
writer Company had no pension rules in 1906 but did grant gratuities. Only
a few employees received them.
Each case is decided on its own merits, depending
entirely upon the value to us of the service ren-
dered by the person interested and upon the circum-
stances generally. In some instances we go so far
as to retire a man on full pay; in others we make
the pension half the amount of a man's former salary
and so on. 3 2
3 0
"Report of Special Investigation of Employees Betterment and
Welfare Features," October 1910, p. 10, NCF Papers, Box 114, file: Sherwin
Williams, NYPL.
3 1For example, see Cochran, Railroad Leaders, appendix, p. 389,
H. B. Ledyard, president, Michigan Central to W. H. Barnes, general mana-
ger, Boston and Albany, 12 January 1885.
3 2Mae E. Orr, Letter to Gertrude Beeks, 20 July 1906, NCF Papers,
Box 114, file: Remington Arms and Ammunition Company, Remington Type-
writer Company, New York, NYPL. The motto printed on the Remington Sta-
tionery is "To Save Time Is to Lengthen Life."
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In 1907 the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company
(New York Central Lines), though it had no regular pension plan, "pen-
sion[ed] a great many of [its] old employees. Sherwin Williams Company
had pensioners but no definite pension plan. 3 Saks and Company likewise
preferred treating employees individually. 3 5
The records of the United States Railroad Administration offer
evidence of these informal practices. While under federal jurisdiction
some of the railroad companies, which had informally pensioned employees,
continued to do so, petitioning the Railroad Administration for regula-
tions. For example, in May 1918 an officer of the Chicago, Milwaukee,
and St. Paul Railway Company wrote to R. H. Aishton, Regional Director
of Western Railroads, asking whether certain allowances which had been
made for retired officers might be continued. 3 6
Also in 1918 the Texas and Pacific Railway requested leave to
pension E. C. Tucker, a sixty-seven year old carpenter who had served
3 3John Carstensen, Vice President, Letter to Gertrude Beeks,
19 March 1907, NCF Papers, Box 113, file: New York Central Lines, New
York Central and Hudson River Rail Road Company, NYPL.
3 4
"Report of Special Investigation of Employees Betterment and
Welfare Features," October 1910, p. 10, NCF Papers, Box 114, file: Sherwin
Williams, NYPL.
3 5L. L. Deaver, "Saks and Company/New York City/Report Upon Con-
dition of Employes and Recommendations for Improvement by Employees'
Welfare Department, the National Civic Federation," 24 April 1913, NCF
Papers, Box 114, file: Saks and Company, NYPL.
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Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company, Letter to R. H.
Aishton, 7 May 1918, USRA, file R-28-6, part 1, Record Group 14, National
Archives, Washington, D.C. Discrimination was common. Even where formal
pensions were established, officers, employees in higher positions, or
skilled versus unskilled were favored in practice.
33
the road since 1872. In support of the request J. L. Lancaster, federal
manager of the road, offered information on, among other things, Tucker's
family, income, property, and employability, saying that his son was
unable to support him, that his only property was his home, that he had
no income, and that there was no job he could hold with the company.
This informal pension was argued from the failure of traditional supports.
These company practices--firing, light employment, and gratuities
--were complemented in some occupations by union regulations for reduced
work and pay rates.
In cases where skill was important and where unions wielded in-
fluence over the distribution of work, if not over the work process it-
self, some older workers were paid lower rates for their work according
to their productivity. At the turn of the century the Iron Molder's [sic]
Union of North America allowed lower wages for older workers. In an
agreement between the Solid Steel Casting Company of Chester, Pennsylva-
nia, and the Iron Moulder's [sic] Union No. 313, a minimum wage of $3 per
day was set for ten hours of work. Molders unable to perform the average
day's work because of age or physical disability were free to work for
rates below the minimum provided that the deviation was agreeable to the
individual molder and the shop committee.3 8
37J. L. Lancaster, Letter to B. F. Bush, 10 August 1918, USRA,
file R-28-6, part 1, Record Group 14, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
3 8U. S. Commissioner of Labor, Regulation and Restriction of
Output, p. 173. Such deviations were also provided for a limited time
for apprentices not yet fully competent to perform the average day's
work. Ibid., pp. 174-76.
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The building trades had established minimum wages but some of
the unions allowed workers who could not do full work because of age or
disability to work for less than the union rate. The Brotherhood of
Painters, Decorators, and Paper Hangers of America was among these unions.
The Brotherhood's constitution provided honorary membership for those
disqualified from full membership because of physical condition or age.
Honorary members could work for less than the standard wage.39
The Journeyman Stonecutter's Association had a similar provision.
Stonecutters over fifty years of age physically unable to earn the stan-
dard were issued exempt cards as evidence that they were allowed to work
for less. A union committee regulated the wages of those issued exempt
cards. In printers' locals older workers who were below average in
efficiency were allowed to work below the union time rate.40
Unions with reduced rate arrangements for aged or disabled workers
had relative strength and control over the labor process in industries
which depended on skill. At the same time, allowing reduced rates
bolstered union membership by securing employment for those who might
otherwise be unemployed. Weaker unions could not provide such employment.
Unions with less control over the labor process, if they could demand
provisions for variation, could not define the nature and extent of
variation. Workers in industries requiring less skill or no skill had
3 9 Ibid., pp. 268, 324.
Ibid., pp. 268, 343; Lloyd Ulman, The Rise of the National Trade
Union: The Development and Significance of Its Structure, Governing Insti-
tutions, and Economic Policies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University
Press, 1955), p. 481.
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no basis for their demand. In some cases automation precluded variation
as a technical matter.
Provisions for variation from the set wage indicated both union
strength and weakness. The unions controlled variation from the rates,
determining both who was eligible and what the alternative arrangement
would be. This discretion was a manifestation of the union's power with-
in the shop. At the same time, varying wage rates according to indivi-
dual productivity was an assertion of the employer's desire to extract
the maximum value from each worker's labor. Underlying the necessity for
deviation was the notion that productivity is an individual attribute
and an attribute of individuals. Measuring the variation in output among
individuals allows finer choice among productive levels of labor input
and allows payments to labor to fit more closely a maximum level of ex-
ploitation.
Reduced rates were an implicit control exercized by the unions
over the employment and discharge of workers. Without these provisions
an older worker could be fired or switched to another job. With them
unions were able to keep members on the job. Replacing older workers
with younger workers could mean increased production for the employer.
The union's discretion to require the employment of an older, less pro-
ductive than average worker, was interpreted by capital, quite correctly,
as a restriction and control over output, a restriction on capital's
discretion to control the level of output and the "intensity of exer-
tion." 41 While capital's objective was economic maximization for gain,
41
U. S. Commissioner of Labor, Regulation and Restriction of Out-
put, pp. 20-22.
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labor's objectives in restricting this maximum were economic subsistence
and union security.
The waiting list was an extension of these forms of worker con-
trol and discretion in the placement and payment of older workers.
Strong unions maintained waiting lists from which firms were required
to hire as the need arose. The firm did not have the discretion to
choose among workers according to their efficiency. The waiting list
compelled the employer to take and retain workers considered old or
inefficient. 42
While union strength was required for wage rates and the waiting
list, the strongest unions, among them the Compositors, Bricklayers,
and Molders, protected members, including older workers, but did not
contest the freedom of employers to hire and fire, except in matters of
union activity and membership. These unions had established union shops
by the turn of the century and did not suffer the threat of non-union
workers in their midst.4 3
Through most of the history of the United States dependency and
employment were not matters of age. Even the late nineteenth and early
twentieth century practices just discussed--firing, gratuities, and
reduced work and rates--were explicitly directed toward work capacity
and disability as distinct from age itself. By the first decade of this
37
42id.
4 3 Ibid.
century older people were defined as a distinct dependent population.
In the most advanced sectors of industry employers considered older
workers a problem.
In chapter 3 I will discuss this new problem--superannuation in
industry.
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III
THE BURDEN OF OLD AGE:
SUPERANNUATION IN INDUSTRY
By the first decade of the twentieth century the employment and
support of older people was an expressed social problem. "Old age
dependency" and "superannuation in industry"--the specific articulations
of this problem--were two aspects of the same condition. A generation
had aged in the context of industrial production. Many of them were de-
pendent on wage labor and corporate capital. Without property, skill,
or support, these people constituted a drag on the machine of the economy.
Outside industry older people without savings, property, skills adequate
to subsistence, or support grew to be an increasing portion of those de-
pendent on charity and community welfare institutions. Their number grew
large enough that they were seen in a separate category of dependence.
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Within industry although only a small portion of workers were over sixty-
five years of age--only a small portion over forty-five in some indus-
tries--those who were over sixty-five were a problem to employers, who
considered themselves stuck with or obligated to superannuated workers
while there was a ready supply of younger, presumably more efficient
workers.
In 1910, three years after its appointment, the Massachusetts
Commission on Old Age Pensions, Annuities, and Insurance reported to the
state legislature. Charged with investigating various forms of old age
income provision and reporting on their advisability and costs, the com-
mission provided the earliest documentation of the "aged poor" and the
extent of old age dependence in the United States.
The commission articulated the problem of superannuation in in-
dustry.
. . . the aged worker is a burden on industry. His
retention in active employment, after he has passed
the limit of his efficiency, means economic waste.
A system of old age pensions has therefore been
advocated as a means of retiring workers at a rea- I
sonable age, and removing this handicap on industry.
Later the report elaborated,
The problem of dealing with the aged employee is
an urgent one in the modern business world. The use
of machinery and the stress of industrial employment
have made it increasingly difficult for aged employees
to holdthe pace. The universal demand nowadays is for
young men. Many concerns refuse to take on inexperi-
enced men over 35 years of age. Moreover, men wear
'Massachusetts, House, Report of the Commission on Old Age Pensions,
Annuities, and Insurance, No. 1400 (Boston: Wright and Potter Printing
Company, 1910), p. 78.
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out faster under the increased strain. What to do with
worn-out workers,--that is the essence of the pension
problem. To carry them on the pay roll at their regu-
lar employment means waste and disorganization of the 2
working force; to turn them adrift is not humane . . .
The need for old age pensions, old age insurance, or some other
form of support for older people was widely discussed among workers,
owners and managers, legislators, and reformers. The need for economic
means is basic but this particular form or expression of that need--that
it attached particularly to older people, that it assumed their-general
exclusion from productive and income-producing activity--was the product
of changes wrought in the nineteenth century.
The nineteenth century witnessed the industrialization of produc-
tion in the United States. Several tendencies broadly characterize basic
changes made over the course of the century. Large scale production,
facilitated by more impersonal, bureaucratic organization and limited
liability corporations, concentrated industry and reduced competition.
New technologies increased the scale of production, replaced labor with
machinery, and degraded skills, increasingly abstracting judgment and
control from the physical process of production.
After 1850 production varied widely. Large mills and small shops
were side by side among other organizations. Some industries were changing
rapidly. As late as the 1840s shoes were produced in cottages. By the
1860s inventions brought a division of labor, mechanization and factories
2lIbid.9 pp. 137-38*.
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to the industry. In the following decade cottage production was gone and
factory machine operators had replaced shoemakers. In the 1890s, glass
was hand-made. In twenty years' time, machines had completely displaced
the glass blowers. The railroad network operating by the 18 70s was the
basis for a national and increasingly urban market.3
Cities changed. In 1850 Paterson, New Jersey was a small city
with a few- silk manufacturing firms. By 1875 there were three locomotive
works and fourteen silk mills. The population had tripled. An increas-
ing portion of the population lived in urban areas. Between 1850 and 1900
the change was from just over 5 percent to about 39 percent.5
Firms grew. With 600 employees the Baldwin Locomotive works was
large in 1850. The firm grew to 3000 workers by 1870 and to over 6000
by 1900. Between 1850 and 1900 the McCormick reaper plant grew from 150
to 4000 employees. In 1916 there were 15,000 employees at McCormick while
the Ford Motor Company works at Highland Park employed 33,000 people.
By 1919 in the northern states between the Mississippi and the Atlantic
three quarters of manufacturing wage earners were in factories employing
over 100 workers; 30 percent were in factories employing over 1000.6
Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., "The Beginnings of 'Big Business' in
American Industry," Business History Review 33 (1959):2; Daniel T. Rogers,
The Work Ethic in Industrial America 1850-1920 (_Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 23.
Rogers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America, p. 23.
5U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, vol. 1 (Washington,
D.C., 1975), Series A 172-94, pp. 22-23.
6Rogers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America, pp. 23-24.
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Employment changed. Increasingly, people looked to factories for
lifetime employment. Dependence on industrial wage labor was accompanied
by the demise of independent agricultural production, which had been a
source of security in old age. Farm land was less widely distributed;
population more concentrated in urban areas. New technologies and large-
scale production created a farm surplus which lowered prices enough so
that making a living on the land was increasingly difficult. 7
In 1820 over 70 percent of workers were employed in agriculture.
By 1850 the percentage dropped to about 64 and by 1900 to only about 37
percent. Meanwhile, in manufacturing and mechanical occupations between
1820 and 1900 employment increased from 12 to 27 percent; in trade and
transportation from 2.5 to nearly 19 percent; in mining, lumbering, and
fishing from under 1 percent to nearly 2 percent.8 People increasingly
depended on employment by another and, in particular, on factory employment,
as their sole means of support.
By 1880 the nation--integrated socially and economically-was
becoming a fact of daily life. The railroads tied together far spread
cities and towns and ways of life. The firms established between the close
of the Civil War and the turn of the century were national, some even
international, in scope. Labor unions began to make firm ties among
7George Rogers Taylor, The Transportation Revolution, 1815-1860,
The Economic History of the United States, vol. 4 (New York.: Rinehart,
19511, pp. 266-67. See also, Chandler, "The Beginnings of 'Big Business."'
8P. K. Whelpton, "Occupational Groups in the United States, 1820-
1920," Journal of the American Statistical Association 21 (September 1926):
339-340.
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locals, creating the bureaucracies which constituted national organizations.
The federal government became a large, bureaucratic organization through
the proliferation of agencies. The rise of national business, labor,
and government was like the construction of a great machine. Small, self-
sufficient economic units suffered setbacks without much consequence
beyond the particular business or locality but in a nationally-integrated
economy dominated by fewer and larger organizations and business units
disruption would have more far-reaching effects.
Methods and'organization of production, the nature of work, and
products themselves were greatly changed. In some cases "changed" is
hardly apt; new techniques and new products were the bases for new areas
of production. Allied to particular developments in physical production
were changes in social forms and daily life. The dominant way of life
changed from agrarian to industrial, from rural to urban. Home and work
were separated. Through the medium of wage labor, work itself became so
well differentiated from other aspects of life that thelength of "the
working day" became an object of struggle.
These same productive developments gave rise to implicit consi-
deration of the length of the working life which was being shortened at
both ends. Children, who had been productive members of farm families,
were increasingly born in or removed to urban settings. As cheap labor
in industry children were subject to the same dangers and over-exertions
as adults. Liberal reformers worked for child labor laws to "protect"
children from these hazards and from work itself. Probably more effective
in raising the age at which people entered the labor force was compulsory
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school attendance established by the various states and educational pro-
grams elaborated at all levels. Mid-nineteenth century and early twen-
tieth century reforms designed to create the disciplined work force
required by the advancing industrial order delayed entrance into that
work force. 9
While union membership and seniority provisions might maintain
the age to which people stayed at work, various factors eroded the length
of the working life. The technical conditions of production, the degra-
dation of skills, widespread and chronic unemployment, and new ideas
about old age contributed in various ways to the undesirability and
unemployment of older people.
Technical changes affected older workers particularly and directly
in several ways. The automated factoryassumed labor inputs tailored--
as machine parts were--to the specifications of the technical apparatus.
It assumed an average worker and a high degree of uniformity across all
labor inputs. The average worker was judged by a standard related to
the notion of an average day's work.
The notion of an average day's work assumed that labor inputs
9For a discussion of public school, labor force, and social control,
see Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America;
Educational Reform and the Contradictions of Economic Life (New York:
Basic Books, Inc., 1976); Michael B. Katz, Class, Bureaucracy and Schools;
The Illusion of Educational Change in America (New York: Praeger, 1971);
Michael B. Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform; Educational Innovation
in Mid-Nineteenth Century Massachusetts (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970);
Marvin Lazerson, Origins of the Urban School: Public Education in Massa-
chusetts,1870-1919 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971).
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could be homogeneous. Variations from these implied standards were
obstacles to the smooth and efficient running of the production process.
Variation in productivity among workers could reduce the speed of produc-
tion to that of thesslowest input. Workers were judged according to the
production process and its standards. Older workers did not measure up.
Reduced wage rates allowed for older workers' "inadequacy" but where pro-
duction became more and more integrated, where the operation of the
factory was more and more one smooth operating whole, such individual
variation was not tolerable.
If industrial work was not strenuous it was relentless and often
it was both. The discipline imposedby machine operations, by high uni-
form standards- of productivity, and by increasing emphasis on efficiency
forced out the variationwhich existed under earlier conditions. The
pace was rapid, steady, and continuous. A worker could not slow down or
vary his rate of work. and he could not work-intermittently. If age brought
a waning of reflex or strength a worker became inadequate to the job.
Even under the putting out system a worker produced to some extent on his
own terms making inputs to the larger apparatus, which could use inter-
mediate products as they came so long as a minimum supply was maintained.
Under one roof and integrated by machinery the productive processlless
and less admitted the truth of human variation. Efficiency--determined by
technical conditions under the employer's control--judged the acceptability
of workers. What is more, the ability to keep pace was not enough. One
must keep pace day after day. If in the past old age did not necessarily
mean discontinuing productive activity, by the end of the nine-teenth- cen-
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tury a productive system had been developed which excluded anyone below
a high standard of efficiency. Indeed, workers recognized that modern
industry compounded the aging process with its pace, relentlessness,
physical dangers, and economic worries.1 Human attributes in aging
became interpreted as inadequacies in labor. Differentiating older
workers, the productive system defined them as unnecessary--indeed, a
hindrance to the production of the- means of life.
Skill degradation took from older workers the advantage and
authority of experience. The technologies developed in the nineteenth
century increased the demand for unskilled labor and broke up the skills
of the trades precisely because these skills formed a basis for power and
employment. Particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies when there was an influx of young, southern European immigrants,
skilled in agriculture but unskilled in industry, firms easily favored
10 I do not accept the unproven--and unprovable--hypothesis that
aging is accompanied by waning productive, physical, intellectual, or
other powers. What small and varied literature I have surveyed argues
on both sides, generally with dubious experimental designs. Always we
must ask, according to what definitions and under what conditions does
aging bring a loss of anything. And we must have a critical understanding
of our notion of aging. At most, on average older people may, for example,
be slower in their reflexes. Yet, among older people is the same broad
range of capacity as among other age groups. Only acting on the basis of
averages and categories without regard to the reality of individuation
could managers and engineers develop technologies which assume away a
segment of variation. The same use of averages and categories was the
basis for arbitrary discrimination against older workers as a group. See,
for example, W. Andrew Achenhaum, Old Age in the New Land: The American
Experience Since 1790 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978),
pp. 40-45, on the medical study of old age.
1 1See, for example, p. 152.
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younger, unskilled (cheaper) labor.
Mechanical and organizational changes in production defined older
workers--for example, to the extent that they were slower--as undesirable.
These changes also contributed to the unemployment of older workers.
The characterization of older workers as unneeded and burdensome
was based in the availability of younger workers. Their availability was
based in chronic and widespread unemployment. Unemployment as we under-
stand it is a relatively new phenomenon. This is reflected in the prac-
tice of the Massachusetts Bureau of Labor Statistics whose unemployment
statistics enumerated children and those physically or otherwise incapable
of work until the late 1870s, when the category was changed to count
those able to work but without employment. 1 2
Both the objective phenomenon and the idea of unemployment as
they developed by the late nineteenth century are important to an under-
standing of the undesirability of older workers and their exclusion from
productive activity. There are two ways in which unemployment generally
contributed to the unemployment of older workers in particular.
First, the commonly acknowledged explanation is that an excess
labor supply gives employers the prerogative to choose among available
workers. In search of the most efficient workers, an employer discriminates
against older people in favor of younger--presumably more efficient, with-
more work years ahead, and perhaps with stabilizing family obligations.
12A forthcoming book by Alexander Keyssar studies the development
of modern unemployment.
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In this sense, the arugments about old age unemployment and technical
conditions are market arguments about the relative desirability of older
workers.
But a second explanation gives a more basic analysis. Unemploy-
ment is not simply a matter of numbers, not simply a product of a misfit
between supply of and demand for labor. To assume that it is would be
to assume that unemployment is a market failure. Quite the contrary.
Unemployment is a product of the market--in particular, the market in
labor.
Unemployment--in the sense which we understand 13--became possible
only on the basis of the work organization which developed in the nine-
teenth century. In the colonial United States most able-bodied community
members of all ages had roles in the productive life of the society.
Idleness, which was condemned, meant simply doing nothing. A wanderer
or a local vagrant might be idle. The Jacksonian theories of sin and of
corruption continued to look tatheindividual's moral character and wel-
fare. In these contexts, idleness was a personal condition.
By contrast, unemployment is a social condition. It implies
being out of work--that is, it implies definable employment by another
person. By 1890, almost two-thirds of the economically active population
in the United States worked for persons other than themselves. The pro-
ductive system developed over the course of the nineteenth century was
based on wage labor. Workers exchanged labor for money to purchase the
necessities of life rather than producing them directly or producing
1 3That is, unemployment as being in want of a job.
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goods directly to exchange for money or other goods.
Employment by another divides a person's time between his own
and that which he sells, the latter being the time during which he is
said to be employed. Regularization of employment--that is, the organiza-
tion of employment according to fixed hours for regular employees--served
further to delineate employment from unemployment.
This second aspect of unemployment underlies the labor market
explanation. The productive activity of older workers was undermined
since under industrial conditions there was less control for the worker
himself. A worker in control of his work, producing primarily for himself
could alter his volume of production or his pace to meet his changing
capacity and need. Within a wide variation efficiency need be of little
or no concern. On the other hand, an employer--who is interested in
profit and who is paying wage labor--wants the most for his money. If
he can afford it socially and politically, he will always replace a less
productive worker by one more productive. Then, the phenomenon of unem-
ployment falls on older workers in particular because of its derivation
from particular conditions of production--that is, employment as wage
labor. 1 4
To a large degree, industry itself was responsible for unemploy-
ment. As I have argued, the. organization of production and increasing
labor productivity were factors contributing to unemployment. Specific
14
This discussion derives from Raymond Williams, Keywords: A
Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York.: Oxford University Press,
19761.
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employment practices--in particular, the regularization of employment--
also contributed to unemployment in ways that particularly affected
older workers.
The rise of chronic unemployment made work distribution an issue.
The question arose whether to distribute available employment or to
employ some people "fulltime" while unemploying others altogether. In
some industries--for example, in brewing and mining--unions divided the
available work among employees. In some mining communities employees
of one mine would share work with miners from another mine closed down. 1 5
Such practices were not common.
Large numbers subject to the relative insecurity of employment
gave rise to discontent. Distributing employment was also distributing
unemployment. Concentrating unemployment concentrated discontent among
a smaller number of people. Herman Feldman, in his primer on regulariza-
tion of employment, argued that, "The question is . . . the relative
insecurity of employment, not the relative amount of unemployment." 1 6
He elaborated:
It is possible that the effects of insecurity of
employment, both on the wage-earner and on industry
itself, are more serious than those of unemployment.
The effect of uncertainty on any one individual may
be less destructive than that of actual unemployment,
but as the number of persons unemployed is at all
times smaller than the number who are living in fear
of it, the cumulative effects of the latter may well
be greater. Moreover, the industrial conditions back
15Herman Feldman, The' Regularization of Employment (New York:
Harper and Brothers, 1925), p. 252.
16Ibid., p. 3.
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of insecurity of employment are irregularity and dis-
continuity of operation. The economic wastes and
losses accompanying such methods of conducting indus-
try are enormous.
Regularization of employment was also argued as a way to avoid
industrial accidents. New employees were thought to be more prone to
accidents. Those irregularly employed were greater risks than those
steadily employed. 18
Where regularization or "decasualization" of the labor force was
practiced, the company gave competent and dependable employees employment
records and preference in the next hiring "with the result that the best
men are given practically permanent employment." 1 9
Insecurity of employment in the rising industrial order had many
sources. Seasonal employment, technological change, technical reorganiza-
tion, crises, and depressions were sources of unemployment. Even when
they were predictable, secure alternatives were not necessarily available
to workers subject to industrial employment. Their insecurity was more
essentially a matter of having no control over! their work patterns and live-
lihood expectations. The regularization of employment gave some workers
something they could depend on in a situation which they did not control.
For those who were employed under regularization, work was
relentless. Casual comings and goings to allow for sickness or rest were
driven out by this formalization. Older workers, along with everyone else,
1 7Ihid., pp. 20-21.
Ibid., pp. 24-25,
1 9Ibid., pp. 294-95.
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performed day after day or they did not perform at all.
Unemployment was rationed in other ways as well. This was not
difficult since there was continual movement--based on the sharing prin-
ciple contrary to regularization--to shorten the work week and work day.
The agitation was based in the need for jobs and in the exhaustion brought
on by industrial employment. A shorter work week would make more jobs
available. A shorter work day would be less wearing on, and more possi-
ble for, a wider range of people. The same rationing of employment kept
people in school--and out of the labor force--longer.
An ideology of leisure was created. When considering the effects
of the shorter work day, R. D. Fleming, a researcher for the Wisconsin
Commission on Industrial Relations, wrote about the "moral right to
leisure."
The moral right of the worker to adequate leisure
is a new concept which looks at the laborer from a
nationalistic rather than an individualistic point of
view. The laborer is looked uponin this concept as
an efficient machine with a definite accepted value
and anyone who by means of overwork, or other misuse,
impairs the value of this machine exhausts the working
energy which is one form of a nation's capital.
[Quoting from a report of the Wisconsin Bureau of
Labor Statistics, 1903-1904:] The stronger, healthier,
and more intelligent a laborer is, the more wealth he
represents. The laborers of a nation represent its
working capital, just as the hands of the farmer, his
horse or his ox represent his working capital. And
the stronger and healthier either may be, the more
capital it represents. The more efficient this capi-
tal becomes, the more wealth will be produced.2 0
R, D. Fleming, "Effects of the Shorter Work Day,"' Wisconsin
Commission on Industrial Relations, microfilm, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
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The workers' leisure, viewed by some as a humane solution to the boredom
and exhaustion of industrial work, is here viewed as the maintenance
of the firm's physical capital.
Employers introduced formal arrangements for their prerogative
to discriminate against older workers. Hiring age limits restricted the
burden of older employees on the firm. Workers over forty-five had diffi-
culty finding jobs. Some firms adopted more severe restrictions. On the
Pennsylvania lines west of Pittsburgh,21 the age limit for hiring brakemen
and firemen in 1919 was between the ages of 19 and 28.22 In the first two
decades of this century, hiring age limits were practiced,23 but it was
2 1Both the Pennsylvania Railroad (and its pension departments
established in 1900 and 1901, east and west, respectively) were divided
between its lines east and west of Pittsburgh.. The companies associated
in the lines east of Pittsburgh were the Pennsylvania Railroad Company;
the Northern Central Railway Company; the Philadelphia, Baltimore and
Washington Railroad Company; the West Jersey and Seashore Railroad Company;
and the Philadelphia and Camden Ferry Company. The lines west of Pitts-
burgh were the Pennsylvania Company; the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chicago
and St. Louis Railway Company; the Grand Rapids and Indiana Railway Com-
pany; the Waynesburg and Washington Railroad Company; th.e Cincinnati, Le-
banon and Northern Railway Company; and the Wheeling Terminal Railway
Company. M. Riebenack, "Pennsylvania Railroad Pension Departments: Systems
East and West of Pittsburgh and Erie, Pa. Status to and Including the
Year 1907," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
33 (19091:258-64. I will not enumerate the subsidiaries and divisions of
other companies which I discuss, but I point out this example since it is
important to recall that companies such as U. S. Steel, International
Harvester, DuPont, and other large railroad companies (which I will discuss
later) included many subordinate entities.
22 G. L. Peck, Federal Manager, Pennsylvania Lines West of Pitts-
burgh, Letter to J. A. Franklin, Assistant Director, Division of Labor,
24 October 1919, USRA, file A-22-Age Limits: General, Record Group 14,
National Archives, Washington, D.C.
2 3Workers past fifty looking for jobs often had to take unskilled
or common labor since they were not hired for the occupations they had
pursued earlier. Pennsylvania, Report of the Pennsylvania Commission on
Old Age Pensions (Harrisburg: J. L. L. Kuhn Printer, 1919), p. 101.
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not until the 1920s that they were documented.
Forty-five was the common age limit, though some employers went
as low as thirty-five for particular jobs. In 1929 numerous steel com-
panies, including some of the largest, had effective age limits. In
1904 Carnegie Steel had set an age limit of forty--in some cases, thirty-
five. Though in 1928 the company denied applying any age limits, the
following year a superintendent at the Duquesne works admitted a hiring
age limit of forty-five. Jones and Laughlin, Colorado Fuel and Iron,
Bethlehem Steel, Crucible Steel, Page Steel and Wire, Weirton Steel, 2 4
and Wisconsin Steel25 had forty-five year limitations. A dozen other
companies reported a limit of fifty, six reported fifty-five, and three
set sixty.26 An American Management Association study in 1930 showed that
40 percent of 239 companies, which employed 61 percent of the nation's
workers, had age limits, and that those with age limits were the largest
companies in each industry.2 7
These age limits were, of course, company enforced and were,
therefore, at company discretion. In practice, they tended to apply to
A subsidiary of National Steel.
2 5A subsidiary of International Harvester.
2 6Horace B. Davis, Labor and Steel, Labor Research Association,
Labor and Industry Series (New York: International Publishers, 1933),
pp. 21-27.
2 7President's Research. Committee on Social Trends, Report, Recent
Social Trends in the United States, vol. 2 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book.
Company, Inc., 1933), pp. 811-12. See also C. R. Dooley, "The Employment
and Adjustment of the Older Worker," American Management Association, Ge-
neral Management Series no. 86 (New York: American Management Association,
1929).
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low-skilled or unskilled laborers. Among skilled workers, particularly
during a labor shortage, age limitations were relaxed in preference for
experience. Those workers over forty-five displaced by technology were
less likely to find work.
Changes in technology, work organization, and employment patterns
discriminated against workers who were slower, less agile, more vulnerable
in serious accidents, more easily tired, and so on. Older workers were,
along with others, subject to these developments and were perhaps parti-
cularly vulnerable to them if age brought waning physical powers. But
the wholesale discrimination against older workers manifest in such prac-
tices as hiring-age limits was justified by new ideas about old age which
had emerged since the Civil War. Older people in general were increasingly
considered--colloquially and scientifically--to be incapacitated, physi-
cally and mentally deteriorated, ill tempered and useless. Previously
revered and idealized, old age had become "obsolete." 28
In Old Age in the New Land, W. Andrew Achenbaum traces the changing
perceptions of old age in the United States. Through the first half of
the nineteenth century the elderly were respected for their experience,
wisdom, virtue, and productive contributions to society. Not only did age
bring experience and wisdom, they a were the means by which one achieved
old age. Age itself was evidence of one's wisdom and moral character.
2 8Achenbaum, Old Age in th-e New Land, pp. 39-54 provides a full
discussion of th.ese developments. The first two chapters of Achenhaum's
book discuss prior conceptions of old age.
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The aged were stores of knowledge and examples of healthful living.
After the Civil War, these notions were replaced by negative
views of the aged. Developments in science, public health, and medical
practice affected ideas about old people in two ways. As professions
were organized, knowledge rested not so much with experienced as with
trained expertise. The secret of health and longevity lay not with the
society's elders but with scientists, doctors, and engineers. As well
as displacing the elderly as experts, modern medicine documented declining
mental and physical capacity accompanying age. Age was correlated with
decreasing productivity, said to be exacerbated by industrial employments
--some of which were, to the contrary, less strenuous than farming acti-
vities. Developments in medical science increasingly concentrated death
in later years, focusing attention on these as the waning of life. Re-
search investigated the diseases of old age and general diseases as mani-
fest in older people. Some postulated old age as a disease in itself.
Evidence of older people's physical deterioration was accompanied
by similar interpretation of their intellectual and psychological condi-
tion. Rather than a period of maturity and fulfillment, old age was a
period of decline. Mental and creative abilities, thought to be at their
height between thirty and forty-five, were said to fall off, with- rare
exceptions, significantly after sixty. This degeneration was only com-
pounded by older people's unpleasant personalities and their inability to
accept or adjust to new ideas and practices--particdarly undesirable in
a rapidly changing society.
These ideas both justified and gained justification from industrial
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practice. The degradation of skill devalued experience, the basis of
age's authority. The uselessness of older people was confirmed by their
inefficiency, their inability to find jobs, and their being let go--
fired or retired--because they were worn out.
By contrast, youth was extolled as productive, healthy, happy,
attractive, and open to change. Age in itself was considered proof of
one's weakness and inadequacy. These changes in thinking formed a basis
for the distinction and exclusion of people as old without regard to the
disablements which had previously justified distinction without respect
to age.
Unemployment made possible discrimination against less productive
workers and new ideas about old age laid the basis for discrimination
against the elderly as a group. Over the course of the nineteenth century
older workers came to be judged undesirable in industrial employment.
While hiring age limits protected the firm to some degree from taking on
"burdensome" employees, some workers grew old in industrial jobs. Firms
did not want to retain these superannuated workers in regular employ.
At the same time, by the turn of the century businesses were constrained
from using traditional means for dealing with older workers.
In Chapter 4 I will discuss the indequacy of traditional means
to meet industry's problem of superannuation.
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IV
SOLUTIONS BECOME PROBLEMS:
CONSTRAINTS ON INDUSTRY
By the turn of the century industry's traditional means for dealing
with unwanted older workers were inadequate in the large corporations
which increasingly dominated economic life and employment. As I have
suggested in the previous chapter, technical constraints made reduced
work and variable pay rates impracticable in these modern businesses.
Large scale-, impersonal work settings and bureaucratic organizations did
not provide the informality and familiarity on which job transfers and
informal gratuities depended.
Several factors limited the firms' freedom in firing, which had
been the primary recourse with unwanted workers old or young. Industry
had to contend seriously with organized labor and some unions had esta-
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blished seniority provisions which constrained employers from dismissing
older workers. Old age dependence, a newly formulated social problem,
was laid at industry's door when the almshouse was being discredited
and big business was being called to account for a variety of social
evils. Within industry itself corporate liberals urged responsibility.
Labor struggles since 1877 had taught business to take labor
seriously. In the case of old age dependence, union power expressed in
seniority provisions was a direct constraint on the freedom to fire
older workers.
Seniority provisions for work distribution were established in
private employment before formal contracts or agreements were recorded.
Seniority systems gave the union or work group a measure of control over
employment and encouraged stability among workers, who had job security
to gain by long membership and service.. Like many other work distribution
and welfare measures, seniority was both a system of dividing workers and
a means of controlling jobs.1
Railroading was the first industry in which the seniority system
was formally developed to any extent.2 The earliest example in a written
labor agreement was in a contract between the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Engineers and the Hudson River Railroad in 1875. Article 3 of the
1Dan H. Mater, "The Development and Operation of the Railroad
Seniority System," Journal of Business of the University of Chicago 13
(October 1940):389.
2Ibid., p. 387.
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agreement, dated January 26, read:
It is understood that the number of engineers are
to be kept down to the lowest possible number neces-
sary to perform the work of the company, and in case
engineers are dropped from the service of the company
by reason of falling off in business, the youngest
engineers in the service of the company are to be
taken first. 3
The Massachusetts Railroad Commission report on the Boston and Maine
strike of 1877 noted the practice of laying off junior employees first
when the work force was reduced. 4
Outside railroading seniority agreements were almost exclusively
local and limited to the craft aristocracies of the nineteenth century.
In 1890 the New York Typographical Union No. 6 obtained the first senior-
ity provision in a labor agreement outside railroading. 5
Seniority had been practiced on the railroads from mid-century.
The first written agreement of every railroad contained a provision and
toward the end of the century seniority rules were standardized in re-
sponse to conditions on the roads.
Agreements between the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and
the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, and Pacific Railroad exemplify the
development of seniority provisions. Among contract clauses were the fol-
lowing:
3Ibid., p. 396, citing Report of the Eight-Hour Commission (Washing-
ton; Government Printing Office, 1918), appendix VI, p, 270. "Youngest"
referred, of course., not to age hut to tenure with. the railroad.
4mid, p. 393.
5Ibid., p. 392.
6Ibid., pp. 405-7.
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1880: When engineers are laid up on account of slack
business or for repairs, the older men in the
company's employ will, as a rule, be kept at
work, and the younger and unmarried men paid
by the mile for what they can make as extra
runners, the intention being to keep all en-
gineers employed as far as possible.
1887: As a rule, when Engineers and Firemen are pro-
moted to a higher grade in the service, the
older men shall have preference of runs, on
their respective divisions, when competent and
worthy. Engineers of the highest grade shall
also have preference of runs on their respec-
tive divisions. The Company reserves the right
to deviate from this rule in special cases . . .
1902: Engineers shall not be transferred to a Divi-
sion where there are firemen eligible for pro-
motion if the firemen are older in engine ser-
vice than the engineer to be transferred.
In case there is a vacancy in assigned runs,
either on account of a new run being put on or
a run becoming vacant, the same shall be bulle-
tined and assigned to the oldest competent en-
gineer desiring the same.
The scope of seniority as a system for work allocation widened to
cover lay-offs, preference of runs within grades, promotions, and filling
vacancies. By 1900 the "Big Four" railroad unions had achieved standard-
ized rates and working conditions, though scheduling arrangements varied.
Still, some railroads had not granted it to all. After the. turn of the
century, the unions successfully standardized seniority provisions to a
large degree among the roads and employee groups.8
7 The. "Big Four" were the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, the
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, the Order of Railway Con-
ductors, and the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen.
8
Mater, "Railroad Seniority System," pp. 108-9.
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The railroad mergers following the depression of 1873 affected
employee relations on the roads. Though the peak of railroad construc-
tion did not come until after 1877 and though traffic continued to in-
crease for decades, the chance for employees to advance decreased because
the number of executive positions was proportionately less.
In 1844 James C. Clarke began work with the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad as a track laborer. Over the next ten years he worked for the
road as brakeman, fireman, conductor, and train master. After holding
several positions as superintendent and general manager, he became general
manager of the Illinois Central in 1874. Nine years later he was president
of the road. John Newell, the son of a farmer from West Newbury, Massachu-
setts, began work on the railroads as a rodman and assistant engineer for
the Vermont Central in 1846. He held numerous jobs, including surveyor,
superintendent of construction, and engineer, and attained several execu-
tive positions. Newell became a major director of the Illinois Central,
the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern, and the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie.
Such career histories as these were exceptional but became vir-
tually impossible. As time went on, an employee had less chance to rise
above the ranks at all. An editorial in Railroad Gazette, a principal
trade publication, noted this trend in 1880:
There can be but little doubt, that advancement to
high positions grows more difficult each year in pro-
portion as the tendency to consolidation of great
9Thomas C. .Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind
in Action (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 19531, appendix,
pp. 292, 408-9.
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interests and immense amounts of capital goes on.10
The decrease in opportunity was compounded by organizational developments
and occupational specialization, which made sharper distinctions in the
hierarchy among jobs.
Seniority then provided security when advancement was no longer
available. It also served as a protection against employer's arbitrary
manipulation of rates and hours. When seniority worked, it protected
jobs. Those who had established service records were protected from
coercion, discrimination, and nepotism. In January 1929, the Railway
Clerk carried an article reflecting on the value of seniority rights:
In the old days, it was not an infrequent occurrence
to see inexperienced men brought into an office and put
to work at a wage higher than men received who had spent
years in the service. Many times have we seen it happen,
that when a job that paid a top wage became vacant a
greenhorn would be brought in, put on the job, and men
receiving less money required to train him to do the work!
Nepotism was a curse in the clerical service before we
organized. A clerical job could always be found for the
nephew, niece, cousin, or neighbor of a chief clerk or
official, even if it meant getting rid of an old employee
to make a place for him.11
A less sanguine view of seniority is also possible. Long service
with a company might mean that a worker had achieved a high wage. If the
company or a particular superintendent wanted to cut labor costs, he
might discriminate. against higher wage employees, even dismissing them for
replacement by someone at a lower rate.
1 0
"Advancement" (_editorial), Railroad Gazette. (26 March_1880):1 68 .
1 1
"What Are Seniority Rights Worth?" Railroad Clerk 28 (January
19.291:7-8.
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For example, according to the seniority and promotion system on
the Chicago, Burlington, and Quincy, it took nine years to become a
first class engineer. After six years a fireman with a satisfactory re-
cord became a fourth class engineer. Each subsequent year, if his record
had been perfect, he would be advanced a grade. The system was acceptable
to employees, but its abuse meant that a first class engineer might be
dismissed for incompetence one day and rehired a few days later in the
fourth class. 1 2
Seniority provisions had two aspects. They meant partial surren-
der by management of control over job allocation, while they meant sta-
bilization of the work force. Likewise, seniority might make compliant
employees interested in job security and the accumulation of privilege,
but a strictly enforced system could protect workers' union activity.13
While seniority provisions protected the jobs of older workers,
they put younger workers at a disadvantage. Advancement depended on time
and the number of positions available overall. Seniority arrangements
were fine when in the long term advancement was assured and the power of
a worker's skill endured. However, developments setting seniority in a
new context heightened the division created between older and younger
workers. Employment instability and skill degradation undermined tradi-
tional seniority practices.
1 2
'Mater, "Railroad Seniority Systems," p. 401.
1 3Joel Seidman, The Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen: The Internal
Political Life of a National Union (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.,
1962), p. 88.
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The benefits of seniority depended on the basic stability of
employment conditions over time. Economic fluctuations might leave a
relatively senior workman unemployed--for example, in the case of a
firm's closing or demand 's dwindling. An individual's employment might
depend on loyalty to the firm or on other matters at the firm's discre-
tion. In this case, seniority was transformed from an expression and
source of power into a privilege to be protected. No longer grounded in
the workmen's power over work and work rules, seniority became traditional
practice which, rather than pointing to the legitimate authority of skill
and experience, embodied the arbitrary authority of one group of workers
over another.
Skill degradation exacerbated this process. While the authority
of craftsmanship underlay seniority provisions they were understood as
legitimate by workers and were incumbent upon firms not wholly in control
of the work process. Skill degradation and homogenization obliterated
work-based distinctions among workers. Older and younger workers might
do the same work with the same skill. Seniority became primarily a matter
of age and length of tenure--a matter of who got there first and who pre-
vailed.
In th.e new context, seniority could be seen as age discrimination.
If senior employees were not in the way, younger workers might he employed
or advanced. Older employees promised fewer productive years ahead and,
less likely to have dependents, needed less income. Efficiency favored
ypunger workers, reputed to be more alert and productive. To the extent
that they were enforced, seniority practices could be a basis for old age
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income provisions--employment or pension rights. Yet as seniority pro-
tected workers against old age dependence, it exacerbated the problem for
industry of superannuation in the workforce.
The social construction of "old age dependence" as a problem was
not simply a product of the "breakdown of the family," the inadequacy
of wages, or the numerical increase in aged dependents, as is often implied.
The family argument usually assumes the mythological extended family.
Low wages were only one in a constellation of factors. Dependence, in-
creasing generally, need not have been associated with age. Old age de-
pendence was realized in an historical setting comprised of many conditions
--among them, as I have suggested, dependence on wage labor, widespread
propertylessness, skill degradation, and the limits of family and community
support.
For clarity, old age dependence needs to be delineated. Among
human beings dependence is the rule. Not dependence but precisely its
opposite is at issue in old age dependence. Social and economic individua-
tion or isolation left older people without means of support, segregated
from the forms and mechanisms of dependence. The social problem was an
interpretation of the absence of traditional--that is, given or assumed
(taken for granted)--patterns of dependence for the aged. So, although
they might be, old age dependents were not necessarily those dependent on
family, charity, or community institutions. Old age dependents were those
who had no means of support, whose dependence. was a felt burden. A social
prohlem was perceived when dislocation made transparent the limits of old
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practices and the absence of adequate new ones.14
Its complementary institutions destroyed, elderly dependence
was manifest precisely because it no longer had a neat, accepted place
in the social order. The commonly expressed need to end old age depen-
dence or to provide old age support was the need for a satisfactory inte-
gration of old age dependence in the new order. 1 5
Though commonly considered the result of improvidence, increasing-
ly old age dependence needed another explanation. Sheer numbers made
necessary a new view of its causes. Studies after the turn of the cen-
tury pointed to misfortune, low wages, unemployment, and industrial con-
ditions.
Old age dependence, which had been publicly debated for a decade,
was conferred formal recognition as a social problem in the. United States
by the publication in 1910 of the report of the Massachusetts Commission
on Old Age Pensions, Annuities, and Insurance. Surveying the population
sixty-five and over who were inmates of correctional institutions, hos-
pitals, insane asylums, almshouses, and benevolent homes, recipients of
public outdoor relief and federal pensions, and non-dependent,16 the com-
14For example, in the Report of the Massachusetts Commission on
Old Age Pensions, Annuities, and Insurance, the survey of non-dependent
aged poor did not include those who had received "occasional aid from
relatives, friends or neighbors, or even from a church, society or settle-
ment." Such marginal aid could certainly make the difference between non-
dependence and dependence. Massachusetts, House, Report of the Commission
on Old Age Pensions, Annuities, and Insurance, No. 1400 (Boston: Wright
and Potter Printing Company, 1910), p. 45.
15 An integration of old age dependence in the new order would not
necessarily mean that people would have adequate support.
1 6The non-dependent were defined as those who had received no aid
from public or private outside sources.
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mission found almost 24 percent dependent on some form of support. The
bulk of these--18.5 percent--received federal and military aid. The re-
maining 5.5 percent pressed the limits of the institutions on which they
depended. 1 7
The Commission provided statistics on expenditures, age, marital
status, residence, nativity, ethnicity, family situation, occupation,
earning power, and property for the almshouse population and the non-
dependent poor. Almshouse residents were of particular interest because
increasingly almshouses were homes for the aged as well as the poor.18
The physical limitations, increasing costs, and increasing demands for
indoor relief were an impetus to consideration of alternatives.
Of the almshouse inmates, 25 percent were sixty-five and over,19
while in the general population the portion was 6 percent. Though the
almshouses were supposed to deal with paupers of any age, an increasing
concentration in this age group was seen as altering the institution.
Among these aged inmates, 92 percent entered the almshouses after sixty
and less than one percent entered before forty. These- admissions were
1 7Massachusetts, House, Commission on Old Age Pensions (j9101, p. 22.
1 8Nationally, between 1880 and 1924 those- over sixty-five increased
from 25 to 54 percent of the .almshoose population. Committee- on. Economic
Security, "The Need for Economic Security in the United States," chart xii,
Committee on Economic Security, Box 27, Record Group 47, National Archives,
Washington, D.C. The population increase for this age group had been from
3.4 percent in 1880 to 4.6 and 5.3 percent, respectively in 1920 and 1930.
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.,
1975), Series A 119-34, p. 15.
1 9Nationally, the figure was 33 percent.
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viewed as related to age and incapacity rather than earlier misfortunes.
Among residents, 29.2 percent were listed simply as "aged and infirm,"
as opposed to insanes, crippled, blind, or otherwise incapacitated.
Nationally, entrances after sixty and before forty were, respectively
40.5 and 31 percent of total admissions. The discrepancies between state
and national figures might bhe explained in part by the relative industri-
alization and urbanization of Massachusetts compared to the nation as a
whole. To the extent that industrial employers diseharged older workers
and urbanization provided no coherent support network, the elderly looked
to public relief. In fact, in Massachusetts manufacturing and mechanical
pursuits were the most common occupations among alsmhouse residents, 33.7
percent of whom had made their livings in these employments. Though
almost 44 percent had adult children living at the time they entered the
almshouse and almost 53 percent had some other near relative living, only
about 8 percent had relatives able to provide aid at the time of the study.
While 66 percent of the almshouse population was foriegn born, 83.6 percent
of the residents had lived in the Commonwealth for at least thirty years,
94 percent for at least twenty years. The inmates had not necessarily
been transients. 2 0
Those not dependent on any form of public or private charity were
surveyed as the "non-dependent" aged poor. "Non-dependent" is a telling
choice., since independent they were not. Many lived near the margin of
dependence, where it would take very little to put them in need. Their
20Massachusetts, House, Commission on Old Age Pensions (1910)., pp.
36, 37, 43, 60, 62, 66-67, 69.
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incomes included money from work, savings, relatives, and pensions. Over
half were "able-bodied"--that is, fully capable of work. Average weekly
expenditures among the non-dependent aged poor were $6.26 for individual
males, $4.28 for individual females, $9.32 for couples, and $12.00 for
families. Less than half of individual males and less than a third of
21individual females had incomes adequate to these standards.
The non-dependent aged poor held more property than the other
aged surveyed. Among those in benevolent homes, at admission 10.9 percent
had property, for most valued at $500 or less. Among those on public and
private outdoor relief, 15.1 and 22.7 percent, respectively, had property
at the time of the survey, also valued at $500 or less in most cases.
Those on state and military aid who had property--17.4 percent--tended
to have more. Over 43 percent of the non-dependent poor had property
and almost three-quarters of these held over $1000 worth. Looking at it
another way, in each category (including almshouse inmates) over a quarter
and as many as 60 percent had held property at one time or another. The
non-dependent poor were those who had been least subject to loss of their
property. Among all groups, loss of property was most often due to
extra expenses for sickness or emergency. The second important cause was
business failure and had investments. Thes.e two accounted for over 80
percent of the cases of property loss. 2 2
The Massachusetts study confirmed the suspicion that almshouses
Ihid., pp. 47-48, 68.
2 2Ibid., pp. 74-75.
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were increasingly meeting problems of old age dependence. The study also
pointed out the fact that, contrary to the traditional view of the alms-
house as a place for transients, strangers, and the improvident, current
inmates were stable Massachusetts residents, many of whom had met mis-
fortune. Criticism of the almshouses--that they were decrepit, poorly
run, and inadequate--which had dated from the 1830s took hold at the
turn of the century. -By suggesting that the almshouse had become an old
age home, the Massachusetts study implied that that almshouse could be
replaced. With a focus on old age dependence, the problems of the alms-
house population could be addressed differently.
The Massachusetts Commission Report offered an analysis of old age
dependence. In discussing old age pensions or insurance the report said:
The problem . . . is of modern origin. It is one of
the questions of social readjustment consequent upon the
industrial revolution. Before the era of the factory
system this problem hardly existed. In the earlier
period, as Carlisle had impressed upon us, the economic
relations between men were of a permanent character.
The labor contract was life-long. The worker lived
under the paternal protection of the master, who felt
obliged to provide for him in sickness, accident and old
age. He was not expected to make independent provision
for the emergencies of life. In the background, more-
over, stood the church, ready to dispense alms with a
free hand.
The industrial revolution changed all this. Tempo-
rary contract took the place of permanent service. The
employer recognized no obligation to support the worker
throughout life. The latter was thrown upon his own
resources and was expected to take care of himself in
periods of infirmity, misfortune and old age. Thus arose
th-e problem of old age pensions or insurance, which., in
essence, is the problem of devising an effective system
of providing for the old age of worn-out workers. 23
2 3Ibid., p, 77.
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Social scientists were also arguing that industrial employment
was the cause of old age dependency. In 1913, Edward T. Devine, professor
of social economy at Columbia, wrote:
It is notorious that the insatiable factory wears
out its workers with great rapidity. As it scraps
machinery so it scraps human beings. The young, the
vigorous, the adaptable, the supple of limb, the
alert of mind, are in demand. In business and in the
professions maturity of judgment and ripened expe-
rience offset, to some extent, the disadvantages of
old age; but in the factory and on the railway, with
spade and pick, at the spindle, at the steel conver-
ters, there are no offsets. Middle age is old age,
and the worn-out worker, if he has no children and if
he has no savings, becomes an item in the aggregate
of the unemployed. 2 4
These formulations of the problem, though pointing toward old age
dependence in general, focus on it as a problem of industrial employment.
In fact, though industry contributed to the problem of old age dependency,
it was not simply a matter of "the industrial scrap heap." To be sure,
employers did not generally care for workers in old age and did put them
out of work.
The industrial worker could not depend on employment in old age
nor could he afford to save against that risk but at the turn of the
century industrial employment itself was not theonly factor underlying
old age dependence. Throughout the nineteenth century agriculture was
the major source of employment for older workers. Those who had been
24 Edward T. Devine, Misery and Its Causes (1913; reprint ed.,
Poverty, U.S.A.: The Historical Record, ed. by David J. Rothman, New
York: Arno Press, 19711, p. 125. Devine was active in social reform,
serving, for example, as general secretary of the Charity Organization
Society of New York from 1896 to 1912 and as editor of the Survey from
1897 to 1912.
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employed in manufacturing and mechanical pursuits tended to be in more
traditional craft occupations--for example, carpenters, masons, and
blacksmiths. Many of these occupations were unchanged by technical
innovation as late as the 1890s. These occupations provided somewhat
more secure employment and income than most industrial jobs.25 Most
old age dependence in 1910 was probably not attributable directly to
industry itself.
It makes more sense to argue that the same social forces which
created the industrial order so hard on older workers undermined also
the traditional sources of support to which older people might turn.
Changes in property holdings and an increase in geographic mobility
induced by land and employment patterns changed relations of family
dependence.
By the 1820s relatives might petition the local board of overseers
for assistance in supporting an aged relative.26 By 1870 every state had
laws requiring adults to care for their family's needy members.27 Depen-
dence had increased enough that efforts were made to enforce family obli-
gations long since ended. With growing dependence on wage labor and with-
W. Andrew Achenbaum, "Old Age in the United States, 1790 to
the Present" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Michigan, 1976), pp. 227
and 233.
26
Massachusetts, General Court, Report of the Committee on the
Pauper Laws of This Commonwealth by Josiah Quincy, Chairman (1821; re-
printed in The Almshouse Experience, Poverty, U.S.A.: The Historical
Record, ed. by David J. Rothman, New York: Arno Press, 1971), pp. 25, 32-33.
2 7Hace Sorel Tishler, Self-Reliance and Social Security 1870-1917
(Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, Inc., 1971), p. 5.
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out property holdings, young families had more reason to look toward the
younger generation than toward the older.
At the same time, declining birth rates and the concentration
of death in old age increased the relative size of the older population,
making their condition--whatever it might be--more evident. In 1850 the
proportion of people over fifty years old was only 8.9 percent. By 1900
it was 15.4 percent.28
State pauper institutions increasingly housed a population over
sixty-five. In 1910 in Ohio, 60 percent of almshouse inmates had
entered after age sixty. In Pennsylvania the percentage was 62; in Wis-
consin, 87; and in Massachusetts, 92.29
In 1911 Lee Welling Squier published his influential Old Age
Dependency in the United States.: A Complete Survey of the Pension Movement.
Depending primarily on the Massachusetts study, Squier estimated that
there were 1.25 million old age dependents in the United States. 30 In
the year that followed, old age dependence and the pension problem became
frequent subjects of public discussion. In 1919 the Pennsylvania Commis-
28
President's Research Committee on Social Trends, Report, Recent
Social Trends in the United States, vol. 2 (New York: McGraw-Rill Book
Company, Inc., 1933), p. 1199.
29Abraham Epstein, Facing Old Age: A Study of Old Age Dependency
in the United States and Old Age Pensions (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1922),
p. 30. Based on the Massachusets report of 1910 I have interpreted Epstein's
apparent misreading. See Massachusetts, House, Commission on Old Age
Pensions (1910).
3 0 Lee Welling Squier, Old Age Dependency in the United States:
A Complete Survey of the Pension Movement (New York: Macmillan Company,
1912), p. 3.
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sion on Old Age Pensions published its report patterned after the Massa-
chusetts study and reflecting the same conditions.31 California, Connec-
ticut, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin were among the other
states to look at old age dependency.32 Business organizations--including
the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Civic Federation,
and the National Industrial Conference Board--responded with further
studies.33 Abraham Epstein, who had worked as director of the Pennsylvania
Commission, became an advocate of the aged dependent, as did Isaac Max
Rubinow, a social reformer interested in social insecurity generally. 3 4
Old age dependence was an increasingly common condition both for
those entirely outside industry and for those cast off by industry. With
alternatives gone, people looked to industrial employment for any income,
at the same time that industrial employers were reluctant to hire those
3 1Pennsylvania, Report of the Pennsylvania Commission on Old Age
Pensions (Harrisburg: J. L. L. Kuhn Printer, 1919).
3 2For example, Industrial Commision of Wisconsin, Report on Old
Age Relief (March 1, 1915); Ohio, Report of the Commission on Health- and
Old Age Insurance (19181; California, Report of the Industrial Accident
Commission (1919).
3 3For example, National Industrial Conference Board, Inc., Indus-
trial Pensions in the United States (New York.: National Industrial Confe-
rence Board, Inc., 1925); Boston Chamber of Commerce, Special Committee
on Social Insurance, "Non-Contributory Old Age Pensions and Health Insu-
rance" (Boston: n.p., 1917), pamphlet; National Civic Federation, Study
of the Extent of Old Age Dependency. Report by the Industrial Welfare
Department upon Economic and Physical Status of Persons 65 Years of Age
and Over in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut includes
Additional Data from Massachusetts (New York: National Civic Federation,
1929).
34 See further information and notes on Epstein and Rubinow in
Chapter 5.
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who might become a burden. Under pressure not to contribute to old age
dependence by putting older employees out of work without some means of
support, employers constrained by public opinion confronted old age depen-
dence formulated as superannuation in industry.
Set in context, this constraint was all the more powerful. By
the turn of the century, business was under attack not only for its
"bigness"--for monopoly, price fixing, and buying politicians--but also
for a variety of social ills attributed to industry and industrial employ-
ment. Problems of urban living--crime, housing, and sanitation--were
seen as by-products of industrial development. Reformers and muckrakers
publicized a host of issues, among them child labor practices, unsafe
working conditions, low wages, and long hours. 3 5
On the political front, the populists and Farmers' Alliance
attacked business, urging basic reform. In 1896 William Jennings Bryan,
Congressman from Nebraska and presidential candidate of the People's Party,
was also nominated by the Democrats, evoking a fevered response by business
interests in support of the Republican candidate, McKinley.36 In 1900
Eugene Victor Debs, veteran railway labor organizer, ran for the presidency
on a socialist ticket. Nominated again in 1904 by the newly organized
Socialist Party, Deb's increasing popularity was taken seriously. Theodore
Roosevelt wrote that the growth of Socialism was "far more ominous than
3 5 See Harold Underwood Faulkner, The Question for Social Justice,
1898-1914, A History of American Life, vol. 11 (New York: The Macmillan
Company, 1931).
3 6Ray Ginger, Age of Excess: The United States from 1877 to 1914
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965), pp. 176-.81.
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any populist or similar movement in the past." A year following the elec-
tion Roosevelt wrote to Taft:
The full, purblind folly of the very rich men, their
greed and arrogance and the corruption in business and
politics, have tended to produce a very unhealthy condi-
tion of excitement and irritation in the popular mind,
which shows itself in the great increase in the socialis-
tic propaganda.3 7
In books and magazine columns writers exposed the abuses of big
business. Ida Tarbell's History of the Standard Oil Company was serialized
in McClure's magazine during 1902 to 1904.38 The publication in 1906 of
Upton Sinclair's The Jungle, a novel which exposed conditions in the
slaughterhouses, caused an uproar which led to government investigation
and regulation.3 9
While no single issue could of itself be the basis for undermining
industrial practice, taken as a whole this program of reforms was a threat
which required response. On this basis a wide range of issues required
accomodation by business. Old age dependence was among them.
Firms were to some degree constrained by public opinion and labor
relations from simply firing unwanted, superannuated workers. Whether for
3 8Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, ed. by
David M. Chalmers (New York: Harper and Row, 1966). See Faulkner, The
Quest for Social Justice, pp. 112-16, 257-58, on muckrakers.
3 9Upton Sinclair, The Jungle (New York: New American Library,
1960). Regulation was the result of both popular agitation and business
strategy and compromise, rather than business concession. While regulation
went far to provide protection, I would be naive to suggest that regulation
was entirely against business interests. See Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph
of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1963), especially pp. 98-110.
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humane or practical reasons, businessmen themselves recognized the
necessity of dealing with employees' needs outside the job.
In 1877 Robert Harris, president and superintendent of the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, wrote to John Griswold, chairman
of the road:
A Rail Road company cannot any more than an indivi-
dual employer take the position that, when their em-
ployees or the family of employees are in sudden dis-
tress and want, they owe them nothing and will do no-
thing for them. A judicious contribution even when
there is no legal liability is money well invested.4 0
By 1900 employers were considering means to deal specifically
with superannuation. Over the first three decades of the century old age
pensions became a standard alternative among large industrial firms.
C. S. Ching, Supervisor of Industrial Relations at the U. S.
Rubber Company, speaking at the Eighth Annual Industrial Conference in
1925, said:
. . . there is undoubtedly a strong force in the general
belief that the just employer will not permit his super-
annuated employees to be forced to seek charity, in old
age. . . .
. however, . . . in the last analysis, so far as
industry is concerned, it cannot decide a question of
this kind (the pension question) merel on the basis of
a belief in its moral responsibility.4 1
Socially, companies could not afford simply to dismiss all super-
4 0Cochran, Railroad Leaders, p. 178, appendix, pp. 354-55, R.
Harris, president, CBQ, to J. N. A. Griswold, chairman, CBQ, 10 December
1877.
C. S. Ching, "Industry's Obligation to Superannuation and an
Evaluation of Present and Proposed Plans," Address at the Eighth Annual
Industrial Conference, Silver Bay, New York, 27-30 August 1925 (reprint,
New York: Brown, Crosby and Company, n.d.1, p. 4.
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annuated workers. At the same time, the alternative had to be economi-
cally justified. Ching argued:
It is inevitable that such a company (without a
pension plan) is paying full wages to many old employees
who are really not earning their pay, and who, by their
continuance on the active payroll, are preventing re- 42
organizations which would mean much greater efficiency.
The employment of superannuated workers was seen as a cost to the
firm. In the past employers had informal methods for handling such
problems but more formal, bureaucratic organizations led to formalization
and rationalization of procedures generally. In 1930 the National Metal
Trades Association published a booklet entitled Meeting the Cost of
Employee Superannuation.43 The booklet provided general suggestions for
formal cost analyses of employee superannuation and offered four possible
programs of cost reduction: assisting voluntary retirement by encouraging
employee thrift, dismissing the older workers, transferring to suitable
4 2 Ibid., p. 6.
4 3National Metal Trades Association, Committee on Industrial
Relations, Meeting the Cost of Employee Superannuation (Chicago: National
Metal Trades Association, 19301. While in general the term "superannuated
worker" was applied to all those above a certain age, the National Metal
Trades Association took a more realistic approach:
It cannot he justly said, of course, that all persons
over 65 are superannuated, but on the other hand, it is
equally true that many employees considerably under the
age of 65 are superannuated. Within the walls of a given
shop an estimate of prevalent employe superannuation can
he made only by a close study of all employes who have
passed their prime of life.
The text then goes on to explain a method for computing employee superannua-
tion, making clear that "superannuation" is a measure of efficiency, Ibid.,
pp. 3-4.
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work, and operating a retirement plan or pension system. The booklet
said:
The difference between what an individual is
actually paid and the value of his efforts as deter-
mined above [by cost analysis with respect to the
four alternatives] constitutes the amount of money
paid out by the employer as a "hidden pension." 4 4
The notion of a "hidden pension" expressed the central concern of
employers. In the past a pension was a priori judged uneconomical--a
payment for idleness. Constrained from firing older workers, the firm's
calculus was changed. As always, the firm must ask whether it received
the maximum return on its payments to labor. However, increasing that
return was now socially constrained by the firm's responsibility for old
age dependency and by its relations with labor unions. Efficiency still
the criterion, the question had become whether to pay employees to work
or to pay them--in the form of a pension--to retire.
Businesses had not always considered, let alone favored, the
establishment of company pensions. In the next two chapters I will dis-
cuss the developments which led firms to establish old age pension systems.
The old age income provisions proposed outside industry were objectionable
while company plans were consistent with-other aspects and purposes of
the firms,
44Ibid., p. 5.
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VINCENTIVES TO A CORPORATE SOLUTION:
ALTERNATIVE SUPPORTS
Schemes for the provision of old age income and the alleviation
of old age dependence had been developed by the beginning of the twentieth.
century. Three major alternatives aside from company plans were tried
with.varying degrees of success. All three were either impracticable
or unacceptable.
Some trade unions set up plans. Dependent on big unions for
success, these plans were a source of union strength. and workers' indepen-
dence. For these reasons they were unacceptable to business as a primary
solution to the problem of old age dependency. Thrift schemes set up after
the turn of the century did not work because workers' incomes were too
small to allow for saving. Proposals and experiments for state old age
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insurance were opposed by business for fear of state intervention in labor
relations and of socialism.
Some occupations and their unions organized under trade unions
imported by immigrants--particularly from England and Germany--were
joined to the benefits of European superannuation systems. For example,
the English Amalgamated Society of Engineers had in 1851 organized a
system which was imported to the United States in 1860. The Amalgamated's
Superannuation Benefit was augmented by an Auxiliary Superannuation Fund
Society established in 1876. This Society's funds also enabled the members
to purchase their own homes
so that when compelled by "old age or infirmity" to
cease work, they could be provided with a home where
they could live rent free.2
The fund was an annuity savings plan. An entrance fee and weekly contribu-
tions yielded weekly benefits at retirement according to age at entrance
and years of membership. Another English union, the Amalgamated Society
1Murray Webb Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems and Other
Superannuated and Permanent and Total Disability Benefits in the United
States and Canada (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors, Inc., 1932),
p. 12.
2Amalgamated's Engineer's Journal, new series, 5 (6 June. 1901):
inside back cover.
It seems the Molders in the United States had a similar connection
with the European union's benefits. By an action of the convention.held
in Louisville in July 1878, the superannuationbenef its were abolished in
favor of $100 death benefits. Still, the union's journal carried reports
of the superannuation fund in England, Ireland, and Wales. See, for exam-
ple, Iron Molder's Monthly Journal. C November 1881):5 and (10 September
1882):4.
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of Carpenters and Joiners, had established old age pensions in 1860
and carried the practice to the United States. Both organizations were
small in the United States. They discontinued their pension plans and
ultimately disbanded altogether.4
Early attempts to establish trade union superannaution benefits
in the United States began in the 1850s but came to nothing. At its
seventh convention in 1857 the Typographical Union appointed a committee
to consider a proposal from the Philadelphia printers for the establish-
ment of an old age home. The proposal was defeated at the ninth conven-
tion in 1860. The Iron Molder's Union formed a superannuation fund in
1874 providing a benefit of $300 to members of twenty years' standing and
$400 to members of twenty-five years' standing if permanently disabled
or unable to earn a living at the trade. Membership was to date from
1859 and benefits were to commence in 1879, the delay allowing fund
accumulation. The regulations were repealed in 1878 before any benefits
were paid because a sufficient fund had not been created. A superannuation
feature adopted by the Granite Cutters met a similar end.5 The course of
these proposals is not surprising considering the tendencies in union
activities at the time.
Though. they did not include old age features, beneficiary acti-
vities were central to union activities during the first three decades of
4Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, p. 12.
5James B. Kennedy, aeneficiary Features of American Trade Unions,
Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.,
series 26, nos. 11-12 (.Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1908), p. 101.
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the nineteenth century when most union activity was local. Then, in the
interest of organizing national udiions, beneficial activities were sub-
ordinated to trade activities until the 1850s when in some unions bene-
volent and fraternal functions began to disappear.6 Local benefits hin-
dered successful emphasis on national organization and national unions were
not well enough established to have benefit systems. In addition to en-
gendering local loyalties, local benefits were not adaptable to expanding
market areas and the practice in some unions of travelling members. A
travelling member might he subject to double assessment--at home and in
the area to which he travelled--and might as well not take advantage of
his travelling privileges while away from home. 7
After the close of the Civil War some unions experimented with
insurance associations limited to union members. These were patterned
after the mutual insurance companies growing rapidly in this period. For
example, the Expressmen's Mutual Benefit Association, organized in January
1869, provided life insurance.8 The Granite Cutters, Iron Molders, and
Printers all tried experiments but only in the railroad brotherhoods did
these mutual insurance plans develop into permanent arrangements.
By 1880 the development of union benefits was argued as an aid
to national organization. The primary appeal of benefits came from the
6Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, pp. 8-9..
7
Lloyd Ulman, The Rise of the National Trade Union The Development
and Significance of Its Structure, Governing Institutions, and Economic
Policies (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955), pp. 181-82.
8NCF Papers, Box 1Q9, file: Expressmen's Mutual Benefit Association,
NYPL.
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members' need for them. While not necessarily attracting members, bene-
fits retained them, particularly when the union needed solidarity--when
wage and working conditions were under attack. In times of unemployment,
for example, when maintaining wages and working conditions is most diffi-
cult, benefits retained members and reduced their temptation to work be-
low the union rate. This argument seems to have held true for the Typographi-
cal Union and Cigar Makers during difficult times in the late nineteenth
9
century.
In addition to securing membership, adoption of benefit features
strengthened the national treasury, making aggressive trade policies
possible -because the union could pay strike benefits. At the same time,
because all union monies were generally lumped together, more conservative
members could argue that protection of benefits depended on less strenuous
activity. 10
In this context of the need for old age support and the develop-
ment of benefits, union pension plans were introduced. In the latter
part of the nineteenth century some local unions informally pensioned
retired members. In these cases, formal plans adopted by the national
union replaced or augmented local practices. Pension systems were generally
adopted among those unions which were more craft based, more organized,
or more powerful, with membership large enough to provide the necessary
9 KYennedy, Beneficiary Features of American Trade Unions, pp. 12-15.
1 0 Ibid., p. 107. In some insurance funds, henefit monies were
held distinct. This was particularly likely in states where law regulated
insurance organizations.
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financial basis.
Several early attempts to establish union plans were abortive
largely because of financing. In 1900 the Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners proposed pensions for members of twenty-five years continuous
service and over sixty years old. In 1902 a $105 benefit was proposed,
along with an increase in union dues to support it. The plan was abandoned
when a referendum of the members failed to ratify the proposal because of
11
cost.
Samuel Gompers proposed a superannuation benefit for the Cigar
Workers' Union in 1893. In 1904 a proposal was discussed which provided
a monthly benefit of $4 for members sixty years of age with twenty-five
years in good standing. This plan was dropped. 1 2
A few unions allowed members to use their benefit entitlement
as an old age benefit. For example, the Granite Cutters allowed members
sixty years of age in good standing for ten years to receive $125.13 The
New York Typographical Union No. 6 maintained a retired list to which a
member sixty years of age in twenty-five years continuous good standing
could be recommended hay the union executive. committee. Provided he was
not regularly employed, a member on the retired list was exempt from
financial obligations to the union but remained in good standing--receiving
union henefits and participating in union activity. Among those- on the
1 1Ihid., p. 101.
1 Ibid.,
13 IT>id., p. 102,
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retired list, some were granted pensions, usually of $3 or $4 a week, by
vote of the membership.14 Union disability pension plans were increas-
ingly used to benefit the aged.15 This was also true of out-of-work
benefits.
Several unions established plans like those of the Iron Molders
and Granite Cutters mentioned earlier--to be funded and to begin payment
at some future date. The Journeyman Plumbers established a provision
effective in 1903 with benefits to begin in 1923. Any member at least
forty-five years old with twenty years full membership and incapable of
following his employment because of old age or infirmity would receive
a benefit determined by his age and length of service. The minimum bene-
fit was $30G paid to those sixty-five years of age with twenty years'
service. The maximum was $500 to those of the same age with thirty years'
service or seventy years of age with twenty-five years' service. This
plan seems never to have paid benefits. 1 6
The Pattern Makers' League benefit operative in 1900 was to be
payable in 1920. It provided two classes of heneficiaries. Members sixty
years of age with twenty-five years continous membership would receive
$12 per month; members sixty-five with thirty years would receive $16.
With the same benefits, the Jewelry Workers' rules were effective in 19G2
1 4Regular meetings, 6 May 19Q6, 3 June 1906, and 1 July 1906,
NYTU Minute Books, vol. May 1906-September 1909, NYPL.
1 5Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, p. 4.
1 6Kennedy, Beneficiary Features of American Trade Unions, p. 102.
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with benefits to commence in 1922. The Machinists' plan, effective in
1903 and payable in 1913, would grant lump sums of $500 and $1000, re-
spectively, to members sixty-five with ten consecutive years in good
standing and sixty-eight with twenty yars. The Wood, Wire, and Metal
Lathers International Union set up a plan in 1909 to pay $7 a week to
those sixty years old with fifteen years continuous good standing "pro-
viding he is unable to qualify as a lather according to our international
law." The plan was to go into effect at a later date. None of these plans
17
was ever operative.
In 1910 only two unions in the United States were paying benefits
specifically designated by a superannuation provision. These unions were
the Granite Cutters and Typographical Union, whose benefits began in 1905
and 1909, respectively.1 8
Qualifications under the Granite Cutters' system were ten years
continuous good standing, age sixty-two, and twenty years membership.
Benefits of $10 were paid monthly for six months each year beginning in
November.1 9
Beginning in 1857 the International Typographical Union had dis-
cussed the establishment of a home for aged printers. Not until May 1892
17Ibid., pp. 102-3; Massachusetts, House, Report of the Commission
on Old Age Pensions, Annuities, and Insurance, no. 1400 (Boston: Wright
and Potter Printing Company, 1910), pp. 172, 176-77.
1 8Kennedy, Beneficiary Features of American Trade Unions, p. 103;
Massachusetts, House, Commission on Old Age Pensions (1910), pp. 172-75.
The printers' system was set up in 1907.
1 9Kennedy, Beneficiary Features of American Trade. Unions, p. 103.
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was the home opened in Colorado Springs, Colorado. Applicants for admis-
sion to the home were required to have been members in good standing for
five years and to be incapacitated by age or illness. Neither retirement
nor admission to the home were automatic and might be denied. Between
1893 and 1907 the homes' residents increased from 22 to 143.20
Around 1903 some locals began agitation for expansion of old age
benefits. The home was inadequate, they argued, because it required peo-
ple to leave their homes and to live in an institution. Further, the
home's capacity was limited, while the number of aged members in need of
support was increasing. The introduction of linotype had put many older
members out of work. Locals began to establish benefits. In 1903 Chicago
local No. 16 made specific provision for payment of old age pensions. In
1895 the New York local set up an out-of-work benefit which became effec-
tively a superannuation benefit. Other locals also made provisions which
were a spur to the national. 21
Consideration of proposals introduced in 1903 and 1904 was delayed
because from 1905 to 1907 the union devoted its resources to the eight
hour struggle, which was finally a catalyst to pension adoption. As a
result of strikes and lockouts during the eight hour battle some members
had permanently lost their jobs. Older workers had particular difficulty
finding work. There were too many for the printers' home. A plan sub-
202bid., pp. 103-4. Regular Meetings 2 October 1909 and 7 November
1909, NYTU Minute Books, vol. October 1909-October 1912.
2 1Kennedy, Beneficiary Features of American Trade Unions, pp. 104-5.
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mitted in 1907 was easily ratified.22 In this instance, extensive unem-
ployment, in particular among older workers, was the direct reason for the
establishment of the pension system.
Requirements for the weekly pension of $4 were sixty years of
age, twenty years continuous good standing and earnings less than $4 per
week. The original plan stipulating that the member must have no other
means of support was interpreted liberally. The pension was paid as a
matter of right, not of charity. For financing pensions the union levied
an assessment of one-half percent on members' wages. At the local level
members receiving benefits had to appear annually before the benefit board
for reexamination. 23
22
Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, pp. 21-22; ibid., p. 105.
23
Kennedy, Beneficiary Features of American Trade Unions, p. 105.
Regular Meeting 7 July 1909, NYTU Minute Books, vol. May 1906-September
1909, NYPL. Among the typographers the tendency was to remain working for
as long as possible. The union had set an age sixty retirement until 1925
when the age was raised to sixty-one. The union planned to raise the age
to sixty-five by 1930. In 1927 the sixty year age was restored, in part
because economic conditions made it more difficult for workers generally
and older workers in particular to find work. Still, during the fund's
operation the average age at retirement was not near sixty. The average
retirement ages between 1909 and 1927 were as follows:
1909 69.9 1914 65.7 1919 64.9 1924 64.8
1910 66.4 1915 65.6 1920 64.2 1925 66.2
1911 66.7 1916 65.1 1921 60.1 1926 66.9
1912 66.5 1917 65.1 1922 64.3 1927 67.2
1913 65.8 1918 63.1 1923 64.3
During World War I th-e fund prospered due to increased employment
and earnings and the fact that older men were recalled to replace younger
men gone to war. These years were- followed by a period of deflation, war's
end and the return of younger men, decreased employment,earnings, and the
strike for the. forty-four hour week, all of which put the fund in the red
almost $122,000 in 1923. U. S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Lahor Statis-
tics, Bulletin, Beneficial Activities of American Trade Unions, Miscella-
neous Series no. 465 (September 1928), pp. 40-41.
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Over the next twenty years a small number of unions established
formal pension plans. The Quarry Workers International Union of North
America (1911), the Amalgamated Association of Street and Electric Railway
Employees (1912), the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers (1913), the
Bricklayers, Masons, and Plasterers (1914), the Bridge and Structural
Iron Workers (1915), the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen
(1920), the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1925), the International
Printing Pressmen and Assistants Union of North America (1925), and the
Electrical Workers (1927) set up plans and paid benefits. 2 4
With the promise of a union pension, a worker had some mobility,
not just among firms but possibly among cities, depending on the mix of
local and national benefits. A member could change jobs any number of
times and risk being fired for union activity. By offering this security
a union plan fostered loyalty to the union and made the union itself more
secure.
Union pension plans were administered entirely by union members.
Usually changing a plan was a convention matter. This made changes, most
2 4Massachusetts, House, Commission on Old Age Pensions (1910), p.
176; U. S. Department of Labor, Beneficial Activities of American Trade
Unions, pp. 33-44; Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, pp. 14-15, appen-
dix A, pp. 164-73, appendix C, pp. 180-81. A unique proposal made in
1911 by th-e U. S. Brewers' Association to the International Union of the
United Brewery, Flour, Cereal and Soft Drink Workers would have set up
an industry plan. (At the time the Brewers' Association represented 40
percent of beer production in the United States.) The plan was to be
financed jointly by employers and employees. It was rejected by the
union membership 22,936 to 12,888, partly because it would have established
cooperation between employees and employers. Latimer, Trade Union Pension
Systems, p. 26.
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of which resulted from financial conditions, cumbersome to make. 2 5
Membership was compulsory. For the most part both disability
and old age provisions developed in industries where firms did not esta-
blish plans.26 Railroading is the prominent exception. There union plan
membership was voluntary and only about 20 percent of the members of the
three brotherhoods participated. 27
Union superannuation benefits took several forms: a weekly or
monthly stipend, a lump sum, or support in a home. Regular payments were
favored. Support in a home required leaving family and community, possible
sources of further support. Several unions established old age homes be-
fore they established old age pensions. Where this was the case, pensions
became necessary because the number in need was so great. In attempting
to meet this need unions were caught between the limitations of indoor
relief and the cost of extensive outdoor relief.28 Lump sum benefits
were. common. Though a lump sum might not be managed well it gave the
retiree more control of the benefit and made possible alternatives not
otherwise available. For example, the old age pension system of the Street
Railway Employees (19121 had provided a benefit of $1 to $3 per week. In
2 5 Ibid., p. 7.
2 6Latimer estimated that of 930,000 trade- unionists in organizations
with pensions in 1931 nearly 70 percent were in industries where companies
did not offer benefits. Ibid., p. 117.
2 7 Ibid. The three brotherhoods with old age provisions were the
Locomotive Engineers (1913), the Firemen and Enginemen. (1920), and the
Railroad Trainmen (1925).
2 8Ibid., pp. 8, 18-19.
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1912 the benefit was changed to a lump sum at sixty-five in order to
enable retired members to engage in business.29
In theory the appropriate financing scheme depended on the bases
for the pension. Pensions thought of as charity or efficiency measures--
to make room for younger workers--should be financed by the present gene-
ration of workers. Where the pension was payment for past service or a
right under an agreement the pensioners themselves should have accumulated
a fund.3 0
Union plans were supported entirely by members, usually according
to a funding plan since no other source of money was available for bene-
fits. Only well-financed unions with large-prosperous organizations could
assume the mounting costs of an old age pension plan. Unemployment among
members or decrease in membership would tend to undermine any benefit
scheme. 31
A comparison among per capita expenditures by four unions for
lump sum superannuation benefits bears this out. Table 1 shows average
per capita expenditures for each- union assuming an average benefit of
$1,000. Each set of figures begins with the plan's first year of operation.
The differences reflect th-e size and prosperity of the unions. Benefits
themselves are also worth note: the Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen's
29U. S. Department of Lab.or, Beneficial Activities of American
Trade Unions, pp. 33-34. Payments of this lump sum benefit began in 1915.
Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, p. 202.
3 0Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, p. 10.
3 1 Ibid., p. 121; U. S. Department of Labor, Beneficial Activities
of American Trade Unions, p. 2.
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TABLE 1
Union Membership and Per Capita Expenditures
Assuming $1000 Average Lump Sum Benefit
Street and
Brotherhood of Electric
Locomotive Quarry Railway Railroad
Firemen Workers Workers Trainmen
amt(membership)
1913 $.02 (133,800)
1914 $1.00 (4,000) .03 (126,100)
1915 .28 (3,600) $.04 ( 58,900) .05 (130,500)
1916 1.43 (3,500) - ( 64,600) .05 (143,200)
1917 .86 (3,500) .08 ( 73,700) .05 (158,100)
1918 1.94 (3,100) .06 ( 78,600) .05 (181,400)
1919 2.00 (3,000) .06 ( 89,700) .08 (196,900)
1920 2.67 (3,000) .09 ( 98,700) 08 (184,600)
1921 4.67 (3,000) .09 (100,000) .13 (177,200)
1922 $.50 (107,300) 7.00 (3,000) .21 (100,000) .17 (169,800)
1923 .61 (118,000) 5.00 (2,400) .70 (100,000) .22 (178,900)
1924 .70 (107,500) 5.86 (2,400) .53 (100,000) .26 (177,800)
1925 .82 (106,800) 4.00 (3,000) .63 (100,000) .39 (179,200)
1926 1.23 (106,600) 6.00 (3,000) .76 (101,000) .47 (183,300)
1927 1.25 (104,800) 3.33 (3,000) .90 (101,000) .64 (184,400)
1928 1.47 (104,200) 2.67 (3,000) .81 (101,300) .69 (183,900)
1929 1.09
Source: Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, p. 79, Table 8; p. 135,
appendix, table VI; p. 132, appendix, table III.
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average pension ranged from $1,360 to $1,486; the Railroad Trainmen's
ranged from $1,466 to $1,745; the Quarry Workers was $50; and the Street
and Electric Railway Employees was $800.32
As union plans matured alterations were necessary to meet finan-
cial problems. In 1925 the Locomotive Engineers' Journal reported,
Many union pension funds are sagging now as the
membership gained in the late 90's and early 00's
reach the age of retirement. In addition the World
War laid stress on these protective funds. Tighten-
ing restrictions has been the only recourse, as
higher fees have seemed either unfair or impossible
of approval.3 3
Throughout the 1920s union plans suffered. Pension roles grew due to
unemployment, contributions decreased due to lowering incomes, other
means of support disappeared, and union membership declined. Plans were
altered by raising the retirement age, increasing the membership require-
ment, reducing the income allowed a pensioner, and reducing the age for
admission to the plan.3 5
By 1930 still only a small portion of workers were. covered by
union pensions and plans were contracting in both. membership and benefits.
As table 2 shows, while almost a quarter of union members were covered by
32Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, appendix, Table VI, p. 135.
33.Locomotive Engineers' Journal 59 (November 1925):868.
3 4In railroading, for example, employment declined between 1920
and 1930 displacing 535,000 workers. President's Research Committee on
Social Trends, Report, Recent Social Trends in the United States, vol. 2
(New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1933), p. 807.
3 5Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, p. 37.
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TABLE 2
Union Superannuation Benefit Coverage
Total Total % Total % Labor % Non-farm
Union Members Members Force Labor Force
Year Membership Covered Covered Covered Covered
1900 868,500 3,300 0.4 .01 .02
1905 2,022,300 18,600 0.9 .06 .09
1910 2,184,200 72,000 3.3 .2 .3
1915 2,607,700 421,300 16.1 1.1 1.6
1920 5,110,800 737,800 14.5 1.8 2.6
1925 3,817,900 709,600 18.6 1.6 2.1
1928 3,900,000 914,600 23.5 2.0 2.6
Sources: Latimer, Trade Union Pension Systems, table I, pp. 128-29;
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, vol. 1, Series D 1-10,
p. 126.
some form of superannuation pension or lump sum benefit (excluding old
age homesl in 1928, those covered constituted only 2 percent of the labor
force and only about 2.6 percent of the non-farm labor force. 3 6
Outside the railroad brotherhoods, those unions providing super-
annuation benefits tended to be the craft-based unions of the nineteenth
century. Workers in th.e ascendant sectors of the industrial economy were
unprotected and most vulnerable. At the same time labor unrest in the
closing decades of the nineteenth. century and early decades of the twen-
tieth- had employers on guard. The increasing numbers of organized workers
and the increasing role of unions made even these limited attempts at
3 6Ibid., pp. 128-29.
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self-protection worth notice. To the extent that union pensions made
workers independent of employers they were unacceptable to business.
Motivations for establishing company plans were structurally counter to
the union plans: the two implied different loyalties and had different
implications for the role and viability of unions. As I will discuss
in chapter 6, company pensions were introduced in part to win the
loyalty of workers away from unions and to undermine union strength,
on which such benefits as union pensions depended.
Despite increasing recognition of the workers' inability to save
for old age, thrift was advanced as a remedy for old age dependence.
Schemes for individual savings and the instruction of thrift were popular
at the turn of the century. Thrift ideology relieved industry of the re-
sponsibility for poor wages and poverty and created business for insurance
companies. The Prudential, Metropolitan Life, and other companies had
old age annuity plans "for the working classes" by 1910.37
Senator John F. Dryden, founder of the Prudential Insurance Com-
pany and a director of U. S. Steel, wrote to his son Forest F. Dryden,
President of the Prudential, regarding these schemes,
The American aim and ideal is for the highest
possible degree of economic independence; and such
independence throughout life, particularly in old
age can only be gained by rational education in fa-
mily expenditures, savings and insurance and by a
decidedly higher degree of industrial efficiency of
the workers of the nation. The only permanent solu-
3 7Massachusetts, House, Commission on Old Age Pensions (19101, pp.
179-83.
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tion to the problem of poverty is through the deve-
lopment of the virtues of self-reliance, forethought,
and thrift; . . . 38
Under thrift schemes, those whose companies produced economic hardships
among workers would teach them how to live with those hardships.
In Massachusetts, under the state's Insurance and Annuity Act of
1908, savings banks, operating without stockholders and solely for the
benefit of depositors, were designated as the institutions to administer
the state's version of a thrift program. Nearly 300 labor organizations
supported the act, among them the state A. F. of L., the Boston Central
Union, the International Boot and Shoe Workers' Union, and the Interna-
tional Textile Workers' Union.3 9
Such plans as the Massachusetts savings bank plan had little chance
of success. In general wages were near subsistence, "as though sickness,
accidents, invalidity and old age had been banished from the earth."4 0
In 190.6, $600 a year was considered the minimum livable income outside
agriculture for a family of five in the. United States. In the same year
average annual earnings of employed workers in the textile industry were
$360, in iron and steel $617, in agricultural implements $548, in electri-
cal machinery $522, in clothing $454, in lumber $479, in leather $534, in
paper and printing $549, in rubber goods $454, in petroleum refining $606,
3 8Lee Welling Squier, Old Age Dependency in the United States. A
Complete Survey of the Pension Movement (New York: Macmillan Company, 1912),
p. 264.
3 9
"Massachusetts Substitute for Old Age Pensions," pamphle.t issued
by Massachusetts Savings Insurance League. (1925?).
4 0Squier, Old Age Dependency, p. 38.
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in glass $719, in tobacco $403, and in auto $689. Most wages were not
adequate to the minimum standard so it was hardly possible to save.
As might have been anticipated, these plans were not very popular
among a population whose wages were often barely adequate to subsistence.
An affordable premium produced a retirement benefit too small to make a
difference; a reasonable retirement benefit required prohibitive pre-
miums.42 The second alternative for old age support was unworkable.
The third alternative, government old age pensions, was part of a
broad program of social reform. The Charity Organization Society Move-
ment begun in England in 1869 was soon introduced to the United States.
The new charity was organized systematically and administered "scientifi-
cally." Applying business techniques to the administration of charity
was consistent with the methods of other large scale, bureaucratic organi-
zations of the time. A response to the hardships of industrial life and
the unorganized relief practices of the 1870s, it also provided an occa-
sion and method for the documentation of widespread need and a basis for
the argument that older forms of relief--in particular, indoor relief--
were costly and inefficient.43 New outdoor relief programs based on the
4 1Paul D. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States 1890-1926,
Publications of the Pollak. Foundation for Economic Research, no. 9 (Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930), pp. 258, 265, 271, 276, 283, 292, 296,
299, 303, 307.
4 2Squier, Old Age Dependency, p. 267.
4 3Daniel T. Rogers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America 1850-1920
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 224-28.
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assumption of widespread social problems influenced later reform pro-
posals for government intervention.
By the 1880s and 1890s notions of unemployment and poverty had
turned from their focus on the individual unemployed to the social pheno-
mena themselves. The new charity faced the exigencies of the industrial
order. Some went so far as to argue that theories attributing unemploy-
ment and other social ills to overpopulation, immigration, or fluctuations
in money supply were mistaken and that these phenomena were aspects of
the. disorganization of the industrial system.
Such theories were unnecessary for many workers whose direct
experiences yielded similar analyses. Old age unemployment and poverty,
no less than these phenomena generally, were recognized as products of
the industrial system. There was organized agitation for state old age
insurance from about 1900 though the question had been raised earlier
as other countries--notably Germany, Iceland, Denmark, Italy, and New
Zealand, all before the turn of the century--adopted measures to meet the
need.
In the Journal of United Labor, the publication of the Knights of
Labor, a specific proposal was put forth as early as 1888 for a workers'
fund to provide pensions.
Each large factory or workshop that owns machinery
should have each machine, building and ground taxed so
much for the State tax as now exists; so much for the
workers' fund. It is but just. The machine robs many
a laborer of his bread;it should, in turn support the
disabled, old and helpless. . . . Too many of us give
our best years to building up the fortunes of others,
and find it impossible from our scanty wages to lay up
a penny for future needs, Therefore, why not urge it
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upon our law-makers--the necessity for a workers'
fund?44
Terrence V. Powderly, Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor,
wrote in favor of government pensions for workers in October 1891. He
argued that if soldiers, who do the work of destruction, deserve pensions,
certainly workers, who produce. in the society, deserve them. 4 5
The workmen are to-day battling in the struggle through
which. corporate greed is enriched, and, when the end
of the thirty years rolls around for each and every one
of them, they are dismissed and another soldier of po-
verty enlists to go on until his aching hack can no
longer bear the burden. . . . Is it not time to agitate
the question of paying a pension to the man who works
himself into premature old age in the service of the
nation? In this age there is no longer standingroom
for the man who works on the field of labor; his work
must be done before he looks upon the morning of his
fiftieth birthday, or not at all. The opportunities
are taken from him, and, no matter at what cost, loss
of pride or feeling, he must take from the hand of cha-
rity that which he has earned from his country. It
4 4
"'Warriors' and 'Workers'," The Journal of United Labor (Phila-
delphia) 9 (13 September 1888):2.
45Soldiers' pensions were notorious in the late nineteenth- century.
In addition to being increased to obtain votes, pension rolls and allow-
ances were increased to solve the problem of the federal budget surplus!
In fact, the ideological distinctions drawn between military and civilian,
between public and private pensions are enlightening and will be included
in further work. To give a sense of the military case: Some argued that
soldiers were working for their country rather than for themselves and so
ought to be pensioned as reward. The counter was that, while in a monarchy
such might be the case, in a democracy soldiers are, in fact, fighting for
themselves and ought not to be pensioned. By risking their lives, soldiers
were also distinguished from civilian workers. (It was in part on this
basis that pensions for policemen and firemen were argued and established.)
In response, reformers pointed out the risks of industrial work. For
background on military pensions, see William Henry Glasson, History of
Military Pension Legislation in the United States (New York: n.p., 1900)
and Charles Francis Adams, The Civil War Pension Lack-of-System; A Four
Thousand-Million Record of Legislative Incompetence Tending to General
Political Corruption (n.p., 1912?).
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certainly is right to pension his services in another
direction by retiring him from the field of industry on
a pension. It will come to that someday, and we may as
well begin the agitation that will make of our posterity
an independent, self-respecting citizenship, instead
of inmates of alms and poor houses, when no longer able
to shovel wealth into the pockets of millionaires. 4 6
Though labor was divided--advocating variously higher wages, union
pensions, state pensions, or revolution--there was agreement that old age
unemployment and poverty required action. After the turn of the century
agitation became more organized and involved a variety of advocates--
including labor, reformers concerned with the affects of industrial condi-
tions, and corporate liberals interested in the system's survival. In
view of the examples of foreign systems, the documentation of widespread
need, the inefficiency of indoor relief, the failure of individual-oriented
schemes, and the recognition of the social basis of the problem, reformers
directed their efforts toward insurance by the states or federal govern-
ment.
Isaac Max Rubinow, an advocate of a broad range of social insurance,
including insurance against old age unemployment, accidents, illness,
unemployment, and death, favored government insurance for old age in part
because private company pensions were objectionable.. He wrote in 1904,
This great triumph of private charity freferring to the
railroad and Carnegie Steel pension plans introduced
since 1900] has all the worst features that such. a fund
can have, for all the benefits for sickness, accidents,
as well as old age, are received by the workingmen, not
as a matter of right, but a favor given only for conti-
nuous "good behavior," 4 7
4 6
"The Payment of Pensions," The Journal of United Labor (Philadel-
phia) 12 (1 October 1891):2..
4 7 Isaac Max Rubinow, "Labor Insurance," Journal-of Political Econo-
my 12 (1903-1904):362-81.
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Rubinow advocated government old age insurance which, though it could be
carried out by municipal and state governments, seemed best brought under
the federal government, which- had experience with army pensions. Over
the next twenty years Rubinow was active in efforts to establish broad
ranging social insurance.
Old age pension bills were put before state legislatures. In
Massachusetts bills were introduced each session beginning in 1903. Bills
were. considered in Pennsylvania beginning in 1909 and in Wisconsin start-
ing in 1911. However, Alaska was the first "state'" to pass an old age
pension law, in 1915, enabling counties to adopt old age pension provi-
.49
sions.
Proposals for state insurance advanced a variety of arrangements.
Some put forward a pro rata tax on industry; some required employee con-
tributions; some would have been provided out of general revenues. Some
prescribed benefits based on age alone; others required minimum service.
or residence; some allowed an automatic pension to any worker unable on
account of age to find employment. Virtually all were intended only as
income supplements rather than complete support.
Some of the impetus for these bills came from the American Associa-
tion for Labor Legislation (AALL), founded in 1906 by a group of social
scientists interested in a wide range of labor reforms. Though- the AALL
48Federal pensions were at the time generally argued to he uncon-
stitutional, a violation of states' rights.
4 9Arizona had passed a law in 1914 but it was voided by the state.
superior court. President's.Research Committee, Recent Social Trends,
vol. 2, p. 12-34.
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focused on health insurance, its work included unemployment insurance
and old age pensions. The AALL drafted a model pension bill which it
circulated and promoted among the states.50
Beginning in 1910 with the Massachusetts Commission study, the
problem received growing documentation and publicity. Though most of the
state research advocated voluntarism--individual thrift or private com-
pany plans--the studies, were nonetheless affirmation of the public
nature of the problem.5 1
Old age pensions became the leading social issue of the 19.20s.
Around the country a variety of organizations were founded with- a wide
range of plans--some of them quite fantastic--to provide income security
for the aged. Among these, the Townsend movement and the Fraternal Order
of Eagles were prominent.52 Probably most notable and influential among
the organizations was the American Association for Old Age Security53
5 0Microfilm Edition of the Papers of the American Association for
Labor Legislation, 1905-1943, Reels 65 and 66: Old Age Pensions and Insu-
rance, 1910-1940, Tamiment Institute Library, New York University, NY. In
particular, reel 65, Research Materials Old Age Pensions and Insurance 1919,
model pension bill.
5 1For example, Pennsylvania, Report of the Pennsylvania Commission
on Old Age Pensions (Harrisburg: J. L. L. Kuhn Printer, 1919); Industrial
Commission of Wisconsin, Report on Old Age Relief (March 1, 1915); Ohio,
Report of the Commission on Health and Old Age Insurance (1918); California,
Report of the Industrial Accident Commission (1919).
5 2For background on the Fraternal Order of Eagles, see Roy Lubove,
The Struggle for Social Security, 1900-1935 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1968), pp. 137-46; on the Townsend movement see Abraham Holtz-
man, The Townsend Movement: A Political Study (New York: Bookman Associates,
Inc., 1963). Also, U. S. Congress, House, Select Committee Investigating
Old-Age Pension Organizations, Old-Age Pension Plans and Organizations.
Hearings Before the Select Committee . . . Pursuant to H. R. 443, 74th Cong.,
2nd sess., 1936, 2 vol.
5 3The American Association for Old Age Security hecame the Icont.]
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founded in 1927 by Abraham Epstein, who had chaired the 1926 Pennsyl-
vania Commission on Old Age Pensions and who authored several books on
old age security. Like Rubinow, Epstein devoted his career to agitation
for social insurance but focused particularly on old age pensions.54
By the end of 1928 six states had passed enabling laws and from
1929 to 1931 eleven more states passed laws, six of these. mandatory. 5 5
By 1933 fifteen states were paying old age pensions.56 These state pro-
visions were eventually superceded by federal social security programs.
Though it was not until well into the 1920s that reform efforts
produced effective public action, the agitation, which had been present
since the turn of the century, was taken seriously by business--not only
in itself but as just one aspect of a wave of reform which- demanded re-
sponse. Business responded by establishing company pension plans and by
opposing old age pension legislation.
During the first two decades of the century the National Civic
Federation (NCF) served as a clearinghouse for businesses interested in
establishing old age pension plans as well as other welfare measures.
American Association for Social Security.
5 4 Books by Epstein include: Facing Old Age; A Study of Old Age
Dependency in the United States and Old Age Pensions (New York: A. A.
Knopf, 1922); The Challenge of the Aged (New York: Macy-Masius, The Van-
guard Press, 1928); Insecurity: A Challenge to America (.New York: Harrison
Smith and Robert Haas, 1933); and Social Security (New York: League for
Industrial Democracy, 1937).
5 5President's Research. Committee, Recent Social Trends, vol. 2,
pp. 1199-1200.
5 6California, New York, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Delaware, New
Hampshire, Idaho, New Jersey, -Utah, Wyoming, Kentucky, Maryland, Minne-
sota, Nevada, and Montana.
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Founded in 1900 and patterned after the Chicago Civic Federation, whose
activities focused on civic reform and industrial arbitration and con-
ciliation, the National Civic Federation included the active participa-
tion of some labor leaders, among them Samuel Gompers, but was dominated
by big business. Opposed to government intervention in industrial rela-
tions, mindful of the need for industrial peace, and vigilantly on the
lookout for an "entering wedge" of socialism, the Federation advocated
voluntary old age pension plans as part of industrial welfare programs
designed to address these issues. 5 7
The Federation's Secretary, Ralph Easley, and his secretary
Gertrude Beeks (who became Gertrude Beeks Easley), corresponded with
firms. They provided lists of companies which had adopted plans and
specific information on practices, including copies of particular plans.
Such firms as American Sugar Refining, General Electric, Prudential
Insurance, American Telephone and Telegraph., Armour, Metropolitan Life,
Firestone Tire and Ruhher, numerous railroad companies, United States
Steel, and scores of others used the Civic Federation as a forum--both
by mail and at meetings--for the exchange of ideas and data on old age
pension plans. In the 1920s, when private plans faced financial problems,
5 7NCF Papers, Boxes 85-90, NYPL. These boxes contain the papers
of the NCF Industrial Welfare Department from 1912 to 1929 and include
papers concerned with old age dependency and pensions. As part of its
program for industrial peace, the NCF encouraged unions, arguing that it
was important to establish stable ongoing relations amenable to arbitra-
tion and conciliation techniques. For information on the activities of
the NCF, see James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State:
1900-1918 CBoston: Beacon Press, 19681 and Marguerite Green, The National
Civic Federation and the American Labor Movement 190Q-1925 (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1956),
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NCF efforts included communications with insurance companies engaged in
various forms of pension reinsurance and annuity plans. 5 8
Dominated by large businesses able to manage welfare problems
internally and viewing old age dependence and pensions as a problem of
industry, the NCF advocated a voluntary solution in the
policies and practices of employers, especially the
leaders--the railroad companies, the great manufacturers,
the gigantic producers of the necessaries for the high
plane of civilization reached in this country. 5 9
The NCF was adamantly opposed to legislation on the matter. The Easley's
kept close watch on legislation in the various. states and were in touch-
with state manufacturers' associations. 61
In March 1923 Gertrude Easley wrote to Carleton A. Chase, Presi-
dent of the First Trust and Deposit Company of Syracuse, New York. She
58For example, Roy A. Hunt, vice.-president, American Central Life
Insurance Company, Indianapolis, Letter to Charles L. Edgar, chairman, NCF
Industrial Welfare Department, 8 January 1926; Raymond F. Low, president,
American Reserve Life Insurance Company, Omaha, Letter to Charles L. Edgar,
7 January 1926; M. Montgomery, president, Acacia Mutual Life Association,
Washington, D.C., Letter to Charles L. Edgar, 4 February 1926; NCF Papers,
Box 85, file: Old Age Dependency and Pensions, General Correspondence A,
NYPL.
5 9National Civic Federation, Study Extent of Old Age Dependency.
Report by the Industrial Welfare Department upon Economic and Physical
Status of Persons 65 Years of Age and Over in New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, and Connecticut includes Additional Data from Massachusetts
(New York: National Civic Federation, 1929), p. 8.
6 00n the other hand, the Federation favored government pensions for
public employees. In 1912 the NCF had established a committee- to adopt a
model pension bill for states and the federal government. F. Spencer Bald-
win, chairman, NCF committee to prepare model pension bill, Letter to James
Duncan, International Secretary-Treasurer, Granite Cutters' International
Association of America, 13 April 19-12, NCF Papers, Box 85, file: General
Correspondence D, NYPL.
6 1NCF Papers, Box 85, files of general correspondence, throughout,
NYPL.
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had been appointed to the New York County Trade Commission Committee
and in that capacity had read the Lyman bill, which would establish state
old age insurance. She wrote,
We have been trying to defeat this proposed legis-
lation in a number of states. I am inclined to think
that if it has not been introduced in New York State
the one reason is because of the knowledge of our ef-
forts. I understood that its introduction was intended
but up to about a week ago it had not been placed be-
fore the legislature. The Lyman bill is as bad. It
is pending.
Once the entering wedge is made all sorts of
"socialization" schemes will be put forth and with our
people uninformed they may gradually secure the enact-
ment of laws which will menace our institutions.
. I spent the morning digesting the bill and it
seems to me to be the most pernicious proposition that
could be conceived. I wonder how you feel about it.
Chase wasted no time, replying the next day. He wrote,
You know, I guess, how I feel regarding all these pa-
ternalistic measures and I believe everything possible
should be done to prevent their becoming attached to
this country.6 2
The Civic Federation's efforts to develop an alternative to state
insurance were less to provide protection in old age than to ward off
intervention. In May 1924, P. Tecumseh- Sherman, an attorney active in
NCF affairs, wrote to George T. Wright, Secretary and Manager of the
Association of Life Insurance Presidents,
Our organization has successfullly opposed legis-
lative propositions for compulsory state social insu-
rance laws on sickness and unemployment insurance and
old age pensions. It has published the results of four
inquiries showing conclusively that we should not adopt
6 2Gertrude Beeks Easley, Letter to Carleton A. Chase, president,
1st Trust and Deposit Company, 12 March 1923; Chase, Letter to Easley,
13 March 1923; NCF Papers, Box 85, file: General Correspondence. C, NYPL.
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such plans in the U.S.
It is believed by many that employers and workers
should co-operate on lines that will stand the test of
time. It is also believed that some step should be .
taken in the near future by those interested in indus-
trial welfare to promote some pregress [progress?] on
old age pensions, which will at least be the first
step toward the solution of this problem.6 3
During the 1920s pressure from the movement for government pensions
increased at the time that company plans were in financial trouble. In
1924 the NCF Committee on Pensions began preparation of what was to be
a "constructive plan" for old age pensions. The chairman of the committee
to draft the report was P. Tecumseh Sherman, a lawyer who had served as
New York's Commissioner of Labor between 1905 and 1907. The rest of the
committee were William J. Graham of the Equitable Life Assurance Company,
Frank V. Whiting of the New York Central Lines, Arthur Williams of the
New York Edison Company, James E. Kavanaugh_ of the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Company, and J. W. Sullivan of the American Federation of Labor.
Edmund S. Cogswell, who had been secretary of the Massachusetts Commission
on Old Age Pensions, was hired in 1926 to do work- on the analysis of old
age dependence. The Committee was to spend two months in Europe and
have a final draft prepared by October., Then a conference of about fifty
corporate and national labor organization representatives would make fur-
ther proposals. Falling somewhat hehind schedule this plan was carried
6 3Chairman, NCF Welfare Department Committee on Pensions, Letter
to George T. Wright, Secretary and Manager, Association of Life Insurance
Presidents, 23 May 1924, NCF Papers, Box 85, file: Old Age Dependency and
Pensions, NYPL.
6 4Gertrude Beeks Easley, Letter to Mrs. Sydney C. Borg, Conference
on Charities and Corrections, NCF Papers, Box 85, file: Old Age Dependency
and Pensions, General Correspondence B, NYPL.
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out.
Through the survey of typical American industrial cities and inter-
views with nearly 15,000 aged people the committee gathered data on dis-
ablement in old age, length of service., and economic status.65 Among
the towns surveyed were Buffalo, Syracuse, Troy, Corning, Elmira, Wales,
and New York City, New York; Bridgeport and Meriden, Connecticut; Newark,
Trenton, and New Brunswick., New Jersey; and Williamsport and Reading,
Pennsylvania. The primary purpose of the study, done under a $40,0.00
appropriation from the Carnegie Corporation, was to get facts on which to
base financial estimates for old age security provisions. Faced with
failing private plans as an argument for state intervention, the NCF
proposed to solve the problem of financially unsound private pensions by
establishing actuarial standards and encouraging employee contributions
to funding.
Writing in 1924, Ralph Easley explained the impetus of the study.
Possibly you are aware that railroad companies and indi-
vidual corporations adopted pensions without realizing
what would be, as they are. now beginning to realize, an
appalling accrued liability. The mounting cost is stu-
pendous.
Labor, we find, will welcome a contributory plan.
This fact, and the failure of Morris and Co. to safeguard
their employees when merging with Armour & Co., make
timely the proposition not only to protect employers
by offering an actuarially sound scheme but one which
will stimulate thrift and prevent the adoption here of
any pauperizing European state pension scheme which-
65P. Tecumseh Sherman, chairman, Committee on Old Age Pensions,
Letter to Edward G. Acheson, president, Acheson Graphite Company, Niagara
Falls, 30 September 1927, NCF Papers, Box 85, file: Old Age Dependency and
Pensions, General Correspondence A, This is a form letter sent to many
businesses.
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also would bring unbearable tax burdens.
Our plan will be contractual with some form of
trusteeship. The growing confidence in insurance will
make it possible for the great old line insurance or-
ganizations to be utilized.6 6
So the recommendations of the study were a foregone conclusion.
Anticipating the document's completion, Ralph Easley wrote to various
state legislators in 1927 calling attention to the study, which would
"indicate whether or not state old age pensions should be advocated." 6 7
Three years earlier Easley had written,
We have persistently and successfully opposed state
Old Age Pensions, one of the devices to secure an enter-
ing wedge to socialization of industry and final disrup-
6 6Ralph M. Easley, Letter to John G. Agar, Agar, Ely, and Fulton,
New York City, 21 July 1924, NCF Papers, Box 85, file: Old Age Dependency
and Pensions, General Correspondence A, NYPL. The Prudential Insurance
Company in 1908 and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company in l909' began
to offer policies for old age insurance. Premiums were based on age at
entry and level of benefits. Weekly premiums were paid until sixty-five
when the annuity began. For example, the premiums for Metropolitan's
plan providing $100 in life insurance and $100 in annuity were 13% for
entry at age twenty, 16. at twenty-five, 21- at thrity, and so on, up
to 82r at fifty. Once the annuity began premiums were discontinued.
Massachusetts, House, Commission on Old Age Pensions (1910j, pp. 179-83.
Some insurance companies writing policies for old age pensions did so for
particular sectors, perhaps in an attempt to choose better risks. The
Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company of Philadelphia, for example,
which began to offer annuities in 1926, preferred pension plans "for
offices, financial institutions, and the like, rather than to factories
and plants." Edward W. Marshall, Associate Actuary, Provident Mutual Life
Insurance Company, Letter to Charles L. Edgar, Chairman, NCF Industrial
Welfare Department, 5 January 1926, NCF Papers, Box 86, file: Old Age De-
pendency and Pensions, General Correspondence P - Q, NYPL. These organi-
zations would have also been more familiar with such plans based on ex-
perience with their own employees.
6 7 For example, Ralph Easley, Chairman, NCF Executive Committee,
Letter to Chairman, Judiciary Committee, Alabama State Senate, Montgomery,
10 February 1927, NCF Papers, Box 85, file: Old Age Dependency and Pen-
sions, General Correspondence A, NYPL.
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tion of our government.
Now, we want to offer a solution of the problem
which we can do with the expert help of the insurance
companies. It must be an insurance proposition to pro-
tect corporations from the mounting costs of free pen-
sions, most startling, and employees against the loss 68
of pensions in case of failure or merger of the business.
The Extent of Old Age Dependency, the final report issued by the
Industrial Welfare Department of the NCF, advocated contributory pensions
69
in industrial concerns and warned against state systems.
The thrift plans and union pensions proposed to alleviate the
problem of old age dependency were impracticable given wage levels and
the state of the labor movement. Extensive union provisions and state
old age insurance were unacceptable to business. However, not only to
ward off state intervention did private companies adopt pension plans
during the first three decades of this century. Business had its. own
reasons for adopting old age- pensions. In the next chapter 1 will discuss,
these motivations.
68Ralph M. Easley, Le-tter to John G. Agar, Agar, Ely and Fulton,
New York City, 17 July 1924, NCF Papers, Box 85, file-: Old Age Dependency
and Pensions, General Correspondence A, NYPL.
6 9National Civic Federation, Extent of Old Age Dependency, pp. 16-
18. The business community was not unanimous in its support of voluntary
pension provisions. Divisions in the business community is a question
to which I will give more attention in further work..
113
VI
MOTIVATIONS FOR A CORPORATE SOLUTION:
CORPORATE NEEDS AND PRACTICE
Over the first three decades of the twentieth century private
corporations in the United States began to adopt formal old age pension
systems. Informal practices of the past based in small scale operations,
personal familiarity, and social obligations became obsolete in the
large scale, nationally organized, and geographically dispersed stock
ownership corporations created by the late nineteenth century. Growing
awareness of old age dependency and its interpretation as a problem of
industry created pressure for firms to rationalize unemploying older
workers and to provide old age retirement support. Following European
examples, trade unions had adopted pension plans which were a threat to
companies since benefits strengthened workers' economic and political
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loyalties to unions. The movement to establish old age insurance was
seen by some to threaten government regulation of labor relations. To
undermine independence and union strength--such as was embodied in union
welfare provisions--and to avert government intervention on the side of
labor, some firms established their own plans and urged the practice on
private industry as a whole.
Whether or not they met the needs of workers for old age income,
these pension plans served the needs of business and were consistent with
business practice. An aspect of attacks on strong unions, pensions
courted employees' economic loyalty and encouraged stability to decrease
labor turnover and promote industrial peace. In the systematic, bureau-
cratic style of the large modern corporations, pensions rationalized the
unemployment of older, unwanted workers and helped make possible increas-
ing technical efficiency in production. Pensions were also consistent
with the structure and purposes of other corporate welfare practices,
Formal pension plans were introduced primarily in larger firms,
which contended with nationally organized unions and were the objects of
attacks on big business and where rationalization and bureaucratization
were becoming standard practice. Railroading and iron and steel were
among the earliest of these modern industries. They were also among the
earliest in which-old age, pension plans were adopted. These two offer
examples of the business interests which gave rise to private old age
pensions.
In companies which adopted formal pension schemes, these were
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often just one among an array of welfare practices, which included
profit sharing plans, libraries, company stores, death benefits, sick
benefits, housing, YMCA's, and life insurance. Formal corporate welfare
programs were organized under employees' benefit associations, consti-
tuting essentially company unions, or under relief departments. Welfare
programs had two bases: the employees' need for economic and social
welfare and the companies' need for a stable, compliant labor force.
These measures did not go far in meeting employees' needs in this period.
Nonetheless, competing with and undermining other likewise inadequate
benefit arrangements--notably the union programs--company welfare provi-
sions bound employees to the firms.
The place of the railroads in the nineteenth century was firm
and primary in the economy. Henry Adams wrote, "The generation between
1865 and 1895 was already mortgaged to the railways and no one knew it
better than the generation itself."' The railroads were the first indus-
try in the United States with complex managerial hierarchies and many
centers of operation., They were among the first corporations to be
regulated by state and federal government, to be confronted by powerful,
national unions, to have large numbers of stock and bond holders, and
to deal with public relations and community welfare.2 They were, accord-
ingly the first to adopt formal welfare and pensioning practices for their
1 Henry Adams, The Education of Henry Adams (Boston: Houghton
Mifflin Company, 1961), p. 240.
2Thomas C. Cochran, Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind
in Action CCambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1953), p. 2.
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employees.
In 1880 the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad was one of the leading
railroads in the country and one of the-first firms to have a separate
management section for rationalizing the labor process and handling
company labor relations. Four years prior to the establishment of its
old age pension plan, in 1880, the B & 0 pioneered in industrial welfare
by the establishment of its relief association. In England railroad
companies had organized relief associations since 1850 and in Canada
the Grand Trunk Railway had organized an employees' accident insurance
association in 1873. W. T. Barnard, organizer of the B. & 0 plan,
examined railway benevolent organizations in England, Canada, and conti-
nental Europe before setting up the B & 0 plan. 3
In case of death or disability from sickness or accident, the
association provided benefits commensurate with members' individual pay-
ments for coverage. Two years later in 1882 the savings feature was
introduced as part of the relief association's program. This mutual
savings plan provided interest on deposits and granted loans primarily
for employees' construction or purchase of homes along the railroad lines. 4
What did the organizers of the Baltimore and Ohio Employees'
Relief Association have in mind? "Although, through misapprehension of-
its provisions and design, opposition was manifested to the plan at its
3Emory R. Johnson, "Railway Departments for the Relief and Insurance
of Employes," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
6 (November 1895):430.
4The Catalogue of the Centenary Exhibition of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927 (Baltimore: n.p., 1927), pp. 180-81.
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inception," in its first year the association's relief feature issued
14,430. policies.5 There is no specific mention of the basis for this
opposition, but later in the association's First Annual Report there is
a suggestion.
It may be reckoned a matter for congratulations that,
when understood, our Association has met with. such very
general acceptance from the employees of the Company.
Possessing a well considered and cheap benevolent organi-
zation, guaranteed and liberally endowed with many and
useful privileges by their employers, yet managed and
controlled by a Board of their own selection, those em-
ployees of the B & 0 Company who desire to protect them-
selves and their families against the pecuniary distresses
incident to compulsory cessation from labor, now under-
stand that there is no need for them to seek outside
Insurance organizations. The Association has supplied a
long-felt want, and its members seem to appreciate the
convenience, certainty and regularity in paying fixed
and definite contributions, by the plan of periodical
deductions from pay rolls, in place of the inconvenient
methods of assessment in vogue among co-operative associa-
tions and the brotherhoods.6
The provisions of the association were an alternative to similar
provisions offered by workers' organizations. In a period of considerable
labor organizing and militancy among railroad workers, this fact in
itself might be enough to create opposition. Compulsory membership in
company relief programs would virtually deplete membership in the parallel
programs of employee organizations, whose role was in part to provide
for workers in the face of hardships suffered in railroad employment and
under the conditions of modern industry. Such provision on the part of
5First Annual Report of the Baltimore and Ohio Employes' Relief
Association, by W. T. Barnard, Secretary (Baltimore: Press of Isaac
Friedenwald, 1881), p. 3.
6Ibid., p. 14.
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working men's organizations laid a basis for mutual benefit and mutual
dependence which bolstered a labor organization in opposition to an
employer. The treasury established also increased a union's ability
to offer support fdr organizing or in case of a strike. Insurance by
labor organizations also affirmed the notion that people ought to take
care of themselves.
Independence was a moral virtue of the old order and a right, to
which economic self-sufficiency--individually or as part of a group--
was prerequisite. Economic self-sufficiency given modern employment
required a wage adequate to daily subsistence and to protection against
the risks of illness, accident, death, and unemployment. Provision
against these risks by the firm, rather than by the individual workman
or by organizations of workmen, established dependence on the firm. These
provisions violated the principles of independence and self-sufficiency
derived from a subsistence agrarian history, as well as setting the
workman against himself--fostering dependence on and loyalty to his
employer as against his own. organization, in this period distinctly at
odds with. the firm.
The financial structure of the B & 0 association further bound
the employee to the firm., Surplus receipts of the relief fund were
invested in B & 0 common stock. Such investment, whether by intention
or not, made using his economic power against the company contrary to
an employee's interests. Hardships suffered b.y company stock would be
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7Ibid., p. 8.
reflected in relief fund payments.
In addition to making donation to the fund of six month's inte-
rest on $100,000 at 5 percent, the company assumed the salaries of the
association's secretary, medical inspectors, and clerks and all other
operating expenses. The company donation amounted to $3,000, which was
added to $85,543.26 in members' dues. 8 Though the Annual Report showed
a balance of $47,040.12 in the fund, after considering future liabilities
on the first year account the actual surplus was reported as $8,779.96
plus thetcompany's donation of $3,000. Between using this surplus to
decrease the next year's assessments and to increase natural death bene-
fits the latter was chosen. Spread across the membership, the reduction
in monthly payments would have been only six cents, while natural death
benefits would nearly double.10 Expenses for the year paid by the B & 0
company amounted to $14,955.25 which, if they had been paid from fund
receipts, would have left the fund without a surplus for increasing the
death. henefit.
"The result attained well illustrated the generosity of the
Baltimore and Ohio Company to this Association."1 1  Such generosity
8Ibid., p. 4.
9 bid., p. 6. In the text the company donation is inaccurately
reported as $4,000, though in an accounting the amount is accurately re-
ported as $3,000.
1 0Depending on payments the employee made, benefits were on the
order of $100 to $200. The increase would then bring benefits to $200
to $400.
1 1First Annual Report of the Baltimore and Ohio Employes' Relief
Association, p. 9.
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was, in a sense, precisely the problem for the working men and their
organizations. Company contributions were often conditional and usually
suspect. Workers were well aware that what the company gave the company
could take away, while benefits the workers built up for themselves
were under their own control.
In the first year membership in the relief association was
technically voluntary and open to any employee wishing to join, the
company considering it
impolitic to discriminate at its inception against age
or physical condition; because those who, by such dis-
crimination, would be excluded from the benefits offered
by the scheme, would mostly be men who had grown old in
the Company's service, and those whose long and faithful
performance of duty had so impaired their constitutions
as to render them ineligible for insurance in other
organizations.12
All employees were permitted to enter the association without medical
examinations or any restrictions as to health. However, subsequent to
the first year all new employees were required to enter the Association.
At the same time, the Company issued peremptory instructions that in
order to counteract "the bad effects that might in time arise from
having accepted undesirable risks (in the first year), and also for
reasons of economic administration," no one over forty-five would be
hired.13 Those under forty-five must be physically healthy. Finally, a
closing date was set for those who were currently employed but had not
opted to join. After that date membership would be closed to them.
1 2Ibid., pp. 9-10.
1 3Ibid., p. 10.
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As the Annual Report states these provisions, it seems that
compulsory membership in the Association motivated the hiring age limit.
This relation is not explicit or clear, however. Several considerations
might bind these two factors together. The obvious and explicit consi-
deration is that the hiring age limit would keep down overall fund costs
and admit only members whose tenure was long enough to absorb the risks
which attended old age, namely death and disability. To the extent
that the relief fund tied workers to the firm, by enforcing a hiring age
limit the firm obtained the long term employees necessary to the stable
operation of a large organization. Employees bound themselves to firms
which held their money because only in that way could they realize their
investment.. Contributions were neither vested nor portable.
Finally, the operation of the relief fund gave occasion for the
development of a policing mechanism to monitor employee absenteeism and
claims to illness. A form for notification of disablement was adopted
by the firm. Prior to adoption of the form,
many claims for sick allowance were made by persons who,
although actually unable to labor for a few days only,
found it profitable [!] to abstain from work the full
six days prescribed by the Constitution before sick
benefits are allowed, and then to assert total disable-
ment as the reason for not earlier assuming duty. 1 5
At that point, investigations of claims were unsatisfactory. Prompt
14
. While older workers, had fewer accidents, the conventional wisdom
was that they were more serious due to greater fragility of aged bodies.
1 5First Annual Report of th-e Baltimore and Ohio Employes' Relief
Association, p. 11.
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inspection of claims was henceforward insured by the requirement that
an employee absent from work on account of illness notify his superior.
Claims would be allowed only from the date of notification. An inspector
would look into the situation within a few days.
The knowledge that such inspection will be had
prevents imposition, and as a liberal percentage of
those examined are not seriously ill, they return to
duty as soon as able, and if within six days, make no
claims for allowance. 1 6
In closing, the First Annual Report suggested additional features
to the relief provisions. The savings and loan arrangements, which were
established in 1882, and an extension of the savings feature, a pension
plan, which was established in 1884, were advanced for response. The
savings provisions would be turned into a pension arrangement. If the
member had withdrawn his savings before the age of sixty-five, he would
be entitled to a yearly annuity or pension based on his deposits with
interest. This scheme had the virtue of encouraging thrift. 1 7
Several points explicit in the Constitution of the Relief Associa-
tion bear attention. The relief fund was to cover members "disabled by
accidents, sickness or by old age, and, at their deaths, for their
families." 1 8  In case of injury by accidents while in the service of
the railroad, surgical attendance and $.50 per day for each day lost were
provided to the employee.19 After six months the daily benefit was cut
16
Ibid.
1 7 Ibid., pp. 16-17.
1 8 Ibid., p. 76.
1 9The benefit was pro rated from the $.50 base according to [cont.]
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in half. Certification that the accident occurred while in the company's
service and caused total disability for labor for the period specified
was required from the employee's supervisor or department head.
Subject to similar certification, in case of death due solely
to an accident while in the company's service and within six months of
the accident, death benefits of $500 were to be paid to the person desig-
nated by the employee.20 However, in order to receive this benefit or
any other, the employee or his beneficiary had to release the company
from further responsibility.
. . . the benefits herein promised shall not be payable
nor paid when the contributor, or any person entitled to
damages because of the accident to him, whether result-
ing in death or not, has or makes a claim against said
Company or any of the Companies operating its branches
or divisions (including the Chicago Division) until
there be first filed with the Committee a release, sa-
tisfactory to them, releasing said Companies from such
damages, signed by all persons entitled to the same.2 1
In a period when employee legal claims against the companies were increas-
ing, relief provisions were a way to avoid costly law suits.
Membership was voluntary for officials paid at least $2,000 a
year and employed in jobs not subject to railroad casualties. Other
employees were required to subscribe to those features covering injury
or death occurring while in the company's service. Employees unmarried
and with no immediate family dependent on them might waive death benefits
employee contributions, which were based on pay.
2 0The $500 benefit was also pro rated. See note 19.
2 1First Annual Report of the Baltimore and Ohio Employes' Relief
Association, p. 76.
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-- except in the case of death from injuries received while on duty.
While apparently protecting those most in need--those with- the least
money and greatest risks--compulsory membership also limited their
freedom.
Benefits, of course, also depended on prior employee contributions.
Employees were entitled to Association benefits for one month after the
time for which contributions had been paid and also for a period extending
from the day work resumed to the first subsequent payment of wages,
Monthly payments were deducted from members' wages. When there were no
wages no payment could be made.
This was the context in which the Baltimore and Ohio pension plan
was introduced. Corporate welfare policies were means to bind the
employee as well as meet his needs. Though it was not until 1900 that
another railroad company organized a pension scheme for its employees,
over the next decade four other major roads established relief programs
with features similar to those of the B & 0: the Pennsylvania Railroad
Company lines east of Pittsburgh in 1886; the Philadelphia and Reading
in 1888; the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy in 1889; and the Pennsylvania
lines west of Pittsburgh and Erie in 1889. These railroads together
owned or operated one-eighth of total railway mileage in the United States
and employed about one-sixth of railway employees. 2 2
The B & 0 system served as a model for these roads and for trans-
2 2Murray Webb Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems in the United
States and Canada, vol. 1 (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors,
Inc., 1932), pp. 24-25; Johnson, "Railway Departments for the Relief,"
pp. 431-33, 451.
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portation and industrial companies later in establishing welfare schemes.
Th.e system of the B & 0 was more comprehensive than those of the other
railroads, but the basic difference was that the B & 0 and the Philadel-
phia and Reading, modelled on Canadian and European systems in this re-
spect, made employment conditional on membership in the relief associa-
tion. The others were modelled after the Pennsylvania:. plan with volun-
tary membership. Compulsory membership was seen as a weakness in the
B & 0 plan since it engendered resentment in employees. Likewise, serving
much as a company union, the employees' association was resented, so the
Pennsylvania's relief provisions were organized as a company department.2 3
As might he expected, voluntary departments enrolled fewer members than
compulsory departments--51 percent on the Pennsylvania Railroad and 53
percent on the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy contrasted with nearly all
the permanent-workforce of the Baltimore and Ohio. 2 4
The Pennsylvania Railroad welfare features were "employed by the
. . . Company . . . to bring about and preserve harmonious relations with
25its employees." The relief fund was to be a formal arrangement which
would eliminate discrimination and obviate the need for an employees'
organization or union.
2 3In 1888 Maryland withdrew the B & 0 Employees' Relief Association
charter and the company organized a department modelled on the Pennsylvania
plan. Johnson, "Railway Departments for the Relief," pp, 430-31.
24Ibid., pp. 430-31, 433, 451-52.
M. Riebenack, "What the Pennsylvania Railroad Company Is Doing
for the Benefit of Its Employees," address before the Economic Club Annual
Dinner (Boston: 10 February 1903), p. l.
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. . . uniform and effective means were necessary to
prevent favoritism or discrimination in the ass.is-
tance rendered to employees in the way of gratuities
from the Company, and to avoid the necessity of vo-
luntary subscriptions made by co-employees when any
of their number was afflicted with sickness or dis-
abled by accident or death left their family in dis-
tressed circumstances.26
In their purpose and structure these relief departments were
similar, seen as "agencies that have been called into being to assist
in the solution of the labor problem," "an attempt on the part of employ-
ers and the employed to cooperate for the benefit of each party." 2 7
Relief departments mixed corporate altruism with corporate self-interest.
When the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy established a relief
department in 1889, E. P. Ripley, general manager of the road, reported
to the Interstate Commerce Commission,
The object of the Company in establishing a relief depart-
ment was to enabled its employes to make provision for
themselves and families at the least possible cost to them
in th-e event of sickness, accident or death. The company
has established this department not only because it has
the interest of its employees at heart, but because it
believes that the department will serve to retain and at-
tract a good class of employes, lessen the amount of dis-
content caused by improvidence, diminish the amount of
litigation inicases of accident, and increase the good
will of the employes toward the company and their confidence
in the good-will of the company toward them. Employes
have been somewhat suspicious of themotives of the company
in regard to this department, but there is now, I am glad
to say, a growing feeling-in favor of it as the regulations
become understood and as the practical advantages of the
department are made manifest by the prompt payment of
benefits.2 8
2 6Ibid., p. 3.,
2 7Johnson, "Railway Departments. for the Relief," pp. 424-25.
2 8Ibid., p. 432; U. S. Interstate Commerce Commission, Third [cont.]
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While the relief departments were supposed "to promote the
material and ethical well-being" of railroad employees who, although
"well-paid," had small savings against risks, some opponents claimed
that the relief provisions were a way for employers to escape legal
liabilities--acceptance of benefits entailed a release from all claims
against the company. Yet, in the wake of militant strikes by the
brotherhoods, the "chief impelling force" for the establishment of relief
departments was less strictly economic.2 9
It has been shown to be for the greater good of the
company to identify its own and its employees' inte-
rests to the fullest extent possible, in order there-
by to cultivate a spirit of loyalty strong enough not
only to prevent strikes, but also to prompt men to
giving the highest grade of service of which they are
capable.30
By establishing relief practices in the 1880s employers were
creating a structure in direct contradiction to the labor conflicts of
the 1870s. If employees participated in these benefit schemes their
opposition to capital would be undermined by their identification with
company interests and their implicit acceptance of an economic solution
for a social and political problem.
Companies were responding to at least two aspects of union acti-
vities: beneficiary features and strike activity.
Railroad employees chose from one of three. insurance. systems.
They could do business with- a private insurance company. They could obtain
Annual Report (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1889), p. 349.
29Johnson, "Railway Departments for the Relief," p. 426.
'Ibid., p. 427.
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relief and insurance through. one of the railroad brotherhoods or workers'
associations. Or, they could join a relief department estabished by
their employer and jointly administered by members and the company.
The most popular of the three was the employees' association. The
insurance and relief schemes of the workers' associations were of two
kinds: employees of a single company might establish a relief and
insurance organization or membership in one of the brotherhoods might
entitle one to coverage.31
However, compulsory participation enforced by some railroads
put the brotherhoods at a disadvantage.. Where compulsory participation
was not part of the relief plan, companies had various means to coerce
membership. In March 1888, Charles Elliot Perkins, president of the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy, received a letter from John Noble Alsop
Griswold, a company director, referring to the Boston and Maine strike
of 1877 and its lesson for the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy strike of
1888.
In. that strike none of the old Engineers were taken
back except that they resigned from the Brotherhood
which a good many did the Company arranging an insu-
rance for liability or death equal to that of the
Brotherhood. I think it might be a go? plan for us
to adopt a good deal of the same idea.
Compulsory participation undermined participation in union welfare plans.
Given wage levels a worker forced to participate in a company plan would
31 Ihid., p. 429.
3 2Cochran, Railroad Leaders, appendix, p. 346, J. N. A. Griswold,
director, Chicago, Burlington and Quincy (.CBQ), to C, E, Perkins, vice-
president, CBQ, 5 March- 1908.
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probably not make payments to the union as well. The tie to the-union
was weakened and the union's treasury, a source of strength, was dimi-
nished.
Specifically, union strength had been shown in actions against
the railroads. The railroad strike of 1877 was a sign of the times.
The first nation-wide strike in the country's history, it began spon-
taneously in response to a 10 percent pay cut for railroad workers.
Starting with forty Baltimore and Ohio firemen and brakemen, the strike
spread to Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey,
Indiana, Illinois, Texas, and California, as well as other states.. It
involved railroad workers on the Pennsylvania, the New York Central,
the Erie, the Michigan Central, the Missouri-Pacific, and other roads.
Railroad men were joined by miners, steelworkers, and farmers.. In some
cities general strikes were called. Federal troops were ordered into
many cities, in some cases where local militia refused to obey orders
and joined the strikers.33 In two months' time the strike was broken.
Labor had exercized power unorganized. Some among them contemplated
what the possibilities would be if labor were organized. Likewise,
capital recognized that labor was a force with which to contend if pro-
ductive operations were to run smoothly.
The rise of the large corporate organization employing wage
laborers was attended by the establishment and growth of large, sometimes
3 3Richard 0. Boyer and Herbert M. Morais, Labor's Untold Story
(New York: United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers of America, 1955),
pp. 58-64.
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national unions based not in the craft tradition of shop competition
but in the new order of labor versus capital. The railroad brotherhoods
were among the first and strongest of these unions, as railroading
was among the first of the large, modern industries. It was the basis
for both the advancing interests of capital and the effective, large
scale organization of labor.
It was important to respond to and stabilize the railroad work
force. The railroads themselves were the infrastructure on which the
development and nationalizing of the economy were based. Railroad em-
ployees were the largest single group of employees in the nation.34
More important, the economy depended on these workers. Powerful unions
were a serious threat. Previously ruling with an iron hand, opposing
unions and denying employee demands, the railroad leaders saw that their
large bureaucracies were dependent on the smooth, continuous operation of
business.35 The harsh. disciplines practiced in the past would only
further disrupt operations.
Prior to 1877 with less centralized, smaller operations as the
basis for tradition, most labor problems were left to lesser administrators,
but with the disruptive and successful militancy of the railroad brother-
hoods labor problems became the concern of top executives, some of whom
began to favor more cooperative or paternalistic methods of dealing with
3 4Johnson, "Railway Departments for the Relief," p. 425.
3 5A factor which discriminated against older workers was a source
of labor's strength in unrest.
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labor.36 Following the strike numerous railroad executives favored
mutual benefit plans under company sponsorship. They hoped that company
plans would lead workers to look to the company rather than the union.3 7
In July 1877 Robert Harris, president and superintendent of the
Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad, wrote to S. Wright Dunning,
editor of Railroad Gazette, recognizing the power of the unions and the
necessity for response.
As soon as the business of the Road has resumed its
usual channels we shall commence to consider what we
should do to prevent a recurrence [of strikes] and to
this end our Road wish me to develop a plan by which.
the company may join its employees in forming a bene-
volent fund for the benefit of widows and orphans,
and the disabled employees of the Company. . . .
The events of the last fortnight have shown the stu-
dents of Railroad science the extent and importance
of the problem demanding solutions. 3 8
Later in the same year Harris corresponded with John Griswold,
chairman of the road. Griswold agreed that the railroad ought to make a
contribution to employees in need. He said insurance would
show the men that while we would not submit to their
dictation we still have their interests at heart and
are desirous of making them understand that the inte-
rests of the corporation and their own are mutual.3 9
A variety of welfare measures were suggested. Writing to Dunning, with
3 6Cochran, Railroad Leaders, pp. 174-81.
Ibid., p. 178.
38 Ibid., appendix, p. 352, R. Harris, president, CBQ, to S. W.
Dunning, editor, Railroad Gazette, 30 July 1877.
39
Ibid., appendix, p. 344, J. N. A. Griswold, chairman, CBQ, to
R. Harris, president, CBQ, 5 October 1877.
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whom he had corresponded about European provisions, Harris said,
I am satisfied that a Chicago, Burlington and Quincy
Mutual Insurance Company is not only practicable but
the best arrangement. I am also inclined to think
that there would be great advantage in. some system
of pensions.40
Recognized by the latter part of the nineteenth century as
responsible for the welfare of employees, the railroad executives knew
they would have to make welfare contributions of one form or another.
Welfare provisions were a business proposition on the railroads--a matter
of both economy and control. A regular plan was thought cheaper than
ad hoc contributions.
Writing in 1877 to Griswold, Harris suggested the company's
contributing to the employees' protective association .
The existence of this Association without doubt relieves
the Rail Road Company to some extent, from the necessity
of contributing to its employees . . . A judicious con-
trihution, even when there is no legal liability, is
money well invested, even from the most pecuniary and
utilitarian aspect. The question is, will a contribu-
tion by the Company, say $250 upon the death of each
member, stimulate the men to join the Association to a
greater extent, and thus relieve the Company from the
necessity of contributing a larger amount in a more
irregular manner.4 1
In the same letter Harris commented on another measure, pay based on
length of service. He favored such a plan and added, "nor do I see how
it need in any way conflict with the due maintenance of discipline and
4 0 Ibid., p. 178.
4 1Ibid., appendix, pp. 354-55, R. Harris, president, CBQ, to J. N.
A. Griswold, chairman, CBQ, 10 December 1877.
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subordination of the employees."4 2
Writing in March. 1879 in the Nation, the country's most influ-
ential weekly, Charles Francis Adams of the Southern Pacific, wrote
of the Boston and Maine strike of February 1877.
The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has got to be
broken up. . . it has become a mere nuisance . . . a
standing menace. The only question is how to proceed 43
so as to break it up most quietly and most effectually.
In the interest of stability, anti-union tactics would have to be less
heavy handed. Adams proposed that the companies organize a regular,
graded work. organization with promotions, life insurance, and pensions.
"The men would [not-] . . sacrifice, by joining in strikes, what repre-
"44
sented the accumulation of years of service."
It was in this spirit that welfare activies were introduced in
the 1880s. Thomas Fletcher Oakes established an employee reading room
for the Oregon Railway and Navigation Company. Henry Brockholst Ledyard
of the Michigan Central gave company support to a railroad YMCA and a
Railroad Men's Hospital. The Michigan Central also provided free passes
for employees' children riding to school,45 Relief and insurance schemes,
parks, housing, and health- and safety programs were designed to relieve
labor of the hardships of the industrial order in order to relieve capital
4 2 Ihid.
43Robert V. Bruce, 1877, Year of Violence (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1970), pp. 34-37.
4 4 Ibid.
4 5 Cochran, Railroad Leaders, p. 177.
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of the threat of strikes or disruption. The welfare measures established
as relief were discipline as well. Rather than reorganizing industry
with-human needs in mind to remove the bases of unemployment and dan-
gerous employment, there was systematic relief of individual problems
symptomatic of the underlying issues. These concessions from capital,
rather than relieving workers of hardships, bound them to the order in
which their hardships were based. 4 6
Corporate relief departments also formalized relations and
benefits. With increasing size and bureaucracy companies could no longer
be run in detail by owners acquainted with the individuals in the firms'
employ. Formal systems established managerial means to administer the
organization in the absence of the owners' discretion and direct control.
Formal systems were also regarded as more efficient means for running
a large organization.
Criticizing informal methods in an article on relief departments
in 1895, Emory Johnson of the University of Pennsylvania wrote,
The railway corporations at present contribute a consi-
derable sum annually to aid unfortunate and aged em-
ployees. Were they to add nothing to the amounts now
given, their expenditures would be more beneficially
made were their contributions given to supplement a
well-regulated pensions and superannuation fund.
4 7
4 6Oscar Wilde warned of this dilemma in 1891 when he wrote, "It
is immoral to use private property in order to alleviate the horrible
evils that result from the institution of private property. It is both
immoral and unfair." Oscar Wilde, "The Soul of Man under Socialism" re-
printed in De Profundis and Other Writings (New York: Penguin Books, 1977),
p. 20.
4 7Johnson, "Railway Departments for the Relief," p. 447.
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At the time three of the four railroad relief departments were consider-
ing pension plans. Within ten years three had non-contributory old age
pension plans, as did numerous other railroad companies, including the
Illinois Central, the Southern Pacific, the Union Pacific, and the
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad.4 8
Employees individually and through their organizations expressed
objections to the company plans. Some companies used pensions and other
insurance arrangements as the basis for hiring age limits on the argument
that the company did not want to be responsible for employees who entered
the, force too late to become eligible for benefits. In the Railway Clerk
one employee said his principal objection was that job applicants over
thirty-five were not hired permanently unless excepted by the company
board of directors and persons "temporarily" employed were not eligible
to participate in the fund. On balance, however, he favored the company
plans.
It has some good features, however, inasmuch as an old
employee is assured a small competence in old age and
if his services have been for any great length of time
his pension allowance will usually supply his needs.
He noted as well that employees retired at seventy were not necessarily
unfit for work and might augment their pensions with employment outside
railroading.49
Quite another position was taken by a writer in the. Railroad
4 8 Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems, vol. 2, appendix A, pp.
1028-35. The Chicago, Burlington and Quincy did not estahlish a plan
until 1922. Ibid., p. 1030.
49The Railway Clerk 3 (November 1904):23-24.
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Trainmen's Journal. Supporting a system of government state old age
pensions the writer denounced company plans.
[The writer] believes his readers are in accord with
him that all wealth is created by those who work, and
if those who work in this country and Canada are de-
sirous of turning over to their disabled or aged bro-
ther workers enough wealth, monthly or annually to
maintain the disabled and aged ones in comfort, why
that is their business, and no part of the business of
intermeddling money owning or corporation owning para-
sites. 5 0
He argued for government industrial pensions supported by a pro-rata
system of assessment on industry for all dismissed on account of age
and disablement. Such a policy, he wrote, would encourage corporations
to guard against accidents and would effectively eliminate hiring age
limits since a person unable to get employment because of age limits
could apply for a pension. This would be a good effect.
It is simply ridiculous, absurd, to deprive a man the
right to follow his chosen occupation before he shows
himself physically unfit. No arbitrary limit, governed
by a certain prescribed age, is either just or sensible.
Some men are better, physically, at sixty than others
are at thirty.5 1
The welfare practices initiated in the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries by the railroads were in response to several needs
of the companies: to undermine union strength and gain employee dependence
or loyalty, to establish a stable work force for the maintenance of
stable operation, to prevent disruption of business, to maintain and
increase control over railroad operation, to respond to public sentiment
50Railroad Trainmen's Journal 22 (August 1905):592.
5 1 Ibid, p. 593.
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holding companies responsible for employee welfare, to tie the interests
of workers to firms, and to accomplish these things efficiently and
economically.
By competing with union benefits, the companiest welfare schemes
undermined part of the union's base while encouraging employees to look
to the. firm for security. Because benefits were under company control
and depended to some degree on employee good behavior, the company
welfare programs were to induce employee cooperation and labor peace.
In looking to the company not only for employment but for security in
case of interruption or discontinuation of employment, employees tied
their interests to the fortunes of the firms. Company instability
threatened employee security. Company welfare programs constituted
companies' assuming social responsibility for the hardships attendant
upon employment by them. Finally, somewhat systematic welfare practices
-- while far from nondiscriminatory-were considered cheaper than ad hoc,
irregular, and perhaps open ended company paternalism.
Steel industry welfare policies and old age pensions were intro-
duced in a different context. During much of the late nineteenth century
the steel companies, like the railroad companies, contended with the
strength of organized labor. One of the earliest attempts in the United
States to organize by industry rather than by trade, the Amalgamated
522
Association of Iron and Steel Workers was founed in 1876, 52after its
It became the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel, and Tin
Workers in 1881.
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predecessor had been virtually wiped out in the panic of 1873. The
union provided insurance against sickness, accident, and death through
a benefit system whose accumulated monies served to strengthen the
union, temper its militance, and discipline its members. 5 3
Part of the Amalgamatedt s strength was based in skill. As late
as the 1890s highly skilled workers still exercized relative independence
and control over their working conditions in the iron and steel industry.
The union's strength made some manufacturers consider the need for
business to organize industry-wide. Voluntary arbitration and profit
sharing schemes were introduced to avert strikes and to identify workers'
interests with those of the firms.5 4
The 1880s and 1890s were a period of relative competition in the
steel industry and companies introduced a lot of technical changes in
production. Though the Amalgamated's power made possible adjustments
in wages and working conditions and though the union was too strong to
5 3Jesse S. Robinson, The Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel
and Tin Workers, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Poli-
tical Science, vol. 38, no. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1920), pp.
9-10, 12-13, 17, 21, 71, 85. Union membership and benefits, as I suggested
in chapter 5, bound employees to unions as company benefits bound employees
to employers. The Amalgamated was described as "a club to keep members
paid up in their dues since by suspension a member loses the rights of
continuous good standing." Ibid., p. 85.
5 4U. S. Congress, Senate, Report on Conditions of Employment in
the Iron and Steel Industry in the United States, vol. 3, Working Condi-
tions and the Relations of Employers and Employees, S. Doc. 110, 62d Cong.,
1st sess., 1913, pp. 109-10. See also, David Brody, Steelworkers in
America: The Nonunion Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1969) and Katherine
Stone, "Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry," paper presented
at Conference on Labor Market Stratification, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Mass., 16-17 March 1973.,
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be driven out of the mills in this period the manufacturers did attempt
to get rid of unions altogether. The disruptive strikes of the 1880s,
although sometimes resulting in set backs for the unions, ultimately
bolstered the union's strength. In 1889 at Homestead the Carnegie com-
pany unsuccessfully challenged the union over a new agreement, but
three years later at Homestead a five month strike ended in a loss of
55power and membership for the union.
By 1910 the power of the Amalgamated had been completely over-
turned. The companies were organized through the American Iron and Steel
Association and the American Iron and Steel Institute. Firms had con-
solidated. U. S. Steel controlled half the industry and a half dozen
firms owned over a third of the rest. Labor was almost completely un-
organized. In 1911 the two iron and steel-unions' membership was less
than 6,000 of the 375,000 men working in the plants. Arbitration had
been abandoned and managements dealt with employees individually. 5 6
In 1901 the executive committee of the newly organized United
States Steel Corporation--commonly referred to simply as "the Steel
Corporation"--had articulated a strong anti-union strategy. First, the
corporation as a whole would not deal with labor. Each subsidiary would
be responsible for its own labor negotiations and settlements. Second,
unions were to be contained. There would be no union recognition where
unions did not already exist. Third, where the company was forced to
55U, S. Congress, Senate, Working Conditions, pp. 113-16,
5 6 Ibid.,, pp. 110-11.
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sign with a union in a previously non-union mill, the mill would be shut
down. 5 7
Among the executive committee there was some question about the
objectives of, on one hand, limiting or eroding union organization and,
on the other hand, avoiding the labor problems which might attend such
a policy. Company welfare programs were proposed to ease these difficul-
ties. Formal welfare policies and bureaucratic labor relations were
symptomatic of the executives' inability to handle by traditional means
such large numbers of employees at such great distances. 5 8
Perhaps the most widespread among the early measures, profit
sharing was designed to encourage cooperation between capital and labor,
identification of employees with the firm. It was also intended to
encourage thrift and economic independence. To the extent that these
plans resulted in savings, they would obviate the need for old age
pensions. Before 1878 the practice had been tried by only two firms,
the Peace Dale Rhode Island Manufacturing Company and the Riverside
Press in Cambridge., Massachusetts. Fifteen years later a hundred or more
firms had adopted some form of profit sharing. 5 9
As a result of labor unrest profit sharing was widely discussed
5 7 Ibid., pp. 118-19; Amos R. K. Pinchot, "The Cost of Private
Monopoly to Public and Wage-Earner," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 48 (July 1913):164-88.
58U. S. Congress, Senate, Working Conditions, pp. 499-503.
5 9Ida M. Tarbell, The Nationalizing of Business 1878-1898, A His-
tory of American Life, vol. 9 (New York: Macmillan Company, 1936), pp.
172-75.
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in the late 18 8 0s. In 1892 the American Association for the Promotion
of Profit Sharing was founded. Its officers were Nicholas Paine Gilman,
a Unitarian clergyman turned literary editor, who wrote on profit sharing
and employers t welfare schemes, Carrol D. Wright, U. S. Commissioner of
Labor Statistics, Francis Amassa Walker, president of the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, the American Economics Association, and the
American Statistical Association, and N. 0. Nelson, a St. Louis plumbing
goods manufacturer. 6 0
Beginning in 1903 U. S. Steel set aside preferred stock for sale
to employees under its profit sharing system. Of course, employees might
buy company stock through usual means but the profit sharing plan offered
an advantage.
As soon as the stock shall have been fully paid for,
it will be issued in the name of the original subscriber
and the certificate will be given to him, and he can
then sell it any time he chooses. But as an inducement
for him to keep it and to remain continuously in the
employ of the Corporation or of one or another of the
subsidiary companies, and to have the same interest in
the business that a stockholder or working partner would
have, the following offer is made, viz.:
If he will not sell or part with the stock, but will
keep it and in January of each year, for five years, com-
mencing with January, 1904, will exhibit the certificate
to the Treasurer of his company, together with a letter
from a proper official, to the effect that he has been
continuously in the employ of the Corporation or of one
or another of its subsidiary companies during the preced-
ing year, and has shown a proper interest in its welfare
and progress, he will during each of such five years re-
ceive checks at the rate of five dollars a share per
year. . .
If he shall remain continuously in the service of
the Corporation or of one or another of its subsidiary
6 0Daniel T. Rogers, The Work Ethic in Industrial America 1850-1920
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 44-50.
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companies for five years, at the end of the fifth
year the Corporation intends that he shall receive
a still further dividend, which- cannot now he as-
certained or stated, but which will be derived from
the following sources, viz.:
All who subscribe for stock in January, 1903,
and commence to pay for it, but who discontinue at
any time during the five years of course will not
receive the $5.00 per share for such of the five
years as remain after they discontinue. The Cor-
poration will, however, pay into a special fund
each year the $5.00. payments that would have been
made to such subscribers had they continued. This
fund shall be credited with 5 percent annual inte-
rest, and at the end of.the five years' period the
total amount thus accumulated will be divided into
as many parts as shall be equal to the number of
shares then remaining in the hands of men who shall
have continued in such employ for the whole five
years, and the Corporation will then by its own
final determination award to each man whom it shall
find deserving thereof as many parts of such accumu-
lated fund as shall be equal to the number of shares
then held by him under this plan. [Emphases added.]
Four points bear note in these provisions. First, the phrases
"shown a proper interest in its welfare and progress," and "each man whom
it shall find deserving" point to the coercive nature of the plan. The
employee was set between his economic welfare and his social welfare.
His return in the profit sharing plan depended on his acquiescence as
an employee. In pursuing his economic interest the employee came more
under the domination of the Steel Corporation, while his political interest
might have led him to organize and forego the economic return.
Second, though the profit sharing plan might be considered equit-
61
Paul Underwood Kellogg, ed., The Pittsburgh Survey, 6 vols.
(New York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910), vol. 3, The Steel
Workers, by John A. Fitch (Reprint ed., New York: Arno Press and the New
York Times, 1969), p. 306.
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able recognition of the employee's role. in the creation of profits it
was not regarded this way. The special provisions of profit sharing
plans were- thought of as gifts distributed by benevolent employers.
This money was considered to be given by the company rather than paid. 6 2
Such- provisions carried no rights or responsbilities. Rather than in-
creasing the employee's security and decreasing his risk, profit sharing
played on these disadvantages, institutionalizing them, ipaking his in-
security a basis for company security.
Third, like many welfare provisions the profit sharing plan
appealed to skilled workers who were likely to be employed in one place
longer and on whom the company depended more. In addition, since unskilled
workers could not usually afford to participate very much, the stock
purchase plan split the workers. Among those. who bought stock there
was room for further division. Any strike which resulted in firings made
the pot all the richer for loyal employees, 6 3
Finally, it is not clear there was a net economic b.enef it to
workers. A worker at Homestead expressed doubts.
But I want to tell you that the first stock issue in
1903 was followed by a cut in wages in 1904 that made
up to the company several times over all the extra
bonuses they will pay in five years. The plan is to
keep the men quiet, anditdoes it too. No stockhol-
der wants to try to organize a union when the terms
of the agreement state that only those who show a
6 2Ibid., p. 212.
6 3Horace B. Davis, Labor and Steel, Labor Research Association
Labor and Industry Series (New York: International Publishers, 1933), pp.
153-54.
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proper interest in the affairs of the company will
receive a bonus.6 4
In February 1908 just after another wage reduction a letter in a labor
paper raised the same issue.
With a blare of trumpets the United States Steel
Corporation has announced a large distribution of
profits to its preferred stockholders, especially to
its employees, but nothing has been said about the
big reduction in wages at its Homestead plant which
took effect February 1, 1908. This is the second
heavy cut in wages at this plant since the preferred
stock scheme was devised by the big corporation and
will amply reimburse the United States Steel Corpora-
tion for its generosity to its workmen.65
Another steel worker's letter to the same paper said,
The United States Steel Corporation is making a grand-
stand play in giving away cash bonuses on preferred
stock. Any man with two spoonfuls of horse sense
knows that when they give away one dollar they know
where they are going toget another in its place. 6 6
So it could be argued with pensions, whose net economic benefit
to workers was questionable. Being, as they were, legally and practically
gratuities, they could be revoked or altered at company discretion and
were used as coercive devices. The U. S. Steel and Carnegie plan provided:
22. Pensions may be withheld or terminated in case
of misconduct on the part of the beneficiaries
or for another cause sufficient in the judgment
of the Board of Trustees to warrant such action.
24. This Pension Plan is purely voluntary provision
for the benefit of employees superannuated or
totally incapacitated after long and faithful
6 4Kellogg, ed., The Steel Workers, p. 211.
65Ibid., pp. 211-12.
66Ibid., p. 212.
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service and constitutes no contract and confers
no legal rights upon any employees. 6 7
The first pension plan in steel was part of the Carnegie Relief
Fund established in 1901 by an endowment of $4 million, a personal gift
from Carnegie himself.
I make this first use of surplus wealth upon retiring
from business as an acknowledgement of the deep debt
which I owe to the workmen who have contributed so
greatly to my success. 6 8
The fund applied to all employees retired for old age or incapa-
city; 40 percent of the million dollars in interest paid between 1901 and
1911 went to pensions. Among the twenty-one pensioners living in
Homestead in 1908, the average monthly pension was $11.06; the highest,
$18; the lowest, $5.65.69 In the same year average annual earnings for
the industry as a whole were $569 or about $47 monthly. Average monthly
income was higher among skilled workers, those among the work force most
likely to receive pensions. 7 0
In May 1910, when the companies merged, the U. S. Steel Corpora-
tion added $8 million to the Carnegie endowment to form the U. S. Steel
and Carnegie Pension Fund, whose income was to go exclusively to retired
6 7United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund, Pension Rules,
taking effect 1 January 1911, as amended 1 May 1927.
6 8Kellogg, ed., The Steel Workers, p. 195.
69
7 0Paul H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States 1890-1926,
Publications of the Pollak Foundation for Economic Research, no. 9
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1930), p. 271.
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superannuated employees. Like most retirement plans the U. S. Steel
and Carnegie plan depended on continuity of service. In theory at
least this would secure a stable labor force. In the 1910 Pittsburgh
survey, John Fitch- wrote of such- provisions,
They Ithe pension systems] give stability to a labor
force, but they do it at the sacrifice of the mobility
of labor. A man will think twice before giving up a
job with a pension attachment for something immedi-
ately better; he will he loath especially as he gets
along in service, to risk discharge; he will not join
a union2 off hand at least, if joining means dis-
charge.
This, he said, was true in practice even if the particular plan did not
explicitly suggest or impose restrictions--and most did.
By 1912 absolutely opposed to collective bargaining of any sort
the Steel Corporation used pensions and profit sharing among other devices
to keep silent men who might otherwise organize. The plans discouraged
any disruption, exercize of power, or expression of objectives. Partici-
pation in any work stoppage broke the continuous service required for
eligibility. Fitch- wrote,
There is nothing in it [the pension plan] to protect
a man excepting his subservience to his superior of-
ficers, and the nearer he approaches toward twenty
years of continuous service, the greater his subser-
vience may conceivably he--for he might be. discharged
at the end of nineteen years and eleven months and
his right to the pension would be forfeited. 7 3
7 1Kellogg, ed., The Steel Workers, p. 197. Accident relief was
to be paid by the Steel Corporation as a regular business expense.
7 2Ibid., p. 198.
7 3John A. Fitch, "The United States Steel Corporation and Labor,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 42 (July
1912):17. Also, Pinchot, "Th.e Cost of Private Monopoly," p. 179.
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Amos Pinchot, a New York lawyer, lumped pensions with other
corporation devices to restrict workers.
through its peculiar attitude toward labor
organizations, its espionage, its pension and bo-
nuses, its scientific blacklisting and its policy
of employing illiterate and comparatively helpless
immigrants, for whom it advertises in the news-
papers, [the Steel Corporation] has established
practically unparalleled industrial peonage in its
plants; . . . /4
Louis D. Brandeis, a Boston attorney later apppointed Associate
Justice of the U. S. Supreme Court, was a liberal who understood that
"among a free people every excess of capital must in time be repaid by
the excessive demands of those who have not the capital," and that "if
the capitalists are wise, they will aid us Ithe Massachusetts Civic
75Federation ] in the effort to prevent injustice." Brandeis supported
collective bargaining with trade. unions as important for capitalism's
survival and as a defense against socialism. He understood the Steel
Corporation plan as an obstacle to unionization.7 6
Before the Senate's Stanley Committee, which was investigating the
steel industry, Brandeis said,
Features in a pension system like those quoted above
tend to make the wage earner compliant. He can be more
readily relied upon to prove "loyal" and not to "go out"
even if others strike for higher wages and better work-
ing conditions. The "continuous employment feature" of
the pension system tends thus to rivet the wage earner
7 4Pinchot, "The Cost of Private Monopoly," p. 182.
7 5The Massachusetts Civic Federation was a chapter of the National
Civic Federation.
7 6 Pinchot, "The Cost of Private Monopoly," pp. 100-1.
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to his employer, and the provision by which the allo-
wance of a pension is made discretionary further in-
sured "loyalty" of the wage earner during his employ-
ment. An employee of the United States Steel Corpora-
tion advancing in years might well be deterred from
hazarding the prospect of a pension by trade union
activity, or even by joining a union, . . .
A pension system with such features must either
prove a delusive protection or operate as a bribe to
induce the wage earner to submit to a new form of
subjection to the corporation. A frank employer re-
cently said, "By providing so liberal a pension we 77have bought from the employee the right to leave us."
The breaking up of the Amalgamated and the anti-union practices
of several major firms--including U. S. Steel which owned half the in-
dustry--opened the door to corporate paternalism and had long term
effects. Though some other major steel companies--among them, Jones and
Laughlin and Bethlehem Steel in 1923--established pension plans as pa-
ternalistic measures, the steel industry pattern of company unions meant
that there were few pension plans among the smaller producers.78 As of
1933 there were no formal pension plans at Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Company, Republic Steel Corporation, National Steel Corporation, Inland
Steel Corporation, Pittsburgh Steel Corporation, and Gulf States Steel
Company. Armco, a small independent firm, in its early years established
a system of employee representation on an advisory committee and set up
the Armco Mutual Benefit Association in 1908. Following the early pattern
7 Ibid., pp. 181-82.
7 8In response to the steel organizing campaign of 1918-1919 and
the strike of 1919 company unions were set up at Be.thlehem Steel, Youngs-
town Sheet and Tube Company, Cambria Steel and Wisconsin Steel. Davis,
Labor and Steel, pp. 148-49.
7 9Davis, Labor and Steel, p. 155.
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of the large steel producers, Armco remained unorganized into the 1950s. 8 0
In 1912 Raynal Bolling, Assistant General Solicitor of the Steel
Corporation, estimated that over 1600 employees were "finishing their
lives free from anxiety and want through the benefits" of the pension
plan.81 Another estimate made in 1913 counted 2,092 on the Steel Cor-
poration pension rolls.82 Either number is small given the firms' over
200,000 employees.8 3
In steel less than half of all employees were covered by formal
pension plans. Being covered was of dubious benefit. While there were
few steel workers who reached sixty-five employed, into the 1920s nearly
half the employed steel workers over sixty-five went on working. Of
those who quit, only 42 percent received pensions. 8 4
By various means workers were excluded from ever receiving bene-
fits. In addition to unfair denials of pensions were hiring and employ-
ment practices in the industry.
Many workers never reached retirement age employed because they
8 0Gertrude G. Schroeder, The Growth of Major Steel Companies, 1900-
1950, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science.,
series 70, no. 2 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953), p. 70.
81
Raynal Bolling, "The United States Steel Corporation and Lahor
Conditions," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 42 (1912):42.
8 2Roger W. Babson, "A Practical Plan for Profit Sharing," Commis-
sion on Industrial Relations., Box 6, Record Group 174, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
8 3Estimated at 275,000 in 1911 and 228,000 in 1913. U. S. Congress,
Senate, Working Conditions, pp. 110-11; Babson, "A Practical Plan."
8 4Davis, Labor and Steel, p. 156.
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were dropped in favor of younger workers. A workman let go at forty-
five was unlikely to be rehired in the industry. If he was rehired he
was most likely being hired too late to meet service requirements for
pension eligibility. In fact, some companies, in other industries as
well as steel, came full circle arguing that hiring age limits were set
partly in order to employ only those young enough to meet pension service
requirements.8 5
The pace of the mills--especially where the practice was a seven
day week at twelve hours a day--excluded many older workers. Because the.
work itself was strenuous there was little employment considered appro-
86priate for older men in the production departments. Many.-companies
reserved less arduous jobs, for example, watchman, policeman, and semi-
clerical positions, for those grown old in the companies' employ and
U. S. Congress, Senate, Working Conditions, pp. 98-99. This
argument was used in railroading as well. The Pennsylvania rationalized
its age limit of thirty-five by arguing that to hire older employees
would be unfair since they would arrive at sixty-five ineligible for both
retirement and pension. On the other hand, the main benefit of the pen-
sion plan to the company was the employment of "younger and more robust
men." Though age limits had been practiced for years, in 1909 the com-
pany controller stated,
The age-limit was the outcome of a long and careful
consideration of propositions the adoption of which
would, it was thought, enable the establishment of
a working basis whose operations would insure a plan
invested with uniformity in the computation and
awarding of retirement allowances.
M. Riebenack, "Pennsylvania Railroad Pension Departments: Systems East and
West of Pittsburgh and Erie, Pa. Status to and Including the Year 1907,"
Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 33 (1909):
260.
8 6In mechanical departments the work admitted more variation.
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unable to continue in their own positions, but these alternatives were
few.87
While there were older workers who maintained their positions,
most did not reach the pension eligibility age. Work in modern industry
was not only heavy and dangerous to older workers, it hastened the aging
and declining strength of all. Young workers anticipated the effects
of long term industrial employment. A Bethlehem tube mill worker wrote,
I am only 18 but I do not consider myself a youngster
since I have been working at the Sparrows Point Plant,
for there they age one considerably, the worry of keep-
ing a home on the poor wages paid and the rotten speed
up conditions. 8 8
It became common to speak of workers as "worn out by industry."
In 1910 Fitch observed,
It is one of the duties of any foreman to eliminate the
drones and to keep up the efficiency of his force. But
in the steel industry the demand is for more than rea-
sonable and ordinary efficiency.8 9
To that end, employment went according to "survival of the fittest."
Fitch. continued,
The steel workers are men of strong, sturdy constitu-
tions; they must be, for when they begin to fail they
cease to be steel workers. Often I was told by work-
men of forty or forty-five that they had been at their
best at thirty years of age, and that at thirty-five
they had begun to feel a perceptible decline in
strength. The superintendents and foremen are alert
8 7U. S. Congress, Senate, Working Conditions, p. 96.
88
Davis, Labor and Steel, p. 26.
8 9Kellogg, ed., The Steel Workers, pp. 183-84.
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to detecting weakness of any sort, and if a man fails
appreciably, he expects discharge. 9 0
Forty was considered old in the steel industry. Given this,
pensions were either not serious--with retirement set at sixty-five--
or they were intended to provide for only a few workers. In 1910, a
quarter of all males ten years or older in the United States were at
least forty-five. In iron and steel only 13.6 percent of laborers and
18 percent of other workers were forty-five or older. In 1913 iron
and steel industry workers were mostly between twenty and forty-five
years of age.
Child labor had been abandoned as unprofitable given the heavy
and dangerous nature of the work and some companies had formal hiring
92
age minima of sixteen or eighteen. At the upper end, besides firing
workers as they got older, the companies tended not to hire older men.
When the steel industry hired immigrants unskilled for iron and steel
work, it hired from a disproportionately young population. Rut it was
also true that selection favored younger workers. While an applicant
of forty might he able to do the job, a younger worker could be expected
to be more vigorous and longer in employ. Carnegie Steel had official
hiring age limits of thirty-five and forty according to occupation. Other
companies, including Jones and Laughlin, Bethlehem, and Wisconsin Steel,
9 0Ibid.
9 1 Davis, Labor and Steel, p. 21.
92U. S. Congress, Senate, Working Conditions, p. 96.
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also established limits.9 3
In steel as in railroading old age pensions were as much a matter
of corporate welfare as human welfare. Welfare paid off. In 1925 a
Bethlehem Steel Corporation statement read,
These plans [i.e., "personnel work"] have been put
into practice because they are considered good busi-
ness and in line with good business policy. Acci-
dents, turnover, waste, etc., are all expensive and
reduce production and net profits.9 4
Despite his disclaimer before the American Iron and Steel Insti-
tute in 1920 that welfare work was primarily "purely humanitarian," six
years later, as head of U. S., Steel's Bureau of Safety, Sanitation, and
Welfare, Charles L. Close summed the Corporation's policy this way.
The Steel Corporation is not an eleemosynary institu-
tion. All its activities for the good of the workers,
apart from considerations of humanity, have been amply
justified by plain business reasons--they paid even-
tually. The men who direct the. policy of the corpora-
tion have never lost sight of the fact that the first
object of any company is to make money for its stock
holders.9 5
The dominant railroad and steel interests adopted company old age
pensions in the first decade of the century. It is not surprising then
that other large corporations--with the same interests in stabilizing
cooperative relations between capital and labor--adopted similar plans for
9 3Davis, Labor and Steel, p. 22. The steel industry did have
seniority systems like thoseof the railroads. Though seniority was used
for promotion and lay off, selections out of the regular order were common
and justified by "efficiency." Ibid., pp. 96-97.
94Ibid., pp. 169-70.
9Ibid., pp. 169-71.
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similar reasons.
Through such formal channels as the National Civic Federation
and industry organizations--for example, the National Electric Light
Association, the National Metal Trades Association, and the American
Iron and Steel Association--and through formal networks such as inter-
locking directorates, the practice of old age pensions spread through
private industry over the first three decades of the twentieth century.
While many companies never adopted plans, the companies which did
adopt plans were among the controlling interests in the various indus-
tries.
International Harvester, which in 1902 manufactured 85 percent
of domestically produced harvesters, and in 1903, 96 percent of grain
binders and 91 percent of mowers, the two main-types of harvesting
9.6
machines, established its pension plan in 1907. It must have been
intended to have limited application since at International Harvester,
as at other industrial plants, only a small portion of employees were
over forty-five years old. 9 7
Writing in 1909, C. W. Price, Director of International Harvester's
McCormick Works Club in Chicago, said of the plan,
there is much evidence that the workingmen favor
the plan, because they have confidence in the bLusiness
9 6Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation
of American History, 1900-1916 (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1963), p. 46;
Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal, p. 164.
9 7C. W. Price, "Employees' Benefit Association of the International
Harvester Company," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 33 (1909):252.
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ability of the officers of the company to organize the
plan on a sound basis. 9 8
As small unions, small employers, and small benefit societies could not
support an extensive and dependable plan, large corporations, as large
unions, could. Social security had become a matter of money and its
sources were narrowly restricted.
To mediate peaceful businesslike relations the International
Harvester plan was "democratically" administered by a board of company
and employee representatives. Of this form of administration, Price
said,
. . . Iit] is not only safe, but exceedingly valuable
in fostering confidence among the employees. . ... in
no case, which has been appealed to the board for de-
cision, have the representatives of the men shown any
disposition to take sides against the representatives
of the company; on the other hand, the men have proven
themselves exceptionally broad and fair in their judg-
ments on all questions. One manufacturer stated that
"The benefit association, conducted by a representa-
tive board, is now doing more than any one thing to
help bridge the gap between the company and the men,
and to offer a natural and legitimate common ground on
which they may meet and consider questions of mutual
interest. 9-9
With. discretionary provisions like those of the Carnegie Steel plan, the
International Harvester plan had strong incentives to employeest "broad
and fair" judgments.
In the same year George Walbridge Perkins, a director of both
U. S. Steel and International Harvester and tied to the railroads as
98Ibid., p. 249.
9 9 Ibid., pp. 249-50.
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well by his partnership in J. P. Morgan and Company,100 spoke to the
National Civic Federation of International Harvester's profit sharing,
benefit, and pension plans.
. . . there should be no sentimental philanthropy about
this great question. It is purely a business question.
Profit sharing, pensions, and the like, from a pecuniary
standpoint, are a profitable thing for a business and
also for its labor or for neither.
. . . if providing for old age means anything,
. . . it should mean the fostering of the interest of
the men in their work, . . . it should mean real co-
operation between stockholders, managers, and employees.
. . . [The company] went into these enterprises
in a purely business spirit, believing that the plans
would so knit its vast organization together, would so
stimulate individual initiative, would so strengthen
and develop the esprit de corps of the organization
as to make it possible for the Company to increase its
business and its earnings,--and with the spirit of be-
ing willing to share this increased success with its
organization.10 1
Perhaps cooperation would, in the long run, benefit the wage
worker. In a time when capital and labor were in direct conflict, such-
a viewpoint assumed by capital--the more powerful adversary since labor
was relatively unorganized--would, if successful, undermine the position
of labor.
The harvester company spread the good word. In 1910 its subsidiary,
the Wisconsin Steel Company, established a plan for old age pensions.
100Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal, p. 9.
1 0 1George W. Perkins, "The Underlying Principle of the Profit-
Sharing, Benefit and Pension Plans of the International Harvester Company,"
paper presented before the National Civic Federation, 23 November 1909,
pp. 2-8.
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Like the Steel Corporation, the American Sugar Refining Company
and its subsidiaries, which adopted a pension plan in 1912, dominated
the industry. As early as 1894 the company controlled about 85 percent
102
of total sugar output in the United States. The Standard Oil Company,
which founded its pension plan in 1903, refined 95 percent of oil pro-
duced in the country in 1898.103 Despite successful anti-trust litigation
against the Standard, in practice the company remained well intact.
Atlantic Refining, a company dominated by Standard interests by 1899,
also set up a pension plan in 1903. The Tide Water Oil Company, at
one time Standard Oil's prime competitor but made an ally in the 1880s
when Rockefeller purchased a third of its stock, set up a plan in 1908.10.5
International Harvester, whose market shares declined after 1903,
continued to dominate production of agricultural implements. Its primary
rivals, Deere. and Company, J. I. Case and Company, and Oliver Farm
Equipment Company set up pension plans in 1908, 1915, and 1917, respec-
tively.106 Major firms in the chemical industry (outside petroleum) set
1 0 2Tarbell, The Nationalizing of Business, p. 206.
103
Peter Collier and David Horowitz, The Rockefellers: An American
Dynasty (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976), p. 29.
1 0 4 Ida M. Tarbell, The History of the Standard Oil Company, ed.
David M. Chalmers (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 210. As an inde-
pendent company Atlantic Refining established its own plan in 1918. In
that year, numerous pension plans were established in the petroleum in-
dustry as a result of the breakup of the Standard. See Latimer, Industrial
Pension Systems, vol. 2., appendices A and B, pp. 998-1081.
1 0 5Tarbell, History of the Standard, pp. 102-6.
1 0 6 Kolko, Triumphof Conservatism, p. 46.
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up plans: DuPont in 1904, Parke Davis in 1910, Sherwin Williams in 1911,
Proctor and Gamble in 1915, Mennen. in 1918, Eli Lilly in 1921, Pratt
and Lambert in 1924, and Chesebrough Manufacturing in 1926.107
In the food industry, not- as concentrated as some, several
major producers in addition to American Sugar Refining established plans:
Beech-Nut Packing Company in 1912, Shredded Wheat in 1913, Libby, McNeill,
and Libby in 1919, and American Chicle Company in 1929. In meat packing,
six companies dominated. Of these, three established plans: Swift and
Company in 1916, Armour and Company in 1917, and Cudahy Packing Company
in 1927.108 The two giants of the electrical industry, General Electric
and Westinghouse, setupplans in 1912 and 1914, respectively.109 B. F.
Goodrich (1915), Goodyear Tire and Rubber (1915), and U. S. Rubber (1917)
were joined by smaller producers in the industry in establishing plans.110
In public utilities, banking, textiles, and insurance, as well
10 7Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems, vol. 2, appendices A, B.,
and C, pp. 998-1085.
1 0 8Kolko, Triumph of Conservatism, pp. 51-53. Armour and Swift
were the largest among the six. Cudahy Brothers Company established a
plan in 1923. Cudahy Brothers and Cudahy Packing were subsidiaries of
the Cudahy and St. Louis Dressed Beef and Provision Company.
1 0 9General Electric and Westinghouse were among the pioneers in
the study of labor turnover. Westinghouse engineer H. F. J. Porter
brought attention to the problem in 1907 and Magnus Alexander of General
Electric and the Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions did the
first statistical study. The men who established these pension plans
were well aware that most workers would never see benefits. See David F.
Noble, America by Design: Science, Technology, and the Rise of Corporate
Capitalism (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1977), pp. 293-94.
1 1 0Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems, vol. 2, appendices A, B,
and C, pp. 998-1085.
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TABLE
Pension Plans and Employees by Industry, 1929
Companies
Reporting
Companies Employees Employees*
Noncontributory 39 railroads 39 1,352,286
61 public utilities 57 658,402
129 manufacturing 119 1,195,566
32 banking and insurance 26 71,571
22 other companies 20 56,035
Contributory 82 companies 70 119,972
TOTAL 365 331 3,453,832
*Includes not all employees but just those of
companies reporting employees.
Source: Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems, vol. 1, table. IV,
pp. 502-5.
as other industries, old age pension plans were established. While
numerous less dominant firms established plans, the response to the
inquiry of the 1910 Massachusetts Commission on Old Age Pensions seems
to be born out. Companies without pension systems put forth as the main
reason for their failure to establish plans the businesses' stability.
It is clear that only business concerns that are well
established, and sure of a reasonable degree of perma-
nency, can afford to undertake old age provisions for
their employees.lll
By 1929 approximately 365 private companies had established formal
lllMassachusetts, House, Report of the Commission on Old Age Pen-
sions, Annuities, and Insurance, no. 1400 (Boston: Wright and Potter
Printing Company, 1910), p. 152.
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old age pension systems covering about 3.5 million employees.ll2 Though
these employees constituted less than 10 percent of the nonfarm employees
in the United States, among the companies establishing the plans were
the dominant, forward looking, and finally persistent firms of the
economy. In 1927, nine of the ten corporations with gross assets over
$1 billion and six of the seven with gross assets between $750 million
113
and $1 billion had pension plansl.  Their examples became models not
only for the structure of old age pensions and retirement but of corporate
welfare generally.
Writing for the U. S. Commission on Industrial Relations (1913-
1915) Selig Perlman of the University of Wisconsin offered an analysis
of welfare work in industry in the United States. Because of the mobility
of the unskilled and semi-skilled workers employers had to train a large
portion of their employees each year. Attractive working conditions,
including welfare provisions, might stabilize the work force. The
"social awakening" of labor and the threat of strikes and organization led
employers to seek a bond between employer and employee. This was done
. . . by inducing the employee to enter with them or with
institutions which are under their control into a number
of contracts which are supplementary to the wage contract
and the termination of the same being dependent upon the
continuance of the wage contract and also being fraught
with disadvantages to the employe. Instances of such-
1 1 2Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems, vol. 1, table IV, pp. 502-5.
1 1 3 Ibid., p. 158. The exceptions were General Motors and the
Standard Gas and Electric Company. By contrast, only about half of the
firms with gross assets between $250 million and $750 million had plans.
Only forty-three of the 126 firms in the top 200 with gross assets under
$25Q million had plans.
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disadvantageous contracts are house leases which are
made to terminate upon leaving employment, thus throw-
ing the man out of a job and out of a house at the
same time, and the operation of "establishment funds"
covering accidents, sickness, old age and invalidity.
The latter are the American makeshifts for social in-
surance. The first class of welfare work which takes
the form of a general improvement of working condi-
tions without any "strings" on the employee is commend-
able; for it frequently paves the way for advanced
labor legislation; the second form, welfare work with
"strings to it," is socially dangerous and ought to
be made subject to governmental regulation, or effec-
tually met by the competition of the state engaging
in the same kind of welfare work (in the case of
housing, for instance), or else it ought to be met by
making welfare work compulsory upon all employers (in
the case of social insurance).1 1 4
Writing particularly of old age pension and invalidity funds
Perlman said,
Probably no less than 1,500,000 employes are employed
by firms which maintain such funds. The majority of
such firms are railroad companies which especially feel
the necessity of ridding their.active service of inef-
ficient superannuated employes. The pensions are suf-
ficiently generous but the amount is made to depend on
the-number of years of service and not on the actual
needs of the applicant. This and also the impossibi-
lity under the system of a private system to do any
work for preventing invalidity are the two big short-
comings of the existing old age pension systems from
the standpoint of adequate relief and prevention . . .
However, the greatest evil of a private old age
pension system lies in the great power which it gives
the employer over the employes: he may force them to
do his bidding, to quit the organization [union], etc.,
by the threat of withholding their pension- Hence the
need for remedial legislation. A promise of a pension
after it has once been made should be held as being
binding upon the employer and the employee should be
entitled to a pro rata compensation based upon a fair
1 1 4 Selig Perlman, "Digest of Mr. Perlman's Report on Welfare Work
and Social Insurance," pp. 1-2, Commission on Industrial Relations, Box 7,
Record Group 174, National Archives, Washington, D.C.
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capitalization of his right to a pension even when
he is discharged by his emplo yer prior to the date
when his right would mature.ll5
In the next chapter I will discuss the pension plans to which
Perlman refers. Th-e formal provisions of the pens-ion plans established
by private employers reflect the context and interests which gave them
rise.
11 5Ibid., pp. 7-8.
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VII
OLD AGE PENSIONS IN PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
Formally pensioning employees on the basis of age is a relatively
recent phenomenon in the United States. The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
established the first formal pension provision in 1880, providing for old
age annuities available to all members of the newly organized employees'
relief association. Four years later the association introduced a formal
pension and superannuation feature.1 Except for the Baltimore and Ohio
Despite numerous references to an old age pension system esta-
blished by the American Express Company in 1875 ISee, for example, David
Hackett Fischer, Growing Old in America (New York: Oxford University Press,
1977), p. 165, and W. Andrew Achenbaum, Old Age in the New Land: The
American Experience since 1790 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1978), p. 49] and suggestion of other early plans, I have found no evidence
of a formal plan earlier than that of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Com-
pany. The American Express plan was no doubt used on occasion to pension
workers "disabled by old age" but it was not a system of old age [cont.]
164
plan, which served as an example to later efforts, and a few other old
age pension plans among smaller, less important, and less enduring firms,
up to 1900 old age retirement provisions were informal and unstandardized.
With the turn of the century came a rapid succession of pension
plans. While many plans were established in a short time and while the
companies establishing these plans included many of the economy's dominant
firms, in terms of numbers alone these pension plans were not very impor-
tant.
First, while many of the major firms and numerous smaller firms
in the economy had adopted plans by the 1920s most firms had not. This
was in a period when many industries still included many small firms.
Second, many workers were not covered by these plans. Most industrial
concerns did not have plans and a large portion of workers remained employed
in agriculture where there were no plans. Third, within firms there was
discrimination in coverage both among classes of workers and individual
workers. Fourth, as late as 1920 most men past sixty-five were still
gainfully employed. Pensioning and retirement had not become the usual
practice. Finally, except for the railroads, which spanned the continent,
these systems were not geographically extensive. The development of old
age pensions was, like industry itself, concentrated in the northeast,
Atlantic, and mid-central states.
pensions. See Murray Webb- Latimer, Industrial Pension Systems in the Uni-
ted States and Canada, vol. 1 (New York: Industrial Relations Counselors,
Inc., 1932), pp. 21-22; Alden Hatch, American Express: A Century of Service
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1950), p. 89; and Lee
Welling Squier, Old Age Dependency in the United States. A Complete
Survey of the Pension Movement (New York: Macmillan Company, 19121, p. 74.
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Yet, what is important about pensions in industry in this period
does not depend on the numerical or geographic extensiveness of the prac-
tice. However narrow the early coverage of these plans the practice of
formally pensioning older workers came to be a common assumption of the
working life. The practices established at the turn of the century are
socially significant for us today. Many of these plans were established
in the dominant, forward looking companies of the time and many of these
companies--along with many of their practices in all aspects of production
--have survived. Pension practices are one aspect of corporate welfare
programs and corporate structure generally. Had the pension plans been
concentrated in small, competitive firms which failed the practices
might not have survived. Likewise, it is possible that the adoption of
various formal welfare programs, including pensions, was a condition of
the larger firms' survival. Pensions were established in the larger
firms and not necessarily in the more competitive firms precisely because
pressures--internal and external--threatened the continuation or advance-
ment of the big firms' interests and practices. Like reform generally,
old age pensions were a change introduced in order to maintain--and make
more efficient, more equitable, or more acceptable, and so forth--the
integrity of the given institution or system.
The pension plans estabished in private employment reflected the
context and interests which I have discussed in the previous chapters.
Two early plans--those of the Dolge Manufacturing Company and the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad--will provide a general idea of the form of these plans.
Then a discussion of various aspects of the plans will describe the variety
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and consistency among them.
In 1882 the Dolge Manufacturing Company set up a pension system
for its 600 employees engaged in manufacturing piano, organ, and polish-
ing felts, felt shoes, piano sounding boards, and "musical instrument
sundries." Alfred Dolge had been a workman and a socialist before becoming
a capitalist manufacturer so he felt he had a special perspective on the
relations of labor and capital.2 In 1895 he advocated nationalization of
his pension and insurance system arguing,
Every manufacturer charges yearly an adequate amount
for the wear and tear of his machinery to expense ac-
count. Why cannot he pay, on the same principle, his
share of the Insurance Fund, for the wear and tear on
the brains and sinews of his employees? There is no
better investment for an employer than that which ena-
bles him to ask a man to retire upon his pension when
he gets too old to produce as good or as much work as
the younger man.3
Dolge was adamant that his system fostered employee independence
and was "in direct opposition to paternal government, socialism and com-
munism." Dolgeville, "an ideal industrial village," boasted not only the.
insurance and pension plan but a mutual aid association, parks and recrea-
tion facilities, and schools for children. The Dolge pension and insurance
plan was extended to two other Dolgeville firms, Daniel Green and Company
2Paul Munroe, "An American System of Labor Pensions and Insurance,"
American Journal of Sociology 2 (January 1897):506. [Alfred Dolge,] The
Practical Application of Economic Theories in the Factories of Alfred
Dolge & Son (Dolgeville, N.Y.: Dolgeville Herald Publishing Company
Printers, 1896), pp. 6, 203.
3IDolge,] Practical Application of Economic Theories, pp. 202-7.
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and the C. F. Zimmerman Company, both textile manufacturers. In this way,
workers might move among the firms without loss of benefits.4
Compared to most early plans the Dolge pension system was generous
in its provision. A maximum annual pension was set at $1000 providing
after ten years of service a pension of 50 percent of average annual wages
earned in the preceding year; after thirteen years, 60 percent; after six-
teen years, 70 percent; after nineteen years, 80 percent; after twenty-two
years, 90 percent; and after twenty-five years, 100 percent.5 Also unlike
most early systems the Dolge plan was based in part on employee contribu-
tions.
The system's performance was less than its apparent promise. Of
2046 people employed by the Dolge company between 1874 and 1894 only 40
percent remained in service a year or more; only 10.8 percent, for at least
five years. Most employees never became eligible for pensions. As of
1897, fifteen years from the plan's inception, only nine employees, in-
cluding disability as well as old age recipients, had received pensions,
ranging from $100 to $507 annually.6 As in most pension systems, service-
requirements were. fantastically high given labor turnover rates.
The pension plan of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad served as the
primary example when other railroads and industrial firms instituted plans
4Ibid., pp. 118, 205.
5In 1887 a plan similar to the. Dolge scheme was adopted by the
Toledo, Ann Arbor, and North Michigan Railway but because of the road's
financial condition the plan apparently came to nothing. Munroe, "An
American System of Labor Pensions and Insurance," p. 513.
6Ibid., p. 510.
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after the turn of the century. The pension feature of the Employees'
Relief Association, a company organization, was set up in October 1884 to
provide monthly allowances "during the remainder of their days" for em-
7ployees who had grown old in the service of the company. The constitu-
tion of the Relief Association had, since its inception in 1880, provided
an annuity fund to which members could make regular contributions of any
amount. Annual allowances would be paid beginning at age sixty-five for
life.
The allowance was set at $.10 on each dollar paid plus $.005 on
the dollar for every year contributions continued. If a member disconti-
nued contributions but did not withdraw them the allowance would be equal
to $.10 on each dollar paid plus $.005 on the dollar for each year from
the middle of the period during which he contributed to age sixty-five.
In case a member ceased participation and withdrew his contributions three-
fourths of his total contributions would be returned to him. Any member
who had become a recipient of the fund might at any time before age seventy
receive in one payment an amount equal to five years' allowance in place
of all future allowances.
For example, a worker who contributed $3 per month for twenty years
would receive at sixty-five an annual allowance of $144 having contributed
$720. After five years h-e would have received the dollar amount of his
contributions without interest. Making the same monthly contribution for
7The Catalogue of the Centenary Exhibition of the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad, 1827-1927 (Baltimore: n.p., 1927), pp. 181-82. In April
1889 the B & 0 Employees' Relief Association was taken over by the B & 0
as part of the company's relief department.
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twenty-five years, the allowance would be $202.50 annually and contri-
butions would have been recovered in four and a half years. The advantage
of longer service was a higher allowance and prospects of a greater return
over the years of retirement.
An employee who discontinued contributions after twelve years at
$3 per month but who continued working for twenty years to age sixty-five
would receive an annual allowance of $73.44 based on total contributions
of $432, recovered after almost six years. Withdrawal after the twelve
years of contributing would net the $432 in a lump sum payment.
While longer service and continued contributions net higher allo-
wances and a shorter recovery time, the system was barely as good as a
banking system. Some workers might not recover the real value of their
contributions. More basically, a worker reaching forty or forty-five would
find employment difficult to obtain. Overall length of service among
workers was not enough nor were wages high enough_ to lay the basis for
allowances whose size might make a difference in retirement.
The B & 0 pension fund was run by the Committee of Management,
consisting of the B & 0 company president, ex officio, four members appointed
by the railroad and five elected by contributors, who voted in proportion
to their monthly contributions, which were based on monthly pay. Higher
paid employees voted disproportionately to their numbers. The justification
for this may have been that provisions generally favored higherpaid employees
who were likewise higher skilled and longer employed-in both ways more
valuable to the company. Benefits were guaranteed by the B & 0. Diffe-
rences arising over claims were submitted to three arbitrators, one chosen
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by each party and a third chosen jointly. 8
In its Fourth Annual Report the Association reported the adoption
of the "superannuation, or pension feature." The original constitution of
the Relief Association had provided for members "disabled by accidents,
sickness or by old age, and, at their deaths, for their families." 9 The
new pension feature, originally proposed in the First Annual Report, pro-
vided an old age pension for those who had been members of the Association
for four consecutive years and who had served the company for ten conse-
cutive years. From age sixty upwards the employee might be relieved of
duty by the company and from age sixty-five the employee might elect
retirement. All contributions to the fund were to be made by the company
and pensions were always dependent on the financial condition of the fund.
No member was entitled to a pension who had left the service of the B & 0
unless the pension had been awarded prior to separation. Any disputes or
claims raised by a member would mean automatic forfeiture of all rights
or claims to benefits.10 Within the system there was no recourse for
employees or retirees in case of unfair treatment.
This superannuation, or pension, feature also included disability
pensions which might be paid after the old age pension obligations had been
8First Annual Report of the Baltimore and Ohio Employees' Relief
Association, by W. T. Barnard, Secretary (Baltimore: Press of Isaac Frieden-
wald, 1881), pp. 76-79.
9Ibid., p. 76.
10Fourth Annual Report of the Relief Features, and Second Annual
Report of Savings and Building Features, Baltimore and Ohio Employees
Relief Association, by S. R. Barr, Secretary (Baltimore: Press of John
Cox, 1884).
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met by the fund. Overall, provisions of this feature were for members
who had become unfit for work by "reason of age, infirmity, or permanent
disability."11
At the end of the first year the Association Secretary reported
111 pensioners "as a reward for their long and faithful service." 1 2 The
report concluded,
The value and necessity for the introduction of this
feature is fully demonstrated by the year's experience,
the majority of those who have been accorded this privi-
lege having been left in their old age and infirmity
without other means of support.13
In 1888 the Seventh Annual Report reported 165 current members,
total enrolment since the feature's introduction having been 195 with
thirty deaths. Though the provisions included possible disability pensions,
it is likely that all those issued were for old age. There was always only
a small margin in the fund and disability pensions were to be paid only
if conditions warranted it, old age provisions having been satisfied first.
The Seventh Annual Report noted also that the number receiving benefits
would not be increased because current funds were too low.14 This indi-
11 Ib.id., p. 8.
1 2Fifth Annual Report of the Relief Features, and Third Annual
Report of Savings and Building Features, Baltimore and Ohio Employes Relief
Association, by S. R. Barr, Secretary (Baltimore: Dowling and Company, 1886),
p. 8.
13Ibid.
1 4Seventh Annual Report on the Relief Features, and Fifth Annual
Report on the Savings Fund and Building Features, Baltimore and Ohio
Employees Relief Association, by S. R. Barr, Secretary (Baltimore: Relief
Association Press, 1888?), pp. 7-8.
172
cates that few, if any, disability pensions would have been dispensed.
More important, the dependability of the pension provision rested on the
fund, which was not necessarily well conceived or independent of other
economic factors.
Most of the early plans had much in common with the plan of the
Baltimore and Ohio. Still, a variety of provisions were established among
the companies. Reflecting a range of benefits, these provisions also re-
presented a range of risks and loopholes to which workers might be subject. 15
In general plans were "pensions," "annuities,"i or "combination"
pensions and annuities, though these terms were sometimes used indiscrimi-
nantly. Pensions were usually understood to be wholly company supported.
Benefits paid in lump sums or periodic payments were usually a function
of age, length of service, and income while employed. The term "service
pension" implied that the pension granted was compensation for past service.
However, a pension was usually entirely ,gratuitous, a gift from the com-
pany to care for a worker unable. to continue work in old age or replaced
by a younger worker at company discretion.
Generally an annuity was wholly based on employee contrihutions
and implied a somewhat actuarially based arrangement in which employee
benefits were a function of contributions and time in the company's ser-
vice. Annuities were paid out in fixed periodic benefits. Where an an-
nuity was company funded it implied compensation rather than gratuity.
1 5See appendix for complete texts of several plans.
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An employee might not make money contributions but "accumulate" the an-
nuity as compensation through service. For example, in recommending
provisions for the industry the National Electric Light Association chose
the term "service annuity" over "pension" to imply that the worker was
being compensated for definite service rendered but not paid for in wages.
The. service annuity was compensation for continuous and satisfactory
16
service.
Contributory plans which included monies from both employer and
employees could be analyzed into a combination of annuity based on employee
contribution and pension based on employer contribution. The distinction
was important since, based on their direct contributions, employees might
have rights to annuities which did not apply to pensions.
Plans were administered in a variety of ways. Some were indepen-
dent programs but many were just one among a range of company welfare
schemes. They were organized under company departments or separately
established relief associations or employees' associations. Though-most
were ultimately under company control, plans were administered either by
company officers or by joint boards of company and employee representatives.
The boards of directors or pension committees determined pension eligibi-
lity and set pensions, in general administering the funds.
For example, in 1908 the International Harvester Company established
a pension plan as part of its newly organized Employees' Benefit Associa-
1 6Arthur Williams, "Industrial Peace Activities of the National
Electric Light Association," Annals of the American Academy of Political
and Social Science 44 (November 1912):93-94.
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tion, a company department set up at company initiative. The Employees'
Benefit Association closely resembled the railroad relief departments,
after which it had been modeled. The pension plans had a thirty member
Board of Trustees. Half were company appointees and half were elected
by the employees. The company president was ex-officio chairman of the
board. 1 7
By contrast the plans of the Atlantic Refining Company (1903) and
Proctor and Gamble (1904) had no provision or show of joint administration.
The Atlantic Refining system set guidelines but administration and provi-
sion were finally on an individual basis entirely at the discretion of the
board of directors.18 The Proctor and Gamble plan was formulated and
administered by the company management.19 Both the U. S. Steel and Carne-
gie Pension Fund (1911) and the Swift and Company Pension Fund (1916) were
administered by pension boards of directors appointed by the companies.
In the latter case, the board consisted of five members who were officers
17
C. W. Price, "Employees' Benefit Association of the International
Harvester Company," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science 33 (1909):246, 248.
18P. G. Wharton, "The Pension Practice of the Atlantic Refining
Company," American Management Association General Management Series, no. 90
(New York: American Management Association, 1929), pp. 3-4, 9. The adminis-
tration was vested in the plan's Board of Trustees, consisting of the chair-
man of the board of Atlantic Refining, three members appointed at his discre-
tion, and three members appointed by him as representatives of plan members
--one each to represent the manufacturing employees, the sales employees,
and the office employees. The role of this Board of Trustees is unclear,
however, since throughout the plan discretion and authority were specifi-
cally assigned to the company board of directors.
1 9Herbert Feis, Labor Relations: A Study Made in the Proctor and
Gamble Company (New York: Adelphi Company Publishers, 1928), p. 53.
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or employees of the company appointed by the company board of directors
to serve one year terms. 2 0
Membership in the pension plan or the welfare system of which
it might be a part was either compulsory or voluntary. Usually employ-
ment by the company was the sole criterion for membership though age or
character might be added.
Membership in the International Harvester Company's pension plan,
as in the Employees' Benefit Association generally, was voluntary. Com-
pulsory membership was generally resented among employees and voluntary
membership, wrote C. W. Price, Director of the McCormick Works Club in
Chicago, was "an opportunity to win the confidence of the old employees
and to meet them on a common ground of mutual interests." Indeed, after
four months of operation the International Harvester association boasted
about 20,000 members, over.75 percent of the employees.21 Yet from Price's
statement one must infer that the company officials who conceived the plan
felt they had a choice as to whether to make membership voluntary or com-
pulsory. Voluntary membership established a field of common interest be-
tween the company and its employees--establishing a paternalistic relation-
ship over an adversary one.
In applications for membership to the benefit association, employees
had to agree to he governed. by the regulations and state that "he is cor-
20
United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund, Pension Rules,
taking effect 1 January 1911, as amended 1 May 1927. Swift and Company
Pension Fund (Chicago: 1916).
2 1 Price, "Employees' Benefit Association," pp. 251-52.
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rect and temperate in habits."22 Such invocations to moral worthiness
were not unusual in pension and relief provisions and while they called
on traditional notions about charity and worthiness they also served to
put workers on political warning. Correct habits could be broadly inter-
preted and whereas in earlier settings worth was intepreted by moral
uprightness and diligence, in the industrial United States worth was an
economic attribute.
Where pension eligibility required a minimum number of years ser-
vice prior to a maximum retirement age, an age limit might he set for
membership. For example, with a twenty year minimum service requirement
for retirement at age sixty-five anyone over forty-five might he refused
membership because he could never qualify for pension. The Swift and
Company Pension Fund barred from eligibility those over forty at the time
of first employment. 2 3
Even workers near the minimum age might be rejected since they
did not offer the company as many productive years as younger men and
were therefore seen as something of a burden on the pension fund. Where
plan membership was compulsory or where the company was wary about taking
on those who could become a burden, the age requirement for plan memb-er-
ship sometimes became a hiring age limit.
Few plans were compulsory. Those that were often argued along with
R. K. Macy and Company of New York., which- required membership in its Rene-
22 Ibid., p. 248.
2 3 Swift and Company Pension Fund, p. 5.
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fit Association, "that improvident employees were the ones who failed to
join" under voluntary terms.24 Compulsory membership protected the com-
pany from informal, moral obligations by superseding these with formal,
bureaucratic arrangements.
Requirements for pension eligibility were based on age, length of
service, and quality of serivce. Typically, between sixty and seventy
years of age with twenty to thirty-five years' service an employee became
eligible for a pension, provided his service had been continuous and his
conduct good. Plans might discriminate among employees, making provision
only for particular classes or making different provisions for different
classes. Retirement could be compulsory according to the system, voluntary
on the part of the employee, or discretionary on the part of the company.
The initiative could be by employer, employee, or either. Eligibility
was not necessarily settled once a pension was granted. Continuation of
the pension might be conditional on conduct in retirement.
Most commonly age and length of service were coordinated require-
ments. For example, the Pullman Company's system (19141 pensioned em-
ployees of at least twenty years' service and seventy years of age.
2 5 The
Prudential Insurance Company plan required of men age sixty-five and women
2 4Employers' Welfare Department, National Civic Federation, "R. H..
Macy and Company, New York, Report Upon Conditions of Employes. and Recom-
mendations for Improvements" (1912), p. 15, NCF Papers, Box 113, file.:
Macy, R. H. Co.--l, NYPL.
25F. M. Gunn, superintendent, Pullman Company, Letter to National
Civic Federation, I September 1914, p. 9, NCF Papers, Box 114, file: Pull-
man Company, Pullman, Illinois, NYPL.
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age sixty with twenty-five years of service.26 Employees of the Atlantic
Refining Company might be retired at sixty-five with twenty-five years
of service or between sixty and sixty-four with twenty years of service.
Retirement at seventy was compulsory unless exception was made by the
board. 2 7
In computing length of service stipulations were sometimes made.
Swift and Company provided in its pension plan that employment prior to
twenty-one years of age would not be computed in the service record.2 8
Some lapses in actual working were not counted in the service record though
they migh-t not constitute breaks in service to disqualify the employee for
a pension.
Quality of service was a condition added to age and length of ser-
vice. Requirements usually stipulated that service must be continuous
through the period designated. This meant that an employee who quit or
was fired and later rehired would begin his service accumulation as a
new employee at reemployment. Continuity could be defined to include
strike activity as a break in service. Though continuous service was de-
fined in many plans, determinations were generally at company discretion.
New York Edison granted a service annuity to any employee fifty years or
2 6Prudential Insurance Company of America, The Formation and
Growth of the Prudential Old Guard; Announcement of Service Retirement Allo-
wances on Account of Old Age, Forrest F. Dryden, President (Newark, N.J.:
March 1912), p. 12.
27P. G. Wharton, "The Pension Practice of the Atlantic Refining
Company," p. 7.
28 wift and Company Pension Fund, p. 9.
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older who had "rendered satisfactory service" continuously for at least
29
twenty-five years.
Forrest F. Dryden, President of the Prudential Insurance Company,
announced in March 1912 a program of service retirement allowances on
account of old age for employees of that company. Prudential was the
first insurance company to inaugurate a plan. The system was established
primarily as an encouragement and reward to continuous,
loyal and efficient service. The allowances to be
granted are not intended to furnish full or adequate
support in old age, or during incapacity for work but
only as a partial contribution towards such support, the
major portion of which should properly be provided for
in the future, as heretofore, by the employees, at their
own cost and in their own way. 3 0
"Continuous, loyal and efficient service" was the stated objective
in numerous pension plans. Continuous, loyal, and efficient employees
would be rewarded. Conversely, the promise of a pension was to encourage
these attributes in employees.
The loyalty expected of an employee could be far reaching. The
Prudential provided as regulation 41 in its plan:
Service Retirement Allowances may be discontinued or
withheld in the case of any retired employee guilty of
misconduct or action prejudicial to the Company's inte-
rests or the public welfare, or both, as determined by
the Company, whose decision shall be final. 3 1
2 9
"Brief Summary of the New York Edison Company's relations with
its Employees," 18 February 1916, NCF Papers, Box 114, fi.le-: New York
Edison Company, NYPL.
3 0Prudential Insurance Company of America, Prudential Old Guard,
p. 8.
3 1Ibid., pp. 14-15.
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Such a clause could be and was, in many instances, used to deny a pension
to a worker who had been active in union affairs or in strikes.
Age, length of service, and merit, with the company discretion
implied by the latter, could be combined in any way. Merit often domi-
nated, as in the case of the John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company
(1914), whose policy was expressed in this equivocation on the part of
Walter Crocker, third vice-president of the company.
Employees are compensated according to merit and length
of service, although the latter is an insignificant fac-
tor, except that it greatly influences tenure and gene-
ral consideration of treatment.3 2
Actual retirement was determined by various procedures. Under
the Wells Fargo plan at seventy any officer or employee was permitted to
retire at his own request or by company decision. If the person had
served at least twenty-five years he would be pensioned.33 The. Swift plan
provided mandatory retirement and pensioning at sixty-five for men and
fifty-five for women, both with twenty-five years service. At sixty for
men and fifty for women with twenty-five years service employees could
be retired at Board discretion.34 The Carnegie and U. S. Steel plan also
had provision for hoth compulsory retirement and for retirement at request.35
3 2Walter Crocker, third vice-president, John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Company, Letter to William G. Mather, chairman, National Civic
Federation Employers' Welfare Committee, 21 July 1914, NCF Papers, Box
112, file: John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, NYPL.
3 3Wells Fargo and Company, Pension System (1903), pp. 2-3.,
3 4 Swift and Company Pension Fund, pp. 4-5.
3 5United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund, Pension Rules,
pp. 4-5.
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Eligibility was rarely determined once and for all. The demand
for loyalty could go beyond a worker's employment with the company.
Many plans stipulated that "good conduct" had to be maintained in retire-
ment or the pension might be revoked. In practice this sometimes meant
that retired employees were required to scab or to use their influence
over their younger relatives who might be inclined toward union activities.
The New York Edison service annuity was subject to approval of the com-
pany's board of directors "and conditioned at its pleasure." 3 6
The Atlantic Refining Company plan established in 1903 prohibited
pensioners from engaging
* . . in any business in competition with The Atlantic
Refining Company or any of its subsidiary companies or
. . . [being] . . . employed by any person, firm or
corporation engaged in like competition . . . 37
For example, a pensioner retired from the Atlantic Refining Com-
pany could not be employed by another refining company or an employee
entitled to a pension could not switch jobs taking employ with another
company without losing his entitlement. Economically, pensioning could
leave the worker in a bind, barred from employment in the industry he knew
and pensioned on an allowance inadequate to the. cost of living. If a
pensioner worked for anyone it would have to be Atlantic Refining and to
resume work he would lose his pension. More likely, the company, having
pensioned him, was no longer interested in his labor. Efficient service
3 6
"Brief Summary of the New York Edison Company's.relation with.
its Employees," 18 February 1916, NCF Papers, Box 114, file: New York Edi-
son Company, NYPL.
3 7 Wharton, "The Pension Practice of the Atlantic Refining Company,"
p. 24.
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went beyond the behavior of individual workers to the labor force over
all. Since older workers were believed to be less efficient, pension
plans were to create a more efficient work force by systematically retir-
ing older workers to be replaced by younger, more efficient workers.
Limitation on a pensioner's activities might go beyond restraint
to require active loyalty. On November 1, 1915, the Cumberland Valley
Railroad Company posted a notice signed by M. C. Kennedy, president.
While the Cumberland Valley Railroad Company has been
glad to establish a "Roll of Honor" and pay pensions to
faithful employees who have become superannuated in its
service; it must be fully understood, nevertheless, that
the payment of pensions is wholly a gratuitous act and
not in any sense an obligation upon the Company and under
no circumstances will pensions be continued to persons
who may become dissipated, or are guilty of improper con-
duct.
It should be distinctly understood that pensioners
are considered to be a reserve force subject to an emer-
gency call to duty at any time the Company may have occa-
sion to utilize their services. 3 8
The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company had a similar
policy. E. G. Buckland, vice president and general counsel for the road,
described the practice in 1916.
Pensions are granted as. gratuities and the company
reserves th-e right to call upon any pensioner for spe-
cial service whichhe is physically and mentally able
to render and to take into consideration the pension
being paid as a part of the payment of such special
service.3 9
3 8
"Notice," The Cumberland Valle-y Railroad Company, Chamhersburg,
Pa., 1 November 1915, USRA, file E-38-8, Record Group 14, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.
39K. G. Buckland, vice-president and general counsel, New York,
New Haven and Hartford, Letter to Ralph- Easley, 21 February 1916, NCF Papers,
Box 114, file: New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad, NYPL.
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Pension benefits might be dispensed in a lump sum at retirement.
More commonly a monthly or weekly benefit was paid. Since the objects of
old age pensions were protection in old age and loyalty from employees
and retirees, weekly or monthly pensions were favored. A lump sum might
not be well managed and would terminate the worker's relation to the
firm.
The benefit amounts were determined in several ways. A flat fixed
benefit might be prescribed. Benefits might be determined by age and ser-
vice or by these in combination with some measure of income. The direct
relation of salary classification and pension benefit favored higher paid
employees providing the least retirement income to those least able to
save. In contributory plans benefits were also related to the levels of
employee contributions. Overall benefits took into account status (through
income), the overall value of the worker's service to the company (through
income and service), and loyalty (through length of service).
Some systems followed the Englisk example, basing benefit amounts
on the last years' earnings. In common practice the last years of service
were the lowest paid since older employees were paid less based on pro-
ductivity. Increasing the base from the last year to the last ten might
increase the. pension somewhat. (This practice applied today has precisely
the reverse outcome since dollar incomes generally rise with time through-
out one's career.) Adjustments following retirement were at company dis-
cretion. There were no regular provisions for cost of living increases
and amounts might be reduced.
Some companies provided a pension which was simply a percentage
184
of salary. In the case of Swift and Company, old age pensions were half
of average annual salary or wages for the five years preceding retirement.4 0
The benefit of the Westinghouse Electric Annuity Plan (1914, revised 1929)
was based on "annuity units" awarded by the company to employees according
to length of service and salary classification. Employees could also pur-
chase "employee annuity units" and bonus units were granted to each em-
ployee who bought at least as many units as the company had awarded him
that year. The cost of employee annuity units was based, according to
sex and age, on group annuity tables of the Equitable Life Assurance
Society of the United States, which handled the annuity plan.41
The superannuation pension plan of the Equitable Life Assurance
Society itself paid annual pensions to a maximum of $3,600 a year. Bene-
fits were 2 percent of the aggregate salary the employee received while
42
in continuous service of the company. Standard Oil gave an allowance
of 2 percent of the average annual pay during the ten years next preceding
retirement with a minimum of $300 per year and a maximum of 75 percent of
average annual pay. The plan also provided for special allowances deter-
mined by the Board.43 The Carnegie and U. S. Steel plan had the same
4 0 Swift and Company Pension Fund, p. 6.
4 1Westinghouse Electric Annuity Plan. New Program for the Employees
of Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company (-East Pittsburgh, 1929),
pp. 16-17.
42C. J. Martin, chairman, Welfare Committee., Equitable Life Assu-
rance- Society, Lecture, NCF Papers, Box 111, file; Equitable- Life Assurance-
Society, NYPL.
4 3Annuities and Benefits for the Employees of Standard Oil Company
(Incorporated in New Jersey) (New York: Annuities and Benefits Committee,
1918), pp. 4-5.
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provision set at 1 percent with monthly limits of $12 and $100.44
Pensions were not generally intended to provide full support in
old age. Employees were expected to have savings, family support, or
other employment to meet their budget requirements. For the most part,
pensions were small and barely adequate to subsistence, if they were that.
45Average annual pensions in railroading in 1911 were:
Philadelphia Rapid Transit Company $240.00
Pennsylvania Railroad 241.00
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe 255.00
Canadian Pacific Railroad 274.00
Delaware, Lackawanna and Western 275.00
New York Central Railroad 312.84
Union Pacific Railroad 314.00
Buffalo, Rochester and Pittsburgh 325.50
Philadelphia and Reading Railroad 362.00
In the same year average earnings for full-time employees in
46
railroading were $690.00. Such_ small pensions were justified first by
the systems' being non-contributory Centirely company funded) and second
on the theory that a pension ought not to provide comfortable support hut
only subsistence, which required less. money in later years. While expenses
in old age might be less, they were not enough. less to absorb.. this sudden
drop in income. Since wages were near enough subsistence that few workers
could save toward retirement, one must wonder how adequate these pension
amounts were to subsistence living.
44 
_United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund, Pension Rules,
pp. 5-6.
45 Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, Seventh
Annual Report (1912), p. 64.
4 6U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United
States, Colonial Times to 1970, Bicentennial Edition, vol. 1 (Washington,
D. C., 19751, Series D 747, p.-166,
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While, as I have suggested in writing about eligiblity, employees
might be rather arbitrarily disqualified and, as I have suggested here,
benefits were generally low, companies discriminated favorably in the
cases of some employees. Such was the case when E. I. duPont de Nemours
Powder Company of Wilmington, Delaware, granted a pension in 1908 to R. S.
Penniman, retiring general manager of the west coast office. The Board
of Pensions considered the $100 per month maximum pension too little for
Penniman, whose income had been approximately $10,000 per year. The
Board applied the standard formula--l percent of average yearly salary
times his years of service estimated to be about thirty--and rounded his
pension to $3000. This determination was not final. Having initially
requested this determination from the pension board, the following year
Coleman duPont granted Penniman a pension of $5,000 a year.47
Early pension plans were for the most part undertaken with vir-
tually no actuarial consideration. Actuarially based funding was not com-
mon until the 1920s when many plans began to mature and federal revenue
provisions made pension funds attractive. Financing was primarily non-
contributory, i.e., provided entirely by the company according to annual
outlays or based on an initial fixed endowment. Because pensions were
subject in amount and continuation to corporate discretion, financing was
ignored to some degree. In the case of contributory plans, whose financing
T. C. duPont, L. R. Beardslee, Charles Copeland, Coleman duPont,
J. P. Laffey, H. M. Barksdale., and Charles B. Halladay, Correspondence,
3 Septemher 1908 to 10 April 1909. Resolution Passed by Board of Pensions,
15 September 190.8, duPont Series II, Part 3, Box 123, Eleutherian Mills
Historical Library, Wilmington, Delaware..
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was based wholly or in part on employee contributions, questions of
employee rights made funding a more troublesome area.
Some plans were organized essentially like annuities. Employees
paid contributions and received payments at retirement based on amounts
paid. Other plans provided both employee and employer contributions to
the fund.48 The common practice was company funding. The costs of the
Prudential plan, for example, were born entirely by the company.49
The bases for company contributions varied. In some cases the
company contributed a flat sum at the outset. Such was the case of the
Carnegie Relief Fund, established in 1901 by an endowment of $4 million.
Such sums might be augmented later by periodic large contributions to
keep the pension plan or relief department funded. In 1911 when the com-
panies merged, the U. S. Steel Corporation enlarged the Carnegie endowment
by $8,000,000.50 In most cases of non-contributory, that is, entirely
company funded, plans monies were annually transferred to the fund to
meet the costs of pension payments.
In contributory systems company contributions were according to
eith-er of these methods or were related to employee contributions. For
example, in the Westinghouse Electric Annuity Plan a system of bonus
annuity units were granted by the company based on employee participation
48
In "pension theory" pensions paid from such. a fund could be
analyzed into an annuity based on the employee. contribution and a pension
based on the employer contribution.
4 9Prudential Insurance Company of America, Prudential Old Guard,
p. 9.
5 0 Chicago Record Herald, 15 December 1912.
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in the plan.
Every employee who buys in any annuity year after the
effective date of this Plan, Employee Annuity Units to
a number not less than the scheduled number of Company
Annuity Units that the Company provides for him for
said year will receive, as a bonus from the Trustees,
one-fourth of a Company Annuity Unit for each Company
Annuity Unit the Company provides for him for said
year, excluding the bonus units and reckoning only
future service and not past service.5 1
The International Harvester Company had an unusual arrangement.
Company contributions were based on employee participation in the benefit
association. If membership was 50 to 75 percent of the average total
number of employees of the company over the course of the year, the con-
tribution was $25,000. Over 75 percent participation, the company gave
$50,000.52
In an unusual case, the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, in
addition to providing allowances of one-third of salary to superannuated
employees past sixty-five, also had a staff savings fund which had a
retirement feature. Each year the company deposited in the fund an amount
equal to one-half the employee's deposits for the year. These deposits
with interest could be withdrawn in case of death, permanent incapacity
or by a vote of the trustees, in cases of honorable retirement after twenty
years continuous service. Voluntary withdrawals by an employee paid only
153
his contributions plus 5 percent interest.
51Price, "Employees' Benefit Association," p. 248. These contri-
butions could have been on paper only.
52Ibid.
5 3This plan was first established in 1900. The descriptiQn here
is from a 1920 version. "Staff Savings and Insurance Fund of the Metropoli-
tan Life Insurance Company," Law and Labor (June 192Q):163.
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Since most plans were non-contributory and unfunded, pension pro-
mises had faulty bases. Company closings and mergers sometimes left
employees with no pensions. Pension entitlements were lost and current
pensions discontinued. Companies sometimes withheld or limited pension
payments in support of company income. Contributory plans provided some
protection for workers, not only because workers had more claim to monies
they contributed directly but also because contributory plans tended to
be more formally organized and funded.
Actuarial provisions required set contributions over a period of
years in order that upon retirement an employee's pension would be finan-
cially guaranteed. Since funding was introduced in part to meet increased
and burdensome costs to the company, actuarially based funding was often
accompanied by the institution of employee contributions.
Insurance companies became active in pension plans in the 1920s,
establishing plans on actuarial principles. Not only did federal revenue
provisions give tax advantages to funds, but also, sound funding schemes
were a defense against reform criticism of the inefficiency and unreliabi-
lity of private pension plans. More important for the insurance companies
themselves, successful private company plans might ward off what the insu-
rance industry considered anappropriationof its field of business. Between
1916 and 1929 insurance companies were partly or wholly responsible for
all contributory plans adopted in textiles, iron and steel, paper and
printing, insurance, and merchandising.54 Smaller companies having both
5 4After numerous industrialists began to support state insurance,
the insurance industry remained bitterly opposed. Irving Bernstein, The
Lean Years, A History of the American Worker 1920-1933 (Boston-: {cont.]
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less money and less assured stability had virtually no choice but to
reinsure. Larger companies could afford to self-insure but looked to the
insurance companies whose business it was to insure cost effectively.
Actuarially based plans were the exception among early systems
but by the early 1920s actuarial provisions were part of many new or reor-
ganized plans. Plans which had been founded after the turn of the century
were approaching maturity. Firms faced increasing costs which had been
unanticipated or ignored. For example, the New York Central Lines adopted
a pension plan in 1910. In that year the average annual pension was $275
and the total amount paid was $289,590. From 1910 to 1927, 9,009 pensions
had been granted at an average age of 67.32 with 33.70 average years of
service. By 1927 the average pension was $748.56 with total disbursements
of $2,330,364. The average capital liability55 per pensioner had increased
between 1910 and 1927 from $2,068 to $6,798.56 The Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad pension payments increased from $7,354 in 1885 to $466,953 in 1925.
U. S. Steel increased total expenditures to pensions from $281,457 in 1911
Houghton Mifflin Co., 19721, pp. 484-88. Latimer, Industrial Pension Sys-
tems, vol. 1, pp. 49-50.
5 5The capital liability is the amount which the company would have
to have on hand at a particular time in order to meet all obligations--pre-
sent and future--incurred up to that time. A simple formulation sets the
capital liability for any employee or pensioner equal to the annual pension
times the expected number of years on pension.
5 6Frank V. Whiting, "Insolvency of Pension Plans and Remedies,"
address presented at Eleventh Annual Conference on Human Relations in Indus-
try, Silver Bay, New York C29 August 1928), pp. 6-7. Also, Bryce M. Stewart,
"Financial Aspects of Industrial Pensions," American Management Association
General Management Series, no. 87 (New York; American Management Association,
1928).
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to $3,003,209 in 1927 with the average pension increasing from $175 to
$470 annually. 5 7
Calculations on the financial status of the Proctor and Gamble
pension system in 1924 brought drastic revisions in 1925. Pension pay-
ments had risen steadily. Total pension payments were projected to triple
over the next fifteen years, assuming stable enrolment. The cost by 1940
would he between $40 and $50 per $1000 of wages compared to the 1924
company contribution of $16. Already facing a fund deficit in 1924, the
company could anticipate the short fall's growth by 1946 to over $4 million,
an amount "far beyond the company's original intention or its judgment of
what should be expended for pensions." The plan was revised by reductions
rather than be abandoned.58 Some plans were abandoned in the 1920s. Some
increased contributions or instituted employee contributions for the first
time. Most plans remained unfunded and were paid annually.
The Atlantic Refining pension plan was non-contributory until
July 1927 when member contributions were added. In 1924 the company had
recognized the problem of increasing costs. Considering only employees
over forty-five years of age, the accrued liability59 was estimated at
$5 million. In the fall of 1926 George G, Buck., a consulting actuary
from New York, was hired to do a valuation. His report in early 1927
5 7Stewart, "Financial Aspects," pp. 405.
5 8Feis, Labor Relations . . . Proctor and Gamble, pp. 58-61.
5 9The accrued liability is the sum of liability over all employees.
See note 55. There is no significant difference between the terms capital
liability and accrued liability.
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showed a total liability in excess of $23.6 million. As a result member
contributions, determined according to the employee's age at joining the
system, were instituted. Other aspects of the plan were changed as well. 6 0
In the late 1920s most new plans were contributory and many were
funded.61 An example of a plan founded in this period is that of Ballard
and Ballard Company in Louisville, producers of wheat flour. Effective
March 1, 1928, this old age income plan provided retirement at sixty-five
with a monthly pension of $2 for each year of service. The pension con-
tinued until death. Eligible employees were those who joined at a maximum
age of forty-five and paid $2 monthly into the fund during employment.
The company also contributed. The plan was met with almost unanimous
approval, all but one employee joining. Like many plans at the time, this
one was handled by an insurance company, in this case Metropolitan Life. 6 2
The establishment of funds and the addition of employee contribu-
tions to feed them was not simply a matter of actuarial soundness and de-
pendable benefits. Questions of risk and the status of funds, as capital
affected arrangements.
The plans of the New York Stock Exchange and the Western Clock
Company were reinsured. In reinsured plans the actuarial risk was trans-
6 0Wharton, "The Pension Practice of the Atlantic Refining Company,"
pp. 4-5, 7.
61
Stewart, "Financial Aspects," p. 20.
6 2Fred Borries, vice-president, Ballard and Ballard, Letter to
Willcox, chairman, NCF Employers' Welfare Department, 26 April 1928, NCF
Papers, Box 85, file: Old Age Dependency and Pensions, General Correspon-
dence K, NYPL.
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ferred to an insurance company, which offered annuities on a group basis
to industrial firms. Larger private firms could self-insure through a
fund set up according to actuarial principles. Depending on how they were
organized, such company funds provided a tax advantage for firms. As
early as 1919 federal internal revenue regulations allowed certain pension
fund contributions to be deducted from gross corporate income. In the
1920s amounts paid directly for pensions to retired employees became
deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses. In both cases these amounts
were taxable as income when distributed to the pensioners.
In 1921 internal revenue provisions made employee benefit stock
bonus plans and profit sharing trust income exempt from taxation. In
64
1926 these provisions were extended to pensions. Under these provisions
firms set aside pension reserves rather than mortgaging future- profits.
At the same time, however, these funds were not lost to investment. Quite
the contrary, pension reserves were necessarily invested to provide the
return for the pension fund. The difference was that this capital invested,
set aside as it had been for pensions, was not taxable.
Employees had no protected rights in these. early plans and com-
panies were under no clear ohligations. Provisions and continuation of
the plans were at company discretion. A pension granted could be revoked
or reduced. Th-e plan itself could be altered or terminated. In individual
cases. a pension could depend on good conduct--behavior not prejudicial to
6 3Whiting, "Insolvency of Pension Plans," pp. 5, 7-9.
6 4Charles L. Dearing, Industrial Pensions (Washington, D.C.: The
Brookings Institutions, 1954), pp. 285-87.
194
the firm--during retirement as well as employment. Company failures or
mergers could mean the end of the pension plan. Portability was unheard
of, especially since in many cases employ by another firm in the same
industry, considered prejudicial to company interests, might mean an end
to one's pension rights. Vesting, as well, was not provided. Plans
wholly non-contributory provided no vesting whatsoever. Contributory
plans might allow vesting of employee contributions but even in this
case the employee might lose.
In the case of a pension plan based on an annuity employees could
argue their right to benefits hut when the company paid all costs bene-
fits were legally and practically gratuitous. Whatever the benefit struc-
ture of the plan, in the final analysis the company was under no obliga-
tion. Employees had no legal rights in such a case: no right to a pension,
no right to employment to ensure the pension, no protection from changes
in the plan's rules or rates, no right to continuation of benefits, no
right to henefits adequate to support in old age, no right to contest
company determinations of pension eligibility or amount.
Plans contained stipulations such as these from the Prudential
regulations:
The plan of Service Retirement Allowances does not con-
cede or grant to any employee the right to he retained
in the Company's service, nor does it grant or concede
any right or claim to a retirement allowance nor to any
interest, right or participation in any fund which may
be set apart for this purpose.
The Company's records concerning an employee's length
of service and his or her average earnings in salary or
wages shall b.e conclusive and final for all the objects
and purposes set forth. in this plan of service Re.tire-
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ment Allowances.65
Provision eleven of the Swift and Company Pension Fund read,
Pensions may be suspended or terminated in case of
misconduct on the part of the beneficiaries or for other
cause sufficient in the judgment of the Board to warrant
such action. The Board may at its discretion reinstate
the pension of any person whose pension shall have been
so suspended or terminated. 6 6
The Wells Fargo plan stated,
Neither the action of the Board of Directors in es-
tablishing a system of pensions, nor any other action
now or hereafter taken by it, or by the Board of Pen-
sions in the inauguration and operation of a Pension
Department, shall be construed as giving to any officer,
agent or employe of the Company a right to be retained
in its service, or any right or claim to any pension
allowance; and the Company expressly reserves its right
and privilege to discharge at any time any officer,
agent or employe when the interest of the Company, in
its judgment, may so require, without liability for any
claim for pension, or other allowance than salary or
wages due and unpaid. 6 7
By contrast, the Westinghouse Electric Annuity Plan, whose benefits
were based on "annuity units," implied rights not only to annuity units
purchased by employees, but also,
. . . guaranteeld] the payment by the Trustees, in ac-
cordance with the terms and provisions of this Plan,
of all Company Annuity Units issued under the Plan by
Trustees.
The Company . . . expects the new Plan to he per-
manent but, the Company reserves the right to modify
the Plan . . . However, all Company Annuity Units is-
6 5Prudential Insurance Company of America, Prudential Old Guard,
pp. 14-15.
6 6 Swift and Company Pension Fund, pp. 10-11.
6 7Wells Fargo, Pension System, pp. 7-8.
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sued up to the time of such action will be honored at
maturity.68
At least on paper, the plan provided protection for the employees.
The basis for employer contributions could implicitly affect the
plan's nature. Wholly non-contributory plans were entirely under company
control unless otherwise provided. The cost of the Prudential Insurance
plan was born entirely by the company with no employee contributions.69
This plan might be changed at any time at company discretion. Regulation
18 of the plan asserted this company control.
The Company reserves to itself, unconditionally, the
right to establish at any time in the future. any new
or different plan of Service Retirement Allowances,
or to alter the rate of such allowances, or to dis-
continue the plan in its entirety. Should such modi-
fication or discontinuance be decided upon, thirty
days' notice will be mailed to all beneficiaries in
receipt of service Retirement Allowances. 7 0
Not only could the plan he changed, but also a pensioner could not neces-
sarily depend on his allowance. The pensions granted were. legally and
practically gratuities., gifts. which could be revoked without justification.
Another way in which employee pension rights or benefits were lost
was through company mergers. The employees of the subsidiary company
might lose their benefits altogether. If they came under the pension plan
of the buying company they might be judged ineligible for participation
or they might enter the plan as new employees from the merger date. Wells
6 8Westinghouse Electric Annuity Plan, pp. 16-17.
69Prudential Insurance Company of America, Prudential Old Guard,
p. 9.
Ibid., p. 15.
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Fargo had a more elaborated provision than most, to some degree insuring
against this contingency. The plan required twenty-five years continuous
service between the merged companies with at least thirteen of those years
in service to Wells Fargo. 7 1
Old age pension plans in private industry reflected the context
and interests which gave them rise. The plans spoke to the dual problem--
old age dependency and superannuation in industry. Old age pensions pro-
vided a systematic means to relieve the company of superannuated workers
while recognizing the employer's responsibility and the worker's dependence.
Age and service requirements combined with effective age limits to assure
that superannuated workers were eligible for pensions.
The plans provided an alternative to union old age benefits and
state old age insurance. Particularly in the 1920s when old age insurance
was the foremost social welfare reform issue, private plans were promoted
and measures taken to assure their security through funding.
Age and service requirements guaranteed the value of the firm's
paying pensions. Not granted for old age or need merely, pensions were.
paid to workers who had grown old in the company's employ. Long service,
which the plans were to induce, was rewarded.
The plans were structured to encourage and maintain employees'
loyalty and good behavior while employed and in retirement. This structure
implied limiting individual independence, by tying the employee to the
7 1Wells Fargo, Pension System, p. 4.
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particular firm, and dampening union activity, a potential basis for
denying a pension. No labor or contract law prescribed or protected
employees' entitlements under these plans. Pension determinations were
entirely subject to company discretion. To protect this prerogative most
of the early plans were entirely company funded. Provisions made possible
the use of the pension promise and the pensions themselves as disciplinary
tools. Regularly paid stipends, as opposed to lump sum benefits which
were more common in union plans, maintained the retirees' relationship
to the firm. While the company could b.e rid of its superannuated workers
nonetheless it maintained their dependence on the firm.
While eligibility provisions required employees' good behavior,
cooperation was induced in a more subtle and essential way. Since in
accepting the pension promise employees depended on the firm for their
welfare, employees must he concerned with the welfare of the firm. While
union or government pensions might have made workers more independent,
benefits tied directly to employment identified the workers' interests
with those of their employers. These benefits also compounded employees'
dependence on employers by expanding their dependence beyond employment
itself. This dependence and identification could serve as a basis for
stable, business relations with. employees and their organizations.
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VIII
Conclusion
At the. opening of the twentieth century private employers in the
United States began to adopt formal old age pension schemes. Three decades
later 365 companies, among them the dominant firms in major industries,
had established plans. Throughout most of the nineteenth century such
practices were not considered because there was no apparent need for them.
When old age pensions were discussed it was, for the most past, as ineffi-
cient for business and degrading to workers. What changes in ideas, prac-
tice, and needs and interests constituted the context for and shaped the
introduction of old age pensions in private employmen.t?
Early industrial employers did not have much concern, oyer older
workers since few of them grew old in industrial employ. Those few who
were not simply fired and remained and who could not continue their usual
zoo.
pursuits were made exceptions. Reduced pay rates, reduced work loads,
and transfers to lighter employment were alternatives to firing. By
the turn of the century these options were no longer adequate.
People increasingly looked to industrial employment for lifetime
support. Simple firing was less acceptable as union seniority provisions
and reform pressures--regarding old age dependence and big business--
constrained employers' freedom. The scale and organization of modern
industry made informal measures impracticable. In some industries tech-
nical constraints made reduced rates and reduced work impossible. A
ready supply of workers made it easy to replace and inefficient to main-
tain older workers. Transfers to lighter work were limited. Workers
growing old in industrial firms constituted a problem, superannuation in
industry.
Firms confronted superannuation in industry as developments both
inside and outside industry changed the nature of old age employment,
unemployment, and dependency. During most of the history of the United
States unemployment as we know- it had not existed. Nor were employment
and dependency understood or treated as matters of age. Agrarian society
integrated older people in a system of mutual dependence and varying
productive roles. Community relief--early in the form of outdoor support
and later by maintenance in the almshouse--took no notice of age.
By the end of the nineteenth century changes in property holdings
and increased geographic mobility had destroyed the patterns of family
relations and subsistence production which had supported the aged. The
almshouse, which had long been criticized as decrepit, inadequate, and
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poorly administered, was being discredited by the criterion of efficiency
increasingly used to judge. Studies concluded that the almshouse-the
major form of relief--had become an institution for aged dependents.
Old age dependency, recognized as a major social problem, was articulated
as a problem of industry and industrial employment. New ideas about the
aged laid the basis for discrimination against them as a group.
A solution to the problem of old age dependence would have re-
lieved the firm of superannuation in industry. Thrift plans, which were
impracticable, were proposed as a solution. Union and government pension
plans, both of which seemed viable possibilities, would have supported
older people and rid the firms of superannuation. Both- these measures
were unacceptable to business. Union plans encouraged a form of unionism
not favored by business. Government pensions constituted intervention in
labor relations. Because these alternatives were impracticable and un-
acceptable and for their own interests, companies adopted old age pension
plans. These plans were designed to serve company purposes: to induce
long and faithful service, to stabilize labor relations, to remove older
workers, to formalize practice, to ward off state intervention, and to
meet industry's obligation to superannuation.
The provisions of these early plans reflect the context and
interests which gave them rise. Pension plans were neither portable nor
vested. Age and service requirements were structured to induce long
service. Funding kept plans entirely under company control. Company
discretion in all areas of administration made the worker rho was inte-
rested in a pension dependent on employer favor. Plans provided rational-
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ized and systematic means for removing older workers. Funding provisions
holstered plans when reform criticism moved for government old age pen-
sions.
This study provides some- historical understanding of the nature
of old age dependence, unemployment, and retirement. At the same time it
points to underlying issues concerning the nature of needs and interests.
The, problem of old age dependence transformed and interpreted
from the perspective of private employers as superannuation in industry
produced a solution which could not adequately speak to the need which
bore the problem. Company old age: pensions were primarily to rid industry
of older workers, not to relieve old age dependency. These pensions were
not given for old age or need but for having grown old in the service of
the company. In this sense, old age pensions were a no-lose proposition
for the firms. Given the number of people who stayed in industrial em-
ployment to sixty-five these pensions could not have helped very many
people in th.e early decades. If one did work that long and received a
pension, the pension period was short.. Meanwhile, in adopting the plans
the companies were accomodating public sentiment.
In part for these reasons, private pensions did not ward off
federal legislation. However, they established a pattern for company old
age pensions and influenced social security legislation. In particular,
this model attached old age income provisions to employment. The necessity
to provide for unwanted, older workers was combined with other purposes.
While not wanting simply to increase wages to allow for saving, firms did
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tie old age pension entitlements to wage and employment arrangements,
in part because the pensions were introduced to reinforce these arrange-
ments. Entitlement, then, was based in employment. Because jobs and
skills were distributed according to ethnicity, nativity, and sex,
pensions, were, we can assume, similarly distributed.
Dependence as a social problem entailed the failure or absence
of previously assumed relations of dependence. Older people socially
and economically individuated, without means of support and lacking re-
lations of dependence were the subjects of old age dependence. Old age
pensions responded in part to this condition by creating a relation of
dependence in old age between worker and employer.
While old age pensions are markedly different from the system of
colonial family dependencies, it is striking that in each instance pro-
perty is central in the relation of dependence and provision of security.
By the middle of the nineteenth century most children no longer depended
on parents for property and mutual security. Employees had by that time
begun to develop a relation of dependence and security with industrial
employers. One difference lay in the fact that the child's subordination
to and care of the parent was predicated on the inheritance of independence,
the eventual assumption of the role of parent and property holder.
Equality over time was implicit in the. relation. Such was not the case
hetween employer and employee. Old age pensions entailed the dependence
between individual workers and the firm based on the economic relation
1Another important difference was the relation between individual
and institution by contrast to the earlier relation between individuals.
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of property holder to wage worker. The relation was set unequal. The
worker's suhordination did not assume any possibility of change and,
indeed, entailed affirmation of his condition.
At the same time, private old age pensions were an indication of
the firm's dependence on labor for production; in particular, on a labor
force stable in its work patterns and its political relation to the
firm. A stable work force was necessary to continuous, rationalized
production and embodied the domination of workers by capital. The
necessity to respond to workers needs assumed the power of workers to
disrupt or halt production.2
This study leads us to consider old age retirement as a form of
technically and ideologically rationalized unemployment. While at the
turn of the century older people were rejected from industry, this rejec-
tion has in time been justified as a reward. Retirement, one example of
the "leisure" developed in this period, maintained the firms' "physical
capital" by replacing worn out workers and became the humane resort for
workers past their productive years. Having been defined outside the
productive process, older workers were rewarded with their exclusion. At
the same time retirement, as a socially acceptable relation to the produc-
tive process, implicitly helped older workers avoid the status loss in-
volved in being unemployed.
2Another aspect of property relations entailed in pensions involves
mobility.. Old age pensions were necessary in part because of the wide-
spread propertylessness, on which a mobile- labor force was predicated. At
the same time, pensions--appealing to the insecurity which. underlay the
mobility--were structured to restrain labor mobility,
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Finally, this case shows that needs and their satisfaction are
historical phenomena. Changes in context can constitute changes in needs
and the possibilities for their satisfaction. As we create new means of
life--technologies, organizations, products, relationships--we create new
needs. Needs are created both in the sense that the conditions for their
realization as needs. are created and that their expression or interpre-
tation in the context of those conditions is activity. These activities
--the creation of conditions and the interpretation of needs--are expres-
sions of interest in the. social order.
For example, when the support of a particular group was no longer
provided as a matter of course, that support became manifest as a need.
The particular conditions under which the need was manifest likewise
created new categories of discrimination, namely, employment and depen-
dence on the. basis of age. The articulations or interpretations of this
need--as old age dependence and superannuation in industry--were expres-
sions of varying interests, were- conditioned by the general context in
which the needs arose, and in turn conditioned the means for the satisfac-
tion of these needs. Finally, the means (in this case, company old age
pensions) developed to satisfy the needs Cold age dependence and superan-
nuation in industry) have themselves given rise to new categories and
practices (e.g., retirement), new needs (e.g., for vesting and portability),
and new notions of the underlying problems (e.g., control of pension funds).
In modern industry workers were, to a large degree., merely labor,
that is, a factor input to production. As Abraham Epstein put it it 1922,
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modern industry finds little use for the worn-out
workers. It replaces and discards these aged wage-
earners as it is in the habit of replacing and discard-
ing the worn-out and inefficient machinery.3
The notion of certain workers as a "burden to industry" or as
"worn-out" assumed that people, like machinery, were "produced" to meet
4
the needs of the production process. The idea that a person could have
"passed the limit of his efficiency" or "outlived [his] usefulness"
implies a standard set for human performance according to the terms of
a particular production process- Once workers did not meet the needs of
the firms and their machines they were scrapped.
As technologies and forms of organization were the material basis
for these ideas at the turn of the century, technologies and forms of
organization can now be the basis for new ideas and practices. In par-
ticular cases, developments already introduced have made some work safer,
easier, and more variable so that exclusion no longer has a physical basis.
Shorter hours of work could not only provide full employment but also
lessen the burden of work. For those unable to work, removing pensions
from their basis in employment and wage contracts could guarantee vesting
and portability and free workers to act without fear of future insecurity.
Wholesale discrimination against older people has already become an object
3Abraham Epstein, Facing Old Age; A Study of Old Age Dependency
in the United States and Old Age Pensions CNew York: A. A. Knopf, 1922),
p. 20.
4An excellent discussion of a closely related notion, that of
labor as a commodity, is enlightening here. See Karl Polanyi, The Great
Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1944).
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of struggle for a growing movement.
While I have broadly outlined the introduction of old age pensions
in private industry with particular attention to two industries, more
detailed study of the variety of conditions and practices would provide
a richer story and expose the complexities of such iTatters as technology,
scale of production, and skill. For example, one would expect develop-
ments in chemical production to b.e different from those in farm machinery
manufacture since the physical process is so different. Insurance com-
panies, less involved in physical production altogether, might be an
interesting case, particularly given that industry's special interest in
the issue. Since pensions were to induce long service from valued
employees one would expect variation according to skill.
Study of union activities and response to company old age pensions
would round out the picture a bit. The union stories would also vary by
industry according to such factors as the. degree and nature. of unioniza-
tion, the union's basis of strength-, and the cultural tradition of the
union. The labor movement was divided on the question of old age income
security provisions. An understanding of these divisions might inform
discussion of the variety of interests expressed by labor in this period.
Examination of union documents would also answer the question whether
workers were effectively won by these pension arrangements, which were so
apparently undependable.
Examination of particular business records might provide more
concrete information on actual practice. Records of the age composition
208
of industries' labor forces can provide some insight into the possible
extent of pensioning. Studies of wheth-er pensioning actually reduced
labor turnover might be available or constructed from materials in
particular business archives.
There were divisions within the business community, for example,
according to competition, scale of production, and patterns of employment.
Study of these variations would provide insight into the political debates
over private pensions and government insurance in the 1920s and 1930s.
Old age pensions, along with other welfare practices at the turn
of the century, are generally considered to have been part of the basis
for a transformation in labor relations, for example, through- identifi-
cation of workers' interests with those of the firms. Study of the spe-
cific ways in which this worked would be particularly interesting.
Practices in the United States were imported from Europe. Study
of these precedents and the ways in which they were transplanted would
ground the introduction of plans in the United States.
Whole segments of the population--women and agricultural workers,
for example--were. outside these provisions. Their conditions in old age
during this period would make stories in themselves.
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APPENDIX
Selected Pension Plans
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WELLS FARGO & COMPANY
Pension System
Rules and regulations, adopted by the Board of Directors of
Wells Fargo & Company, governing the organization of the Pension
Department of Wells Fargo & Company respecting a system of pensions, for
the purpose of enabling employes of the Company who have rendered long
and faithful service to retire when they have attained an age necessi-
tating relief from duty.
(Administrator of Pension Department)
1. The administration of the Pension Department shall be by
what is designated as the Board of Pensions, and shall, consist until
otherwise ordered, of the following:
(Board)
The President will have the power to fill all vacancies in
the Pension Board as they may occur from time to time.
(Powers)
2. The Board of Pensions shall, subject to the approval of the
President, have power--
To make and enforce rules and regulations for the efficient
operation of the Pension Department; to determine the eligibility of
employes to receive pension allowances; to fix the amount of such
allowances; and to prescribe the conditions under which such allowances
may be made.
It shall make rules, not inconsistent with these regulations,
for its own guidance; elect a Chairman from its own number; appoint a
Secretary; and from time to time, as required, make reports of its
action to the President.
The actions of the Board of Pensions, when approved by the
President, shall be final and conclusive.
(Eligibility)
3. The benefits of the Pension system will apply only to those
persons who have been required to give their entire time to Wells Fargo
& Company, or to that Company and some other Express Company operating
jointly where Wells Fargo & Co. controls. In case of such joint employ-
ment, the Board of Pensions shall decide the amount of the employe's
monthly pay that shall be used in determining the pension allowance.
Source: W-ells Fargo & Company Pension System (1903)
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(Retirement at seventy),
4. Ca) All officers and employes who have attained the age of
seventy years shall be retired; provided that, after investigation, it
shall appear to the satisfaction of the Board of Pensions that any such
officer or employe is able to and does fully discharge the duties of
his position and, in the judgment of the Board, the Company's interests
will he best served thereby; it may retain him in active employment, hut
any such officer or employe shall be permi.tted.to retire at his own
request. All cases of persons so continued in active employment shall
thereafter be brought before the Board for reconsideration periodically--
at least as often as once a year. Officers and employes of said age
retired, or retiring as above, who have been twenty-five years in the
service, shall be pensioned.
(Over sixty and incapacitated)
(b) Officers and employes between sixty and seventy years
of age, who have been twenty-five years in the service and who have become
incapacitated, may b.e retired and pensioned.
Physical examination shall be made of employes recom-
mended by the employing officer for retirement who are under seventy
years of age, and a report thereof with. the recommendation of the
physician appointed to make such examination, shall be furnished the
Board of Pensions for consideration in determining such- cases.
(Date of retirement)
5. Retirement shall be made effective from the first day of
the calendar month following that in which the person shall have
attained the specified age, or from the first day of a calendar month to
be determined by the Board of Pensions.
(Definition of "service" and "in the service")
6. (a) The terms "Service" and "in the Service" will refer to
employment with any Express Company which Wells Fargo & Company may have
acquired, or may hereafter acquire, and previous continuous service with
such Company will be counted as service with. Wells Fargo & Company when
computing the twenty-five years.
(b) Should Wells Fargo & Company acquire a Line of another
Express Company, employes on that Line, to be eligible for the pension
roll, must have rendered not less than twenty-five years of continuous
service to the two Companies, and, of this service, at least thirteen
years must have been to Wells Fargo & Company.
(Computing length of service)
7. In computing service, it shall be reckoned from the date since
which the person has been continuously in the service, to the date when
retired, eliminating in the final result any fractional part of a month.
Leave of absence, suspension, dismisals [sici ]followed by
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reinstatement (within one yearl, or temporary lay-off on account of
reduction of force, is not to be considered as a break in the continuity
of service.
Persons who leave the service thereby relinquish all claims
to the benefits of pension allowances.
(Basis of pension allowance)
8. The pension allowances authorized are upon the following
basis, subject to change however, by the Board of Directors:
For each year of service, an allowance of one per cent. of
the average regular monthly pay received for the ten years immediately
preceding date of retirement. Thus, if an employe has been in the
service for forty years, and his average salary or wages for the last
ten years was $100 per month, his pension allowance would be 40 per cent.
of $100, or $40 per month.
(Possible change of basis)
9. Should conditions arise making necessary a change in the
amount or basis of pensions allowed, the action of the Board of Directors
in establishing such change or new basis shall be absolutely conclusive.
(Allowances paid monthly)
10. When pension allowances shall be authorized, pursuant to
these regulations, they shall be paid monthly during the life of the
beneficiary: Provided, however, that the Company may withhold its
allowance in all cases of gross misconduct.
(Reports on employes attaining required age)
11. It shall be the duty of every employing officer to report
at once, to the Secretary of the Board of Pensions, all employes who in
January, February, and March, 1903, or prior thereto, shall have attained
the age of seventy years; also, all employes between the ages of sixty
and seventy years, who have served twenty-five years and become incapa-
citated; and thereafter,.at least three months in advance of the date
of retirement, all employes about to attain the requisite age for con-
sideration for pension allowances.
(Location of pensioned employes)
12. The Secretary of the Board of Pensions must keep himself
advised of the whereabouts of pensioned employes, and shall require
satisfactory evidence from each of such employes at least once a year,
and oftener if necessary, showing that he is entitled to the pension
allowance. It shall also be the duty of any official who may notice or
receive any advice of gross misconduct on the part of any pensioned
employe to promptly notify the Secretary of the Board of Pensions in
relation thereto, who will report the circumstances to the Board of
Pensions.
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(Pensions not assignable)
13. In order to preserve direct personal relations between the
Company and its retired employes, and that they may continue to enjoy
the henefit of the pension system, no assignment of pensions will be
permitted or recognized.
(Employes retired from service of the Company may engage in other
business)
14. The acceptance of a pension allowance does not debar a
retired employe from engaging in any other business which is not pre-
judicial to the interests of this Company, but he can not re-enter the
service of the Company.
(Age limit for new employes)
15. No person inexperienced in Express [or Banking*] business
over thirty-five years of age, and no person so experienced,over forty-
five years of age, shall hereafter be taken into the service: Provided,
however, that, in the discretion of the President persons may temporarily
be taken into the service irrespective of age, for a period not exceeding
six months, and that this period may be extended, if necessary, to com-
plete the work for which said persons were originally employed: Provided,
also, that with the.approval of the Board of Directors, persons may be
employed indefinitely, irrespective of age limit, where the service to
be rendered requires professional or other special qualifications.
(No right to continued employment or pension allowances conferred)
16. Neither the action of the Board of Directors in establish-
ing a system of pensions, nor any other action now or hereafter taken by
it, or by the Board of Pensions in the inauguration and operation of a
Pension Department, shall be construed as giving to any officer, agent
or employe of the Company a right to be retained in its service, or any
right or claim to any pension allowance; and the Company expressly
reserves its right and privilege to discharge at any time any officer,
agent or employe when the interest of the Company, in its judgement, may
so require, without liability for any claim for pension or other allowance
than salary or wages due and unpaid.
(Date effective)
17. These rules and regulations shall take effect January 29, 1903.
DUDLEY EVENS,
President
HOW TO SECURE A PENSION.
The applicant for a pension will secure the proper form of
*Bracketed portions were printed in the original document and thereafter
deleted by hand-in the copy I examined. There is no indication of the
date or status of these deletions.
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application from the Secretary of the Board of Pensions at San Francisco,
and, when filled out, will obtain the signature to it of his employing
officer. Th-e application should be sent to the Secretary of the Board
of Pensions. Wells Fargo & Company, San Francisco, Cal., and the action
taken thereon by the Board will be communicated to the applicant through
his employing officer.
PENSIONS--FOW COMPUTED.
The amount of pension will depend upon two conditions, viz., the
number of years the person has served the Company, and the amount of his
average regular monthly pay for the ten years next preceding retirement.
Therefore, to find the amount of the monthly allowance, first ascertain
the average regular monthly pay for the ten years next preceding the
date of proposed retirement, then find the number of years employed by
the Company, and from the final result eliminate any fractional part of a
month; thus, 26 years and six months, or 26.5 years. The number of years
of service determines the percentage to be applied to the average monthly
pay. Thus, if it is found that the average monthly pay for the ten years
next preceding the time of retirement was $80, and the years of service
26.5 the monthly pension would be 26.5 per cent of $80, or $21.20.
The following is the form that will be used by applicants for
pensions:
APPLICATION FOR PENSION.
Personal Record of Service.
I, personally, make this record of my services with Wells Fargo
& Company, and tender it as the basis for being placed on the pension
rolls of that Company:
Name (in fulll ........................................................
Date of birth (month, day, year)...............-----......-----....-
Where born .............................................................
Entered W. F. & Co.'s service (month, day, year) ........................
Where first employed .................................................. 
In what capacity then employed ..........................................
Monthly pay at date of employment .......................................
Occupation with company between first and present, if any ...............
Where no. employed .................................................... -
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In what capacity now employed ........................................
Present monthly pay ...............................................
Salary received yearly during each of the last ten years .
............ o..e...........................
If more than one position has been held, or the amount of salary
received has varied during this time, show- these facts in detail
......... 
............... 
. . .
If you left the service of this company, give time not in the service
of the Company from the date of original employment, showing
length of different periods, if there were more than one....
Remarks: (In this space give any information as to your service with
the Company that you think should be known by the Board of Pen-
sions in its investigation of your case) ........................
I hereby certify to the correctness of this record.
................. #.0.........
(Signature of Applicant.)
The above statement, to the best of my knowledge and helief, is correct.
I recommend that pension be allowed.
(Signature of Employing Officer.)
Employes sixty-one to sixty-nine years of age applying for
pensions on account of disability will be required to furnish a certificate
from their Family Physician, if they have one, such Certificate to be
approved by the nearest Wells Fargo & Company Physician.
If they have not had a Family Physician within a year, the Certi-
ficate of the Company's Physician will be sufficient.
PENSION DEPARTMENT-Wells Fargo & Company.
Permanent Disability-Certificate of Family Physician.
I have examined the person whose address is below, and hereby
certify as follows:
Name of person examined .................................................
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His Postoffice address
His occupation .................
I have known him ........ years
I have been his Family Physician
I consider him to be permanently
for .
disqu
position with the Company for
Conditions of Heart .........
Lungs .......................
Liver .......................
Stomach ......................
Bowels ......................
Kidneys .....................
Spine .......................
Sight .......................
Hearing .....................
Any facts that may be
mining this case ............
Date ........................
Address .............
usef ul t
Si
..0
...................years
. .. .years ........
alified for the duties
the following reasons:
.... ... ... ...*.....
o the Board of Pension
gned.................
of
S in
his
deter-
I am acquainted with Dr.
who signs the above Certificate, and believe him competent to give a
correct opinion in this case.
Signed .........................................................
(Physician, W. F. & Co.)
Date ...........................................................
(This blank to be used where the applicant has a Family Physician
who has known him at least one year; and is to be signed by the Company's
nearest Physician.)
PENSION DEPARTMENT.
WELLS FARGO & COMPANY.
Permanent Disability-Report of Company's Physician.
I have this day examined ......................................
who is employed by Wells Fargo & Company at ...........................
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.
.
as -----------------............ and believe him to be permanently
disabled for performing the duties of his position with the Company,
for the following reasons:
Condition of
Lungs ......
Liver ......
Stomach ....
Bowels .....
Kidneys ....
Spine ......
Sight ......
Hearing ....
Any
Hear t
.acts
mining this case
Date ....
that may be useful to the Board
.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.
0 0 0
Pensions
Signed ............................
(Physician, W. F. & Co.1
NOTE.--This report is strictly confidential between the-
Physician and the Board of Pensions, and it is hoped
that the Physician will give the Board all the informa-
tion in the case that he can, so that no injustice shall
be done to the Applicant or to the Company.
NOTE.--This blank is to be used where the Applicant has
not had a Family Physician for the last year, the Certi-
ficate of the Company's Physician being sufficient.
PERSONAL RECORD CARDS.
The Board of Pensions has determined that a personal record
shall be made and kept of every person employed by the Company who has
attained the age of fifty years or over, so that the Board may at all
times have in its possession all information required in determining the
pension status, present and future, of any person who at any time may
come within the limits of the pension system. For this purpose a
record card has been prepared and will be supplied by the Stationery
Department on regular requisition.
Should the spaces on the face of the card not give sufficient
room, the lines on the back may be used.
Two records are to be made for each person permanently in the
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in deter-of
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employ of the Company who has reached the age of fifty years or over;
they will be sent to the head of the department by whom he is employed,
who will file one in his office, and sign, and forward the other to the
Secretary of the Board of Pensions.
These record cards should be revised by the heads of departments
during the month of January of each year and new card made covering
any changes that have occurred during the past year, which should in-
clude any change in title or occupation of employes.
New record cards should also be made for those employes who have
during the year attained the age of fifty years.
The record card does not do away with the record of service
required on application for pension.
EMPLOYE'S RECORD CARD.
Wells Fargo & Company.
Will be 70 years of age........................
(Do not fill in this space.1
Name (in full) ......................................................
Date of birth (month, day, year) ....
Where born ..........................
Entered W. F. & Co.'s service (month,
Where first employed ................
In what capacity then employed ......
Monthly pay at date of employment ...
Other positions occupied in Company's
Where now employed ..................
In what capacity now employed .......
Present monthly pay .................
day, year)
service since first
.....
employment
0..........
. ........... 0
Superintendent.
............. 190...
(BACK OF RECORD CARD)
If employe left the service of the Company at any time between
his first employment and now, state the fact and give length of time
absent, and any other particulars.
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THE PRUDENTIAL OLD GUARD
Prudential Insurance Company of America
RULES AND REGULATIONS
Governing Service Retirement Allowances on
Account of Old Age
1. The plan of Service Retirement Allowances hereby established
shall apply to the entire Industrial Field force and to all the- employees
of the Home Office, including Inspectors and those employed in the
Building and Mechanical departments. The plan shall not apply to the
Officers of the Company.
2. Service Retirement Allowances shall be granted only to
employees who shall have received a stated and regular compensation,
and the plan shall not apply to the Field Employees of the Ordinary
Department whose compensation is entirely on a commission basis, nor to
Medical Examiners rendering service on the basis of fees.
3. Male employees of the character defined in the preceding
sections, who shall have attained the age of sixty-five years and who
shall have been twenty-five years or more continuously in the Company's
service, may, upon their own application or at the discretion of the
Company, be retired. All male employees on reaching the age of seventy
shall be retired.
4. Female employees of the character defined in Sections 1 and
2 who shall have attained the age of sixty years and who shall have been
twenty-five years or more continously in the Company's service, may,
upon their own application or at the discretion of the Company, be retired.
All female employees on reaching the age of sixty-five shall be retired.
5. The Service Retirement Allowance on account of age shall go
into effect as herein provided on the first day of the calendar month
following retirement.
6. In computing length of service, absence granted by the Company
to employees in exceptional cases will not be deducted unless such absence
exceeds six consecutive months.
7. Employees who leave the service of the Company shall not be
enti-tled to Retirement Allowances, and if any such employee shall be
re-employed he or she shall he considered, for the purpose of the present
plan, as a new employee, unless an exception is made on the merits of
the case by the Company. Absence from the service solely on account of
illness or injury, or by written permission of the Company, shall not be
deemed tobea break in the continuity of the service of the employee.
Source: Prudential Insurance Company of America, The Formation and Growth
of the Prudential Old Guard; Announcement of Service Retirement Allowances
on Account of Old Age, Forrest F. Dryden, President (Newark, N.J., March
1912). (Pamphlet.)
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8. The rate of Service Retirement Allowance shall be, for each
year of service rendered, one per cent. of the average annuail earnings
in wages or salary, exclusive of compensation on account of Ordinary
insurance,, new or renewed, received during the ten years of employment
preceding the retirement.
9. The computation of Service Retirement Allowances is illus-
trated in the following example: Assuming an employee to have attained
the age of sixty-five years and to have been continuously twenty-five
years in the Company's service and his average earnings for the previous
ten years of service to have been $1,440 per annum--the retirement allo-
wance would be 1.per cent. of $1,440, i.e., $14.40, multiplied by 25,
the number of years of service, or $360 per annum. If the length of
service had been thirty years, the retirement allowance for the remainder
of life would be $432 per annum, or $36 per month.
10. The minimum retirement allowance shall be $30 a month, and
the maximum $100 per month. When the retirement allowance computed as
herein provided would be less than $30 a month, it will be increased to
that amount, or if it should exceed $100 a month it will be reduced to
that amount.
11. Service Retirement Allowances will be paid monthly in advance
and will continue only during the lifetime of the retired employee, sub-
ject however to the conditions and limitations of this plan as otherwise
provided or as may be deemed necessary or advisable in the discretion
of the Company.
12. The Service Retirement Allowances provided under this plan
are solely for the benefit of the retired employees and their immediate
dependents during such employees' lifetime, and they shall in no case
be in any wise assignable to any person, persons, firm or corporation,
for any consideration whatsoever. If any assignment is made or attempted
contrary to this rule, the Service Retirement Allowance may be terminated
at the discretion of the Company.
13. The receipt or acceptance of Service Retirement Allowances,
as provided under this plan, shall terminate the payment of any other
allowance or gratuity previously granted.
14. Service Retirement Allowances may be discontinued or withheld
in the case of any retired employee guilty of misconduct or action pre-
judicial to the Company's interests or the public welfare, or both, as
determined by the Company, whose decision shall be final.
15. The plan of Service Retirement Allowances does not concede
or grant to any employee the right to be retained in the Company's service,
nor does it grant or concede any right or claim to a retirement allowance
nor to any interest, right or participation in any fund which may be set
apart for this purpose.
16. The Company expressly reserves the right to discharge at
any time any employee when in its judgment the interests of the Company
so require, and in the same manner and with the same effect as if no
plan of Service Retirement Allowances had been established.
17. The acceptance of a Service Retirement Allowance shall not
dehar any former employee from engaging in any other business, unless such-
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employment is deemed by the Company to be contrary to its interests,
in which case the continuance of the Service Retirement Allowance will
he made conditional upon the discontinuance of such employment.
18. The Company reserves to itself, unconditionally, the right
to establish at any time in the future any new or different plan of
Service Retirement Allowances, or to alter the rate of such allowances,
or to discontinue the plan in its entirety. Should such modification or
discontinuance be decided upon, thirty days' notice will he mailed to
all the beneficiaries in receipt of Service Retirement Allowances.
19. The Company's records concerning an employee's length of
service and his or her average earnings in salary or wages shall he
conclusive and final for all the objects and purposes set forth in
this plan of Service Retirement Allowances.
20. The entire cost of this plan will be paid by the Company,
and no contributions whatsoever will be required of the employees. The
plan is not intended to provide for full support in old age, but is
established to provide in a systematic manner a reasonable amount of
pecuniary assistance to deserving employees.
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UNITED STATES STEEL AND CARNEGIE PENSION FUND
I. ANNOUNCEMENT by E. H. GARY, CHAIRMAN UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION
Plans have now been consummated to begin on January 1, 1911, to
pay pensions from the United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund,
which- was established last spring by the joint action of the United
States Steel corporation and Andrew Carnegie. This Fund was established
for the purpose of paying old-age pensions from the income of the Fund
to employees of the United States Steel Corporation and its subsidiary
companies. For this purpose the United States Steel Corporation provided
eight million dollars, which, with the Carnegie Relief Fund of four
million dollars created by Andrew Carnegie on March 12, 1901, makes up
a joint fund of twelve million dollars. This Pension Fund is administered
by a Board of twelve Trustees, through a Manager appointed by the Board,
with such powers and duties as may be given him by the Board.
The Board of Trustees has adopted Pension Rules for the adminis-
tration of this Fund, to take effect on January 1, 1911, and apply to
persons who are in the service of the United States Steel Corporation
and its subsidiary companies on and after that date.
Under the Pension Rules three classes of pensions are provided:
First: Pensions by compulsory retirement, granted to employees
who have been twenty years or longer in the service and have reached
the age of seventy years for men and sixty years for women.
Second: Pensions by retirement at request, granted to employees
who have been twenty years or longer in the service and have reached the
age of sixty years for men and fifty years for women.
Third: Pensions for permanent incapacity, granted to employees
who have been twenty years or longer in the service and have become per-
manently totally incapacitated through no fault of their own.
The monthly pensions to be paid from the income of the fund
will be made up on the following basis: For each year of service one
percent of the average regular monthly pay received during the last ten
years of service; provided, however, that no pension shall be more than
one hundred dollars a month or less than twelve dollars a month. For
example,--an employee who has been twenty-five years in the service and
has received an average monthly pay of sixty dollars a month, will receive
a pension allowance of fifteen dollars a month.
This Pension Fund provides for the support of faithful employees
in their old age. It is entirely separate and distinct from the Voluntary
Accident Relief Plan put into operation by the United States Steel Corpora-
tion on May 1, 1910, which provides for employees who may be injured
and the families of employees who may be killed while at work in the
service of the subsidiary companies of the United States Steel Corporation.
Neither the Voluntary Accident Relief Plan nor the United States
Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund involves any contribution from the men
themselves toward the accident relief or old age pensions.
Source: Paul Underwood Kellogg, ed., The Pittsburgh Survey, 6 vols. (New
York: Charities Publication Committee, 1910; reprint ed., New York: Arno
Press and the New York Times, 1969), vol. 3: The Steel Workers, by John
A. Fitch, pp. 336-40.
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II. UNITED STATES STEEL AND CARNEGIE PENSION FUND
The United States Steel and Carnegie Pension Fund was established
in the year 1910 by the joint action of the United States Steel Corpora-
tion and Andrew Carnegie. Its purpose is the payment to employees of
old age pensions from the income of the Fund. For this purpose the
United States Steel Corporation provided $8,000,000, which, with the
Carnegie Relief Fund of $4,000,000 created by Andrew Carnegie on March
12, 1901, makes up a joint fund of $12,000,000. This Pension Fund is
administered by a Board of twelve Trustees, through a Manager appointed
by the Board with such powers and duties as may be given him by the
Board. The Pension Rules are established by resolution of the Board
of Trustees.
PENSION RULES
Who May Obtain Pensions
1. Employees of the United States Steel Corporation or of any
other corporation a majority of whose capital stock is owned or controlled
by the United States Steel Corporation, or of the Board of Trustees of
this Pension Fund, may obtain pensions under the following conditions:
FIRST.--Pensions by Compulsory Retirement.
2. All men who have been twenty (20) years or longer in the
service and have reached the age of seventy C70) years shall be retired
and pensioned.
3. All women who have been twenty (20) years or longer in the
service and have reached the age of sixty (60) years shall be retired
and pensioned.
4. At the request of their employing officers persons employed
in executive or administrative positions may be allowed to continue
in active service after reaching the ages mentioned above.
SECOND.--Pensions by Retirement at Request.
5. Any man who has been twenty (20) years or longer in the
service and has reached the age of sixty (60) years may be retired and
pensioned either at his own request or at the request of his employing
officer.
6. Any woman who has been twenty (20) years or longer in the
service and has reached the age of fifty (50) years may be retired
and pensioned either at her own request or at the request of her employing
officer.
THIRD.--Pensions for Permanent Incapacity.
7. Any employee who has been twenty (20) years or longer in the
service and has become permanently totally incapacitated through no fault
of his or her own as a result of sickness, or injuries received while not
on duty, may be pensioned at the discretion of the Board of Trustees.
224
Amount of Pensions
8. The monthly pensions to be paid will be made up on the follow-
ing basis subject to the provisions of section 27:
For each year of service one per cent (1%) of the average
regular monthlypay received during the last ten years of service.
ILLUSTRATION.--An employee who has been twenty-five (25)
years in the service and has received an average regular monthly pay of
sixty dollars ($60) a month will receive a pension allowance of twenty-
five per cent (25%) of sixty dollars ($60) or fifteen dollars ($15) a
month.
9. No pension granted shall be more than one hundred dollars
($100) a month or less than twelve dollars ($12) a month.
How to Obtain Pensions
Pensions by Compulsory Retirement
10. Employing officers will report to the Manager of the Fund
the name of every man who has been twenty (20) years or longer in the
service and has reached the age of seventy (70) years, and of every
woman who has been twenty (20) years or longer in the service. and has
reached the age of sixty (60) years. These reports will be sent to the
president of the company concerned for his approval.
Pensions by Retirement at Request
11. Any man who has been twenty (20) years or longer in the
service and has reached the age of sixty (60) years, and any woman who
has been twenty (20) years or longer in the service and has reached
the age of fifty (50) years, who wishes to be retired and pensioned,
should notify his or her employing officer.
12. Any employing officer who wishes to retire an employee who
has reached the age and has had the length of service fixed for retirement
by request must notify such employee and report to the Manager of the
Fund the request that such employee be retired and pensioned. These
requests whether from an employee or an employing officer will be sent
to the president of the company concerned for his approval.
Pensions for Permanent Incapacity
13. Any employee who has served twenty (20) years and who is
permanently totally incapacitated through no fault of his or her own as
a result of sickness, or injuries received while not on duty, may notify
his or her employing officer and apply for a pension. Every such appli-
cation will be sent by the employing officer to the president of the
company concerned for his approval. In every such case it must be shown
to the satisfaction of the Board of Trustees by physical examination that
the -employee applying for a pension is permanently totally incapacitated
to earn a livelihood.
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General Regulations
14. Pensions from the Fund will be paid only to those employees
who have given their entire time to the service of corporations included
under the provisions of the Fund.
15. The acceptance of a pension from the Fund shall not bar any
former employee from engaging in other business so long as such other
business is not of the same character as the former employment. No
employee receiving a pension may re-enter the service.
16. Length of service shall be reckoned from the date since which
the employee has been continuously in the service to the date when retired,
and a part of a year if less than a half shall not be counted, if more
than a half it shall be counted as a full year.
17. Leave of absence, suspension, temporary lay-off on account
of reduction in force, or disability shall not be considered as breaks
in the continuity of service, and time thus lost shall not be deducted
in reckoning the length of service.
18. Dismissal or voluntarily leaving the service followed by
reinstatement within two years shall not be considered as breaks in the
continuity of service, but the time thus lost shall be deducted in reckon-
ing the length of service.
19. The Board of Trustees shall fix the date, in each case, upon
which the pensions shall begin.
20. Pensions shall be paid monthly at the close of each month,
unless revoked by the Board, and shall terminate with payment for the
month succeeding that in which the death of the employee occurs.
21. Whenever the terms "service" and "in the service" are used
in these rules they mean employment by the United States Steel Corporation,
by one or more corporations a majority of whose stock is owned or con-
trolled by the United States Steel Corporation, by their predecessors,
or by the Board of Trustees of this Fund.
22. Pensions may be withheld or terminated in case of misconduct
on the part of the beneficiaries or for other cause sufficient in the
judgment of the Board of Trustees to warrant such action.
23. In order that direct personal relations with retired employees
may be preserved and that such employees may continue to enjoy the bene-
fits of pensions granted them, no assignment of pensions will be permitted
or recognized under any circumstances; neither shall pensions he subject
to attachment or other legal process for debts of the beneficiaries.
24. This Pension Plan is a purely voluntary provision for the
benefit of employees superannuated or totally incapacitated after long
and faithful service and constitutes no contract and confers no legal
rights upon any employee.
25. The Manager of the Fund shall decide all questions arising
out of the administration of the Fund and relating to employees, subject
to a right of appeal to the Board of Trustees within thirty (30) days
after notice to the persons interested of the Manager's decision. The
action of the Board of Trustees or of any committee designated by the
Board tohear such appeals shall be final and conclusive.
26. Neither the creation of this Fund nor any other action at
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any time taken by any corporation included under the provisions of the
Fund or by the. Board of Trustees shall give to any employee a right to
be retained in the service, and all employees remain subject to discharge
to the same extent as if this Pension Fund had never been created.
27. Whenever it may be found that the basis named for pensions
shall create total demands in excess of the annual income increased by
any surplus deemed applicable by the Board of Trustees, a new basis may
be adopted reducing the pensions theretofore or thereafter granted so
as to bring the total expenditures within the limitations fixed by the
Board of Trustees. Notice of such new basis shall be given before the
beginning of the year in which it may be decided to put the same into
effect. These Pension Rules may be changed by the Board of Trustees at
its discretion.
28. An annual report giving an account of the Fund and its adminis-
tration will be made as soon after the first of each year as practicable,
and copies of such report will be posted at all mills, mines, railroads,
shops and other works and published in such newspapers as may be desig-
nated by the Board of Trustees.
By order of the Board of Trustees, these Rules for the administra-
tion of this Fund shall take effect on January 1, 1911, and shall apply
to those who are in the service on and after that date.
III. OFFICERS OF THE UNITED STATES STEEL AND CARNEGIE PENSION FUND
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SWIFT & COMPANY PENSION FUND
For the purpose of making provision for faithful
employes, Swift & Company has adopted the following Pension plan:
ONE
Fund The Fund shall be known as "Swift & Company Pension Fund."
TWO
Pension Board
The Fund shall be administered by the Board, which shall
consist of five members who shall be officers or employes of
the Company.
The members of the Board shall be appointed annually by the
Directors to serve one year and until their successors shall be
appointed.
The Board shall. elect of its members, a Chairman and a
Secretary. The Treasurer of the Company shall be ex-officio
Treasurer of the Fund.
The Board, subject to the approval of the Directors may
make and enforce such rules as it may deem advisable for the
efficient administration of the Fund.
A majority of the Board shall constitute a quorum for all
purposes connected with the administration of the Fund under
the rules.
THREE
Pension Fund
The Fund created by the Company is Two Million dollars
($2,000,000) and such additional contributions as may be made
by the Company from time to time. The Fund shall be invested
in interest bearing securities approved by the Board.
FOUR
Those Eligible
Employes of the Company or of its subsidiary corporations
Source: Swift & Company Pension Fund (Chicago, 1916).
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will be eligible under the following conditions:
Service and Age--Males
(A) At the discretion of the Board male employes who have
been in the service continuously for twenty-five C25) years or
longer and have attained the age of sixty (60) years may be
pensioned.
Male employes who have been in the service continuously
for twenty-five (25) years or longer and have attained the age
of sixty-five (65) years shall be pensioned.
Service and Age--Females
(B) At the discretion of the Board female employes who
have been in the service continuously for twenty-five (25)
years or longer and have attained the age of fifty (50) years
may be pensioned.
Female employes who have been in the service continuously
for twenty-five (25) years or longer and have attained the age
of fifty-five (55) years shall be pensioned.
Disability
(C) An employe who has been in the service continuously
for fifteen (15) years or longer up to twenty-five (25) years
and is permanently incapacitated for work through no fault of
his or her own may be pensioned at the discretion of the Board.
0D) An employe who has been in the service continuously
for twenty-five (25) years or longer and is permanently
incapacitated for work through no fault of his or her own may
be pensioned at the discretion of the Board.
Age Restriction
(E) Employes who were over forty (40) years of age at the
time of entering the service shall not be eligible for a pension.
FIVE
Pension--How Computed
The pension of employes regularly retired on account of age
and length of service under Clauses Four A (4A) and Four B (4B)
and of employes retired on account of permanent incapacity for
work prior to attaining the age of retirement under Clause Four
D (4D), shall be one-half C1/2) of the average annual salary
or wage for the five (5) years preceding retirement.
The pension of employes retired on account of permanent
incapacity for work prior to reaching the age of retirement
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under Clause Four C (4C), shall be computed on the basis of one
and one half percent Cl 1/2 %) of the average annual salary or
wage for the five (5) years preceding retirement for each- year
of continuous service.
Maximum and Minimum Pension
In no case shall the pension exceed fifty percent (50%) of
such average salary or wage, nor shall the maximum pension be
more than Five Thousand dollars ($5,000) per year, nor shall
the minimum pension be less than Two Hundred and Forty dollars
($240) per year.
SIX
Dependents of Deceased Employes
The widow, (or if no widow, then the children under eighteen (18)
years of age and unmarried)of an employe whose term of service
has been fifteen (15) years or more up to twenty-five (25)
years and who was in the service of the Company at the time of
his death may receive a pension equal to three-quarters (3/4)
of one percent (1%) of the average annual salary or wage of the
husband (or father) for the five (5) years prior to his death
for each year of continuous service.
If the employe had been in the service continuously for
twenty-five (25) years or more such pension shall be one quarter
(1/4) of the average annual salary or wage of the husband (or
father) for the five (5) years prior to his death.
In no-- case shall the pension exceed twenty-five percent
(25%) of such average salary or wage, nor shall the maximum
pension be more than Twenty-five Hundred dollars ($2,500) per
year.
Re-marriage of Widow
Upon the re-marriage of the widow her pension shall cease,
but one-half (1/2) of her pension may be paid to the children
of the deceased employe if there be any under eighteen (18)
years of age and unmarried.
Death of Widow
Upon her decease, the widow not having remarried, her pension
may be paid to the children of the deceased employe if there be
any under eighteen (18) years of age and unmarried.
As each child attains the age of eighteen (_18) years or
marries, his or her interest in the pension shall terminate.
The Board at its discretion may at any time during the
continuation of the pension, increase or decrease the amount
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to be paid to dependents of deceased employes as may seem
equitable under the circumstances of each case..
SEVEN
Dependents of Deceased Pensioner
The widow (or if no widow, then the children under eighteen
(18) years of age and unmarried) of a deceased male pensioner
shall be allowed one-half (1/2) of the pension of the husband
(or father).
Re-marriage of Widow
Upon the remarriage of the widow her pension shall cease
but one-half (1/2) of the pension paid her may be paid, to
the children of the deceased pensioner, if there be any under
eighteen (18) years of age and unmarried.
Death of Widow
Upon her decease, the widow not having remarried, her pension
may be paid to the children of the deceased pensioner if there
be any under eighteen (18) years of age and unmarried.
As each child attains the age of eighteen (18) years or
marries, his or her share in the pension shall terminate.
The Board at its discretion may at any time during the con-
tinuation of the pension, increase or decrease the amount to be
paid to dependents of deceased pensioners as may seem equitable
under the circumstances of each case.
EIGHT
Service
(A) The terms "service" and "in the service" apply to all
employes of the Company or of its subsidiary corporations. The
term of service shall be computed from the date of employment
by the Company or by its subsidiary corporations.
Employes Under 21 Years of Age
(B) In the case of employes who entered the service before
attaining the age of twenty-one (21) years, the service records
for computing pensions shall commence at the time the employe
attains such age.
Employes of National Packing Company
(C) Employes of the National Packing Company and employes
of its subsidiary corporations, who were employed by the Company
or any of its subsidiary corporations at the time of the dis-
solution of the National Packing Company (July 27, 1912), shall
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he allowed service credit from the time of entering the employ
of the National Packing Company or of its subsidiary corporations.
NINE
When Widow is not Entitled to Pension
The widow of an employe who shall have married him after he
reached the age of fifty (50) years, or the widow of a pensioner
who shall have married him after he was pensioned, or their
children, shall not be entitled to a pension.
TEN
Assignment of Pensions
No pension paid under this plan is assignable, nor shall
pensions be subject to attachment or other legal process for
debts of beneficiaries.
ELEVEN
Cancellation of Pensions
Pensions may be suspended or terminated in case of miscon-
duct on the part of the beneficiaries or for other cause
sufficient in the judgment of the Board to warrant such action.
The Board may at its discretion reinstate the pension of any
person whose pension shall have been so suspended or terminated.
TWELVE
Employment of Pensioner
The acceptance of a pension shall not bar any former employe
from engaging in business provided it is not of the same charac-
ter as the business of the Company nor in any way detrimental
to its interests.
THIRTEEN
Amendments to Rules
The Board, subject to the approval of the Directors may
alter, add to or amend any rule or regulation governing pensions.
FOURTEEN
No Contractual Rights Conferred
The establishment of this pension plan is intended only to
declare the present policy of the Company and to give authority
and instructions to the officers of the Company to carry out
such policy and neither the establishment of this plan nor the
granting of a pension, nor any other action now or hereafter
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taken by the Board, or by the officers. of the Company, shall be
held or construed to create a contract or to give to any officer,
agent or employe a right to be retained in the service, or any
right to any pension allowance and the Company expressly reserves,
unaffected hereby, its right to discharge without liability,
other than for salary or wages due and unpaid, any employe when-
ever the interest of the Company may in its judgment so require.
FIFTEEN
Health Report of Pensioner--Account of Disability
Male employes who have been pensioned before attaining the
age of sixty (60) years and female employes who have been pen-
sioned before attaining the age of fifty (50) years, on account
of permanent total disability, shall on the 30th of December of
each year furnish the Board a certificate from a reputable
physician as to the state of his or her health. at that time.
SIXTEEN
Re-Employment
A pensioner on account of disability, may be required to
re-enter active service of the Company if in the judgement of
the Board the condition of his or her health warrants such action
and in the event of his or her failure to do so upon proper
notice, his or her pension may be suspended or terminated.
SEVENTEEN
Definition of Terms
Wherever in this plan the following words occur without
qualifications, they shall have the meaning herein given:
"Directors" shall mean the Board of Directors of Swift &
Company, or of its successors or assigns. "Board" shall mean
the Pension Board formed for the purpose of carrying out the
provisions of this plan.
"Fund" shall mean the Pension Fund established under the con-
ditions of this plan. "Company" shall mean Swift & Company, its
successors or assigns. "Employes" shall mean officers and
employes of Swift & Company or of its subsidiary corporations.
EIGHTEEN
Retirement of Officers
The provisions of Clause Four A (4A) as to the retiring
age shall not be mandatory in the case of officers of the Company
or of its subsidiary corporations.
234
NINETEEN
Demands in Excess of Income
Whenever it may be found that the basis named for pensions
shall create total liabilities in excess of the annual income
of the fund increased by such additional contributions as may
be made by the Company from time to time, a new basis may be
adopted reducing the pensions theretofore or thereafter granted
so as to bring the total expenditure within the limitations
fixed by the Directors. Notice of such new basis shall be
given before the beginning of the year in which it may be
decided to put the same into effect.
TWENTY
Enactment of Pension Laws
In case any benefit or pension shall be payable under the
laws now in force or hereafter enacted, of any State or Country,
to any employe of the Company or his or her beneficiaries under
such laws, the excess only, if any, of the amount prescribed
in this plan, above the amount of such benefit or pension pre-
scribed by law, shall be the benefit or pension payable under
this plan.
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WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC ANNUITY PLAN
Trusteed Plan
The Westinghouse Electric & l1anufacturing Company (hereinafter
called the "Company") has adopted a new Retirement System, constructed
on a scientific reserve basis, which provides for voluntary co-operation
of employees, and is contractual so as to be dependable as long as the
Plan remains in force. The plan is called the "Westinghouse Electric
Annuity Plan."
For the purpose of administering the funds and operating the
Plan, the Company, by an Indenture of Trust, has created a Trust, into
which it has deposited certain sums and annually will deposit additional
sums, actuarially calculated to be sufficient to pay at maturity the
Service Annuity Units, which the Company causes to be issued to the
employees by the Trustees hereinafter mentioned, in accordance with the
Plan. All sums deposited by the Company with the Trustees shall con-
stitute a separate trust fund to be used only for purposes specified
in the Indenture of Trust.
The employees have the privilege of buying, under advantageous
terms, annuities for themselves from the Equitable Life Assurance Society
of the United States (hereinafter called the "Insurance Company").
Administration
By the Indenture of Trust, the trusteeship is vested in five
Trustees, who are authorized to administer and operate the Trust and the
Plan.
Service Annuities
A Service Annuity Unit is one unit of retirement income and yields
one dollar ($1) per month beginning at normal retirement age and contin-
Source: Westinghouse Electric Annuity Plan C1929). This plan superseded
the company's original plan established in 1914. In a letter introducing
the new plan to employees, the company-s president wrote,
This pension system 11914] has now been superseded, and
in its place we present the Westinghouse Electric Annui-
ty Plan, established on an actuarial reserve basis, and
with a feature included through which any employee may
secure additional retirement income by making contribu-
tory payments distributed throughout his employment
period. (Westinghouse Electric Annuity Plan, 1929, p. 2.)
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uing for life.
Company Anniuty Units
As a reward for length of service and as its share towards an
employee's retirement income, the Company will cause the Trustees to
issue to him, for each year of service to normal retirement age, except
the first year, from one to six Service Annuity Units according to his
salary class, which only mature if the holder of these Units continues
in the Company's employ until normal retirement age. The Service Annuity
Units the Company provides are called "Company Annuity Units" and cer-
tificates will be issued to employees therefor.
Salary Classification
The salary classes into which the employees are classified and
the number of Company Annuity Units the Company will provide for each
year of service, are as follows:
Number of Number of
Company Company
Salary Annuity Salary Annuity
Class Yearly Wages Units Class Yearly Wages Units
A $1500 & under 1 F $3901--$4500 3 1/2
B $1501--$2100 1 1/2 G $4501--$5100 4
C $2101--2700 2 H $5101--$6300 4 1/2
D $2701-$3300 2 1/2 T $6301--$7500 5
E $3301-$3900 3 J $7501 & over 6
Employee Annuity Units
Each employee is given the privilege of buying, each year,
from the Insurance Company, at the rates hereinafter specified, Service
Annuity Units (hereinafter referred to as "Employee Annuity Units").
The Insurance Company will issue certificates to the employees
covering the Employee Annuity Units which the employees buy for themselves.
The specified income under an Employee Annuity Unit is the same
as the income under a Company Annuity Unit, but th-ere are certain provisions
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applicable only to the Employee Annuity Units, viz.:
(l) In case an employee- dies or ceases. to be employed by the
Company prior to reaching retirement age, the full amount
paid by him for an Employee Annuity Unit is returned with
compound interest at the rate of 3 1/2 % per annum (interest
being credited at the end of the completed year during which
payments have been made, on payments and accrued interest on
hand at the end of the preceding year), less a cancellation
charge of 3 1/2 % for any employee who withdraws within
two years after the purchase of his first Employee Annuity
Unit. There will be no cancellation charge for any employee
who withdraws more than two years after he has purchased
his first Employee Annuity Unit;
(2) In case an employee ceases to be employed by the Company
prior to reaching retirement age, in lieu of the cash pay-
ment above referred to, he may elect to receive a paid-up
annuity beginning at the normal retirement age;
(3) The income from Employee Annuity Units may be larger than
the specified amount, because of extra interest earned by
the Insurance Company;
(4) An employee, upon reaching retirement age, may elect to
obtain in lieu of the annuity purchased by him under the
Plan, the following forms of annuity for an amount, the
mathematical equivalent of the amount of the annuity pur-
chased under the Plan, viz.:
Ca) Refund Annuity form--guaranteeing payments until an
amount equal to the death or withdrawal benefits at
time of retirement has been disbursed; or
(b) Joint and Survivor Annuity form--guaranteeing continua-
tion of payments as long as either pensioner or named
beneficiary lives.
Bonus Units
Every employee who buys in any annuity year after the effective
date of this Plan, Employee Annuity Units to a number not less than the
scheduled number of Company Annuity Units that the Company provides for
him for said year will receive, as a bonus from the Trustees, one-fourth
of a Company Annuity Unit for each Company Annuity Unit the Company
provides for him for said year, excluding the bonus units and reckoning
only future service and not past service.
238
Eligibility
All employees, both men and women, who on May 1, 1929 were under
70 years of age, are eligible to participate in the Plan after a waiting
period of one year. In determining the number of Company Annuity Units
an employee is entitled to receive, this waiting period is not counted.
Normal Retirement Age
The transition from the present retirement age, which is 70,
to the desired normal retirement age, which is 65, will be gradual.
Normal Retirement age is:
70 years for employees who on May 1, 1929, were 65 to 69 years inclusive
69 years for employees who on May 1, 1929, were 60 to 64 years inclusive
68 years for employees who on May 1, 1929, were 55 to 59 years inclusive
67 years for employees who on May 1, 1929, were 50 to 54 years inclusive
66 years for employees who on May 1, 1929, were 45 to 49 years inclusive
65 years for employees who on May 1, 1929, were 44 years and under.
What an Employee Pays
He makes monthly deposits, and completes the purchase of Employee
Annuity Units each year. After his first monthly deposit, an employee
receives an Employee Annuity Certificate as evidence of his participation
in the purchase of Employee Annuity Units. After he has completed
payment for the first Employee Annuity Units he has purchased or at the
end of his first deposit year, the employee receives an Employee Annuity
Unit Record Slip, and, annually thereafter, cumulative Record Slips evi-
dencing the subsequent purchases by him of additional Employee Annuity
Units, completing the transaction each year. The employee pays for the
Employee Annuity Units he purchases at the rate for his age at nearest
birthday at the beginning of each annuity year.
The rates per Employee Annuity Unit are the Group Annuity rates
of the Insurance Company. The monthly deposits, required of men and
women to purchase an Employee Annuity Unit, yielding a monthly income of
One Dollar ($1.00) beginning at retirement age, are as follows: [see fol-
lowing pages]
The rates are subject to change. Any change in the rates would,
of course, apply only to Employee Annuity Units purchased after the
date of such change. The Insurance Company guarantees that these rates
will not be increased with respect to Employee Annuity Units which might
be purchased by employees entering the Plan during the five year period
dating from the Register date of the Contract with the Insurance Company.
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Retirement Age 65
Attained Men Women Attained Men Women
Age Age
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
$1.86
1.93
2.01
2. Q9
2.17
2.26
2.35
2.44
2.54
2.64
2.75
2.86
2.97
3.09
3.22
3.35
3.48
3.62
3.76
3.91
4.07
4.23
4.40
4.58
4.76
$2.11
2.20.
2.29-
2.38
2.47
2.57
2.67
2.78
2.89-
3.01
3.13
3.25
3.38
3.52
3.66
3.81
3.9-6
4.12
4.28
4.45
4.63
4.82
5.01
5.21
5.42
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59,
60
61
62
63
64
$4.95
5.15
5.36
5.57
5.79
6.03
6.27
6.52
6.78
7.05
7.33
7.58
7.80
8.02
8.26
8.49
8.74
9.0 0
9.26
9.56
$5.64
5.86
6.10
6.34
6.59
6.86
7.13
7.42
7.71
8.0.2
8.30
8.53
8.78
9.03
9.29
9.56
9.84
10.13
10.43
10.72
Employees' Deposits
An employee makes an application for the number of Employee
Annuity Units he wishes to purchase and in his application authorizes
and requests the Company to deduct from his wages the amount required to
pay for said Employee Annuity Units and to deposit the same with. the
Insurance Company.
What an Employee Receives
He receives from the Company, without cost, the number of Company
Annuity Units stated in the schedule. He can buy Employee Annuity Units
from the Insurance Company, and if he buys as many Employee Annuity Units
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Retirement Age 66
Attained Men Women Attained Men Women
Age Age
45 $4.60 $5.25 55 $6.81 $7.78
46 4.76 5.46 56 7.08 8.04
47 4.98 5.68 57 7.37 8.27
48 5.17 5.91 58 7.62 8.51
49 5.38 6.15 59- 7.83 8.76
50 5.60 6.39- 60 8.06 9.01
51 5.82 6.65 61 8.29 9.27
52 6.05 6.91 62 8.53 9.54
53 6.30 7.19 63 8.78 9.82
54 6.55 7.48 64 9.04 10.11
65 9.29 10.40
Retirement Age 68
Attained Men Women Attained Men Women
Age Age
55 $5.88 $6.74 60 $7.11 $7.98
56 6.11 7.01 61 7.32 8.21
57 6.36 7.29 62 7.53 8.45
58 6.61 7.54 63 7.74 8.69
59 6.88 7.76 64 7.97 8.95
65 8.20 9.21
66 8.44 9.48
67 8.69 9.78
for himself as the number of Company Annuity Units, excluding Bonus Units,
the Company provides for him, he receives extra Company Annuity Units
as a bonus, reckoning only future service- and not past service.
For example: He is 34 years old; he is in Class A; his wage is
$100 per month. The Company gives him one Company Annuity Unit per year
for 30 years, not counting his first year of service. If he buys one
Employee Annuity Unit per year for himself, he gets 7 1/2 Company Annuity
Units extra as bonus. Thus at the age of 65 he will have 67 1/2 Units,
which will yield him a life income of $67.50 per month. If he should
buy up to 30 more Employee Annuity Units, this would make his monthly
income for life $97.50. Any employee can easily count how many Company
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Retirement Age 67*
Attained Men Women Attained Men Women
Age Age
50 $5.30 $5.95 60 $7.56 $8.48
51 5.40 6.19 61 7.78 8.73
52 5.62 6.44 62 8.Q1 8.98
53 5.85 6.70 63 8.24 9.25
54 6.08 6.97 64 8.48 9.52
55 6.32 7.24 65 8.73 9.80,
56 6.57 7.53 66 8.98 10.09
57 6.84 7.79
58 7.11 8.01
59- 7.35 8.24
Retirement Age 69
Attained Men Women Attained Men Women
Age Age
60 $6.65 $7.58 65 $7.70 $8.74
61 6.87 7.80 66 7.93 9.00
62 7.07 8.02 67 8.16 9.26
63 7.27 8.26 68 8.40 9.51
64 7.48 8.49
Units his schedule entitles.
into higher salary classes,
creases.
him to receive. Of course, if he advances
the number of his Company Annuity Units in-
If Employees Die or Leave the Service
If an employee dies or ceases to be an employee before retirement
age, the full amount he paid for his Employee Annuity Units, plus 3 1/2 %
interest, compounded, less cancellation charges, if any, is returned to
him or to his estate, and the Company Annuity Units he has received from
the Company are automatically cancelled.
*These figures are correct. The tables for ages 67 and 68 are merely
out of order as a result of this transcription.
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Retirement Age 70
Attained Men Women
Age
65 $7.23 $8.21
66 7.44 8.44
67 7.65 8.69
68 7.88 8.95
69 8.11 9.20
The company reserves the right to dispense with the services of
an employee at any time, but if the Company finds it necessary, or desir-
able, to dispense with the services of an employee who has been con-
tinuously employed for twenty-five years or more, and who has not yet
reached the retirement age, the Company will continue in force the Company
Annuity Units held by the employee so that upon reaching the retirement
age he may receive the annuities represented by his Company Annuity Units.
Continuous Service
If an employee leaves or is discharged and re-enters the service,
the years prior to re-entry are not counted as continuous service, except
absence due to involuntary separation from the service not exceeding one
year, in which event the period of absence is deducted, but prior service
counts to his credit.
Temporary Absences
Temporary absence is any time during which an employee, though
still in the employ of the Company, is not receiving wages, salary or
relief benefits. No time less than one month shall be considered an
absence.
In the event of temporary absence, Company Annuity Units will be
issued pro rata, dependent upon the length of active service during the
annuity year, and the employee will receive such number of Company Annuity
Units which, with fractional Units, if any (to be issued only in fractions
of one-quarter of a Unit or multiples thereof) will be an amount nearest
to the exact proportion of which he is entitled.
Employee Annuity Units for which application has been made are
scheduled to be paid for within the same annuity year. If absence pre-
vents continuous regular payments, an adjustment will be made by issuing
a fractional Unit.
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When Income Begins.
All Service Annuity Units, both Company and Employee, mature and
income from them begins at normal retirement age, at which-age employees
automatically retire.
This rule may he suspended by special action, if an employee's
retirement is brought up for review by the officers of the Company,
who will decide whether it will be to the mutual advantage of the Com-
pany and the employee for him to retire or continue at work. If he
continues in service, it is under a new-wage contract, taking into
consideration the retirement income from the Company Annuity Units.
This rule likewise may be suspended by special action and an
employee brought up for review previous to his scheduled retirement age.
If he is retired earlier than his regular retirement age, the annuity
income from his Company and Employee Annuity Units will be the amount
which is the actuarial equivalent for retirement at his then age.
When Company Certificates Are Issued
During the first year after thePlan starts, certificates for
Company Annuity Units will be issued covering past years of service
based on salary classifications as shown by past salary records, and
annually there-after covering current service. An employee receives
his certificates in the month which marks the anniversary of his entrance
into the service. For example, if his service started in April, his
annuity year runs from April to April, and his certificates will be
issued in April of each year.
Joint and Survivor Annuities
When Units mature an employee has the option of converting the
Company Annuity Units he gets from the Company and the Employee Annuity
Units he buys for himself, respectively, into a Joint and Survivor
Annuity, so that after he dies, income will continue to his widow as
long as she may live. He does this by taking a less amount of income.
The same privilege is available to women employees. The amount of income
on the joint plan depends upon the difference in age of the husband and
wife.
Assignments
No assignment of any right in an employee's annuity income will
be valid or recognized by the Trustees or by the Insurance Company.
If Annuitant Is Incompetent
In case of incompetency or inability of the employee to handle
his own affairs, payment on Company Annuity Units may be made, for the
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use and benefit of the employee, to some member of the employee's family
or other persons selected by the Trustees.
Annuities and Workmen's Compensation
The amount payable on Company Annuity Units to a retired employee
for any month may be reduced by any payment made to him by the Company
in such month under the provisions of any Workmen's Compensation Law.
Pension Laws
If the Federal Government, or any state or county in which the
Company operates has or shall have in the future a pension law, to the
support of which the Company contributes, the amounts payable under
Company Annuity Units to any employee shall be only the amount, if any,
by which the amounts payable under said Company Annuity Units shall from
time to time exceed the amount payable to such employee under such law.
Guarantee
The Company guarantees the payment by the Trustees, in accordance
with the terms and provisions of this Plan, of all Company Annuity Units
issued under the Plan by the Trustees.
The New Plan and the Old
This new Service Annuity Plan replaces the old pension plan and
applies to all employees who on May 1, 1929 were under 70 years of age.
It provides on the average approximately the same annuity benefits and
it gradually reduces retirement age from 70 to 65 years; adds the security
of a Reserve Fund, and offers employees the opportunity to purchase
annuities themselves.
Present Pensioners
All pensions awarded under the old Plan will be paid by the Trus-
tees of the new Plan out of a reserve fund provided for this purpose.
Interpretation
The Trustees' interpretation of this Plan and of the rules and
regulations thereof and of the Indenture of Trust shall be final and
conclusive upon all parties.
The Plan's Future
The Company not only desires but expects the new Plan to be per-
manent but,the Company reserves the right to modify the Plan or withdraw
from the Plan and discontinue or suspend the distribution of Units in
the future, just as any employee has the right to stop buying Units for
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himself. However, all the Company Annuity Units issued up to the time
of such action will be honored at maturity. If conditions compel the
Company's withdrawal temporarily or. permanently, it may he possible to
make an arrangement with the Inaurance Company for the. continuance. of
the Plan with. respect to annuities- purchased by employees.
Reward for Service
The Company considers the Service Annuities as a reward for
long and loyal service, and expresses its appreciation in this form.
The Company trusts that the employees will co-operate to increase their
retirement income by buying annuities for themselves.
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